Abstract
The physical system of the power grids relies on the cyber system for monitoring, control, and operation. As a result, the reliable operation of power grids is highly dependent on the associated cyber infrastructures. The integrated cyber and physical system of power grids creates a large and complex infrastructure. Due to the high penetration of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are highly interconnected with one another, resulting in higher vulnerability with respect to cyber intrusions. Recent reports indicate that cyber-attacks are increasingly likely for the critical infrastructures, e.g., control centers, nuclear power plants, and substations. These attacks may cause significant damages on the power grid. Cyber security research for the power grid is a high priority subject for the emerging smart grid environment.
Substations in the power grid are critical as they are installed with power system components such as transformers, busbars, circuit breakers, and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). Measurements from substations are used as input to Energy Management System (EMS) software applications, including state estimation and optimal power flow. These cyber and physical devices can be physically or electrically connected. For example, a protection and control unit of a transformer is connected to the user-interface via the substation local area network. Remote access to substation networks is a common way for maintenance of substation facilities. However, there are many potential cyber security issues including remote access connection. Simultaneous cyber intrusions to important substations may trigger multiple, cascaded sequences of events, leading to a blackout. As a result, it is crucial to enhance the cyber security of substations and analyze cyber and physical security as one integrated structure in order to enhance the resilience of power grids. The mitigation strategy is vital to cyber-physical security of substations in order to stop the attack, disconnect the intruder, and restore the power system to a normal state. Mitigation methods can be taken on the cyber (ICT) side and physical (power system) side. The key to cyber mitigation is to find anomaly activities or malicious behaviors, and disconnect or stop the intrusion.
A cyber-physical testbed is critical for the study of cyber-physical security of power systems. For reason of security by power companies, real measurements (e.g., voltages, currents and binary status) and ICT data (e.g., communication protocols, system logs, and security logs) are not available. A testbed is a good alternative to acquire realistic cyber (i.e., ICT data) and physical (i.e., power system measurements) system data for research and demonstration purposes. The cyberphysical testbed provides a realistic environment to study the interactions between a complex power system and the ICT system. It is important to study the causeeffect relationships of cyber intrusions, vulnerability and resilience of power systems, as well as the performance and reliability of applications in a realistic environment provided by a testbed.
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Hong, J., Chen, Y., Liu, CC., Govindarasu, M. (2015). Cyber-Physical Security Testbed for Substations in a Power Grid. In: Khaitan, S., McCalley, J., Liu, C. (eds) Cyber Physical Systems Approach to Smart Electric Power Grid. Power Systems. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45928-7_10
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