Abstract
In the 1992 paper [1] Bikchandani et al. show how it may be rational for Bayesian agents in a sequential decision making scenario to ignore their private information and conform to the choices made by previous agents. If this occurs, an agent ignoring her private information is said to be in a cascade.
Access provided by Autonomous University of Puebla. Download to read the full chapter text
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., Welch, I.: A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political Economy 100(5), 992–1026 (1992)
Rendsvig, R.K.: Aggregated Beliefs and Information Cascades (extended) (2013), http://vince-inc.com/rendsvig/papers/IC1.pdf
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Rendsvig, R.K. (2013). Aggregated Beliefs and Informational Cascades. In: Grossi, D., Roy, O., Huang, H. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8196. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_29
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_29
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40947-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40948-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)