Abstract
We show that it is possible to achieve perfect forward secrecy in two-message key exchange (KE) protocols that satisfy even stronger security properties than provided by the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model. In particular, we consider perfect forward secrecy in the presence of adversaries that can reveal the long-term secret keys of the actor of a session and reveal ephemeral secret keys.
We propose two new game-based security models for KE protocols. First, we formalize a slightly stronger variant of the eCK security model that we call eCKw. Second, we integrate perfect forward secrecy into eCKw, which gives rise to the even stronger eCK-PFS model. We propose a security-strengthening transformation (i.e., a compiler) between our new models. Given a two-message Diffie-Hellman type protocol secure in eCKw, our transformation yields a two-message protocol that is secure in eCK-PFS. As an example, we show how our transformation can be applied to the NAXOS protocol.
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Cremers, C., Feltz, M. (2012). Beyond eCK: Perfect Forward Secrecy under Actor Compromise and Ephemeral-Key Reveal. In: Foresti, S., Yung, M., Martinelli, F. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2012. ESORICS 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7459. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_42
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_42
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