Abstract
Necessary and sufficient conditions for an alternative to be a sophisticated voting outcome under an amendment procedure are derived. The uncovered set, as first defined by Miller (1980), is shown to be potentially reducible, and conditions are determined for which this reduction equals the set of sophisticated voting outcomes. In addition, simple methods are given for calculating both the uncovered set and its reduction.
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Banks, J.S. Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control. Soc Choice Welfare 1, 295–306 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00649265
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00649265