Abstract
Implementations of cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to side-channel attacks. Masking techniques are employed to counter side-channel attacks that are based on multiple measurements of the same operation on different data. Most currently known techniques require new random values after every nonlinear operation and they are not effective in the presence of glitches. We present a new method to protect implementations. Our method has a higher computational complexity, but requires random values only at the start, and stays effective in the presence of glitches.
The work described in this paper has been supported in part by the European Commission under contract IST-2002-507932 (ECRYPT) and through the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under grant number P16110-N04. The information in this paper is provided as is, and no warranty is given or implied that the information is fit for any particular purpose. The user thereof uses the information at its sole risk and liability.
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Nikova, S., Rechberger, C., Rijmen, V. (2006). Threshold Implementations Against Side-Channel Attacks and Glitches. In: Ning, P., Qing, S., Li, N. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4307. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11935308_38
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11935308_38
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