Abstract
This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas by comparing the average utilities obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. The average utility obtained in simulations is higher with expected utility maximising behaviour than with sincere voting behaviour under a broad range of assumptions. Strategic voting increases welfare particularly if the distribution of preference intensities correlates with voter types.
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Lehtinen, A. The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas. Theor Decis 63, 1–40 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9028-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9028-4