Abstract
The superadditive solution for 2-person Nash bargaining games was axiomatically defined in Perles/Maschler (1981). In Perles (1982) it was shown that the axioms are incompatible even for 3-person bargaining games. In this paper we offer a generalization method of this solution concept for n-person games. In this method, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (1975) is revealed as the rule followed to determine the movements along the path of intermediate agreements.
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The authors wish to thank M. Maschler for many helpful comments and Stef Tijs for his careful reading of the manuscript.
Financial support for this research was granted by Universidad del País Vasco / Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea. Grant no. UPV 036.321-H061/91.
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Calvo, E., Gutiérrez, E. Extension of the Perles-Maschler solution to n-person bargaining games. Int J Game Theory 23, 325–346 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01242947
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01242947