Abstract
Game theory provides us with a set of important methodologies for the study of group decisions as well as negotiation processes. Cooperative game theory is a subfield of game theory that focuses on interactions in which involved parties have the power to make binding agreements. Many group decision and negotiation processes (such as legal arbitrations) fall into this category, and as such, they have been central in the development of cooperative game theory. Particularly, an area of cooperative game theory, called bargaining theory, focuses on bilateral negotiations as well as negotiation processes where coalition formation is not a central concern. The object of study in bargaining theory is a (bargaining) rule, which provides a solution to each bargaining problem (or in other words, negotiation). Studies on bargaining theory employ the axiomatic method to evaluate bargaining rules. This chapter reviews and summarizes several such studies. After a discussion of the bargaining model, we present the important bargaining rules in the literature (including the Nash bargaining rule), as well as the central axioms that characterize them. Next, we discuss strategic issues related to cooperative bargaining, such as the Nash program, implementation of bargaining rules, and games of manipulating bargaining rules. We conclude with a discussion of the recent literature on ordinal bargaining rules.
This is a revised version of the chapter “Cooperative Game Theory Approaches to Negotiation” which was published in the first edition of this handbook.
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Notes
- 1.
Cooperative game theory analyzes interactions where agents can make binding agreements and it inquires how cooperative opportunities faced by alternative coalitions of agents shape the final agreement reached. Cooperative games do not specify how the agents interact or the mechanism through which their interaction leads to alternative outcomes of the game (and in this sense, they are different than noncooperative games). Instead, as will be exemplified in this chapter, they present a reduced form representation of all possible agreements that can be reached by some coalition.
- 2.
This set contains all agreements that are physically available to the negotiators, including those that are “unreasonable” according to the negotiators’ preferences.
- 3.
As will be formally introduced later, an agreement is Pareto optimal if there is no alternative agreement that makes an agent better-off without hurting any other agent.
- 4.
We use the following vector inequalities x ≧ y for each i ∈ N, xi ≧ yi; x ≧ y and x ≠ y; and x > y if for each i ∈ N, xi > yi.
- 5.
A stronger assumption called full comprehensiveness additionally requires utility to be freely disposable below d.
- 6.
A decision-maker is risk-neutral if he is indifferent between each lottery and the lottery’s expected (sure) return.
- 7.
This is Pareto optimal since both bargainers prefer accession to rejection. What they disagree on is the tariff rate.
- 8.
A function λi : ℝ→ℝ is positive affine if there is a,b ∈ ℝ with a > 0 such that for each x ∈ ℝ, λi(x) = ax+b.
- 9.
Any (S, d) can be “normalized” into such a problem by choosing \( {\lambda}_i\left({x}_i\right)=\frac{x_i-{d}_i}{N_i\left(S,d\right)-{d}_i} \) for each i ∈ N.
- 10.
Any (S, d) can be “normalized” into such a problem by choosing \( {\lambda}_i\left({x}_i\right)=\frac{x_i-{d}_i}{a_i\left(S,d\right)-{d}_i} \) for each i ∈ N.
- 11.
On problems that are not d-comprehensive, the Egalitarian rule can also violate weak Pareto optimality.
- 12.
For a scale invariant rule, (S1,d1) and (S4,d4) are alternative representations of the same physical problem. (Specifically, E’s payoff function has been multiplied by 2 and thus, still represents the same preferences.) For the Egalitarian rule, however, these two problems (and player E’s) are distinct. Since it seeks to equate absolute payoff gains from disagreement, the Egalitarian rule treats agents’ payoffs to be comparable to each other. As a result, it treats payoff functions as more than mere representations of preferences.
- 13.
This property is weaker than scale invariance because, for an agent i, every translation xi + zi is a positive affine transformation λi(xi) = 1xi + zi.
- 14.
Any (S, d) can be “normalized” into such a problem by choosing λi(xi) = xi−di for each i ∈ N.
- 15.
Thus, as in Nash (1953), each agent demands a payoff. But now, they have to rationalize it as part of a solution proposed by an “acceptable” bargaining rule.
- 16.
This is due to the following fact. Two utility functions represent the same complete and transitive preference relation if and only if one is an increasing transformation of the other.
- 17.
There is no reference on the origin of this rule in Shubik (1982). However, Thomson attributes it to Shapley. Furthermore, Roth (1979) (pp. 72–73) mentions a three-agent ordinal bargaining rule proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1974, Rand Corporation, R-904/4) which, considering the scarcity of ordinal rules in the literature, is most probably the same bargaining rule.
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Kıbrıs, Ö. (2021). Negotiation as a Cooperative Game. In: Kilgour, D.M., Eden, C. (eds) Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49629-6_10
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