Abstract
One protection of cryptographic implementations against side-channel attacks is the masking of the sensitive variables. In this article, we present a first-order masking that does not leak information when the registers change values according to some specific (and realistic) rules. This countermeasure applies to all devices that leak a function of the distance between consecutive values of internal variables. In particular, we illustrate its practicality on both hardware and software implementations.
Moreover, we introduce a framework to evaluate the soundness of the new first-order masking when the leakage slightly deviates from the rules involved to design the countermeasure. It reveals that the countermeasure remains more efficient than the state-of-the-art first-order masking if the deviation from the ideal model is equal to a few tens of percents, and that it is as good as a first-order Boolean masking even if the deviation is 50%.
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Maghrebi, H., Prouff, E., Guilley, S., Danger, JL. (2012). A First-Order Leak-Free Masking Countermeasure. In: Dunkelman, O. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2012. CT-RSA 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7178. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27954-6_10
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