Abstract
In the last decades' revival of contractarianism a constitutional contract is interpreted as a device to overcome the hypothetical state of anarchy. It is not entirely clear, however, how, in a pre-constitutional setting that lacks any institutional forms, an unanimous agreement on the rules and the agency enforcing the rules can be imagined to emerge. This paper conceptualizes the problem in game-theoretic terms. A solution is discussed together with an old dilemma that turns up in this context. The dilemma results from the fact that the protective agency has to be endowed with sufficiently powerful coercive means to prevent anyone breaking the social contract. However, this concentration of power itself may induce a violation by making the protective agency usurp its power. The logical basis of the dilemma is explored together with the conditions under which it may challenge the contractarian approach.
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I would like to thank Juli Irving-Lessmann, Dennis Mueller, Viktor Vanberg, Georg von Wangenheim, and in particular Hartmut Kliemt for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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Witt, U. The emergence of a protective agency and the constitutional dilemma. Constit Polit Econ 3, 255–266 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393122
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393122