Abstract
This paper deals with the question of coalition formation inn-person cooperative games. Two abstract game models of coalition formation are proposed. We then study the core and the dynamic solution of these abstract games. These models assume that there is a rule governing the allocation of payoffs to each player in each coalition structure called a payoff solution concept. The predictions of these models are characterized for the special case of games with side payments using various payoff solution concepts such as the individually rational payoffs, the core, the Shapley value and the bargaining set M1 (i). Some modifications of these models are also discussed.
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This research was supported in part by the Office of Naval Research under Contract N00014-75-C-0678 and the National Science Foundation under Grants MPS75-02024 and MCS77-03984 at Cornell University and also by the United States Army under Contract No. DAAG-29-75-C-0024 and the National Science Foundation under Grant No. MCS75-17385 A01 at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. The author is grateful to Professor William F. Lucas under whose guidance the research was conducted and to Professor Louis J. Billera for many helpful discussions.
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Shenoy, P.P. On coalition formation: a game-theoretical approach. Int J Game Theory 8, 133–164 (1979). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770064
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770064