Abstract
We provide new characterizations of the egalitarian bargaining solution on the class of strictly comprehensive n-person bargaining problems. The main axioms used in all of our results are Nash’s IIA and disagreement point monotonicity—an axiom which requires a player’s payoff to strictly increase in his disagreement payoff. For n = 2 these axioms, together with other standard requirements, uniquely characterize the egalitarian solution. For n > 2 we provide two extensions of our 2-person result, each of which is obtained by imposing an additional axiom on the solution. Dropping the axiom of anonymity, strengthening disagreement point monotonicity by requiring player i’s payoff to be a strictly decreasing function of the disagreement payoff of every other player j ≠ i, and adding a “weak convexity” axiom regarding changes of the disagreement point, we obtain a characterization of the class of weighted egalitarian solutions. This “weak convexity” axiom requires that a movement of the disagreement point in the direction of the solution point should not change the solution point. We also discuss the so-called “transfer paradox” and relate it to this axiom.
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Rachmilevitch, S. Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution. Int J Game Theory 40, 63–85 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0229-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0229-7