Abstract.
Using a model according to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998) we consider a sub-game perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game in a duopolistic industry in which the products of the firms are vertically differentiated. In the industry, there are a high quality firm and a low quality firm. In the first stage of the game, the firms choose their strategic variables, price or quantity. In the second stage, they determine the levels of their strategic variables. We will show that, under an assumption about distribution of consumers' preference, we obtain the result that is similar to Singh and Vives (1984)' proposition (their Proposition 3) in the case of substitutes with nonlinear demand functions. That is, in the first stage of the game, a quantity strategy dominates a price strategy for both firms.
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Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000
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Tanaka, Y. Profitability of price and quantity strategies in a duopoly with vertical product differentiation. Econ Theory 17, 693–700 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00004124
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00004124