Abstract
Cryptosystem designers frequently assume that secrets will be manipulated in closed, reliable computing environments. Unfortunately, actual computers and microchips leak information about the operations they process. This paper examines specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. We also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.
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Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., Jun, B. (1999). Differential Power Analysis. In: Wiener, M. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO’ 99. CRYPTO 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1666. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48405-1_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48405-1_25
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