Abstract
The lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering is an important and widely used tool in social choice theory. We provide an axiomatization of it by means of five axioms. When the basic ordering is linear the following four (independent) axioms are sufficient: (1) Gärdenfors principle; (2) Neutrality; (3) Strong Fishburn monotonicity; and (4) Extension. Our result may also have applications in the theory of individual choice under uncertainty.
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Pattanaik, P.K., Peleg, B. An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set. Soc Choice Welfare 1, 113–122 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00452883
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00452883