Abstract
In this paper the circumstances under which a Nozickian libertarian claim can produce self-consistent results are studied. These circumstances are shown to consist of technological separability of social alternatives and partial separability of individual preferences. Under these conditions some restricted versions of the Pareto principle and of the Rawlsian maximin can be reformulated consistently with the Nozickian libertarian claim. Also, in absence of external utility, Paretian efficiency, Rawlsian distributive justice and the Nozickian libertarian claim are consistent and can be together satisfied by a choice procedure. Moreover, the Nozick libertarian claim is shown to be satisfied by a perfectly competitive economy. A parallelism between a general equilibrium market system and a Nozickian rights system is pointed out.
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For helpful comments on an earlier version I am very grateful to C.J. Bliss, G. De Fraja, A. Sen, and an anonymous referee
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Mezzetti, C. Paretian efficiency, rawlsian justice and the Nozick theory of rights. Soc Choice Welfare 4, 25–37 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433953
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433953