Abstract
Based on some notions from recent game theoretic approaches to explain the emergence of institutions, a model is put forward which implies some generalizations and extensions. First, the evolution of institutions is interpreted as a diffusion process. This interpretation provides a general formal framework to cover both, the case of strategic and that of non-strategic interaction. Second, different forms of interdependency effects between the individuals involved are identified as making the crucial difference between the case where institutions emerge spontaneously in an unorganized form and the case where they do not.
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The author is grateful to J. Irving-Lessman, T. Kuran, D.C. Mueller, J. Nugent and V. Vanberg for valuable comments on an earlier draft.
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Witt, U. The evolution of economic institutions as a propagation process. Public Choice 62, 155–172 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124332
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124332