Abstract
Probabilistic symmetric encryption have already been widely studied, from a theoretical point of view. Nevertheless, many applications require length-preserving encryption, to be patched at a minimal cost to include privacy without modifying the format (e.g. encrypted filesystems). In this paper, we thus consider the security notions for length-preserving, deterministic and symmetric encryption schemes, also termed ciphers: semantic security under lunchtime and challenge-adaptive adversaries. We furthermore provide some relations for this notion between different models of adversaries, and the more classical security notions for ciphers: pseudo-random permutations (PRP) and super pseudo-random permutations (SPRP).
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Phan, D.H., Pointcheval, D. (2004). About the Security of Ciphers (Semantic Security and Pseudo-Random Permutations). In: Handschuh, H., Hasan, M.A. (eds) Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3357. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30564-4_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30564-4_13
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