Abstract.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a more straightforward generalization that assumes almost no limit on ties or beliefs about them.
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Received: 15 December 1997/Accepted: 16 November 1998
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Duggan, J., Schwartz, T. Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized. Soc Choice Welfare 17, 85–93 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00007177
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00007177