Abstract
Although theM 1 -bargaining set for games with side payments is known to exist, it frequently contains payoffs which are highly inequitable. For this reason the more restrictedM 2-bargaining set is of interest. SinceM 2 is not known to exist in general, this paper introduces anM *-bargaining set, contained inM 1 and containingM 2, and presents an existence theorem. For the class of symmetric, simple games with decreasing returns, theM 2 -bargaining set is shown to exist, and a fairly severe restriction on payoffs satisfyingM 2 -stability is obtained.
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This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. Soc. 77-21651
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Schofield, N. Generalised bargaining sets for cooperative games. Int J Game Theory 7, 183–199 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769189
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769189