This paper presents some recent developments in the theory of coalition and network formation. For this purpose, a few major equilibrium concepts recently introduced to model the formation of coalition structures and networks among players are briefly reviewed and discussed. Some economic applications are also illustrated to give a flavour of the type of predictions such models are able to provide.
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Marco, A.M. (2009). Games of Coalition and Network Formation: A Survey. In: Naimzada, A.K., Stefani, S., Torriero, A. (eds) Networks, Topology and Dynamics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 613. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68409-1_3
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