Abstract
We introduce two new concepts of strategy-proofness for social choice correspondences based on the theory of preferences over sets of alternatives under complete uncertainty. One is based on Pattanaik and Peleg (Soc Choice Welf 1:113–122, 1984) and the other is based on Bossert et al. (Econ Theory 16:295–312, 2000). We prove that there is no social choice correspondence satisfying anonymity, neutrality, a range condition, and either of our concepts of strategy-proofness.
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An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0304-1
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Sato, S. On strategy-proof social choice correspondences. Soc Choice Welfare 31, 331–343 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0285-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0285-5