Abstract
Physical attacks based on Side Channel Analysis (SCA) or on Fault Analysis (FA) target a secret usually manipulated by a public algorithm. SCA can also be used for Reverse Engineering (SCARE) against the software implementation of a private algorithm. In this paper, we claim that an unknown Feistel scheme with an hardware design can be recovered with a chosen plaintexts SCA attack. First, we show that whatever is the input of the unknown Feistel function, its one-round output can be guessed by SCA. Using this relation, two attacks for recovering the algorithm are proposed : an expensive interpolation attack on a generic Feistel scheme and an improved attack on a specific but commonly used scheme. Then, a countermeasure is proposed.
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Réal, D., Dubois, V., Guilloux, AM., Valette, F., Drissi, M. (2008). SCARE of an Unknown Hardware Feistel Implementation. In: Grimaud, G., Standaert, FX. (eds) Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications. CARDIS 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5189. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85893-5_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85893-5_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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