Abstract
Non-cooperative game theory has contributed several major ideas to the study of negotiation. In the two-person context, the line of research based on simultaneous offers with incomplete information focused on the strategy of making demands, showing the importance of each side’s perception of the other, and how these perceptions can lead to inefficiency. The Rubinstein Alternating Offers game emphasizes the role of time, and establishes a link to the Nash Bargaining Solution. More recent studies have turned to coalitional bargaining and its relation to the core.
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Chatterjee, K. (2020). Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory. In: Kilgour, D.M., Eden, C. (eds) Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12051-1_9-1
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