Abstract
We define a new primitive, input-aware equivocable commitment, baring similar hardness assumptions as plaintext-aware encryption and featuring equivocability. We construct an actual input-aware equivocable commitment protocol, based on a flavor of Diffie-Hellman assumptions allowing adversarially chosen domain parameters. On a parallel front, and since our commitment is extractable and equivocable in a straight-line way, we show that our commitment enjoys UC-security, when atomic exchanges are available as a UC setup. We further compare our protocol and our UC setup with similar, existing ones (i.e., in terms of efficiency, assumptions needed, etc.). Finally, we show that cryptography becomes UC-realizable in a natural way when participants are able to have “close encounters” or when atomic exchanges can be enforced onto the communication.
Access provided by Autonomous University of Puebla. Download to read the full chapter text
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: A general composition theorem for secure reactive systems. In: Naor, M. (ed.) TCC 2004. LNCS, vol. 2951, pp. 336–354. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Barak, B., Canetti, R., Nielsen, J.B., Pass, R.: Universally composable protocols with relaxed set-up assumptions. In: Proc. of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2004, pp. 186–195. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC (2004)
Beaver, D.: Foundations of secure interactive computing. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 377–391. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)
Blum, M.: How to prove a theorem so no one else can claim it. In: An Address to the Int. Congress of Mathematicians (August 1986)
Boneh, D.: The Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem. In: Buhler, J.P. (ed.) ANTS 1998. LNCS, vol. 1423, pp. 48–63. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Brands, S., Chaum, D.: Distance-Bounding Protocols (Extended Abstract). In: Helleseth, T. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1993. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 344–359. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)
Canetti, R.: A Unified Framework for Analyzing Security of Protocols. In: Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), vol. 8(16) (2001)
Canetti, R.: Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2000/067 (2005), http://eprint.iacr.org/
Canetti, R., Dakdouk, R.R.: Towards a theory of extractable functions. In: Reingold, O. (ed.) TCC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5444, pp. 595–613. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Canetti, R., Fischlin, M.: Universally Composable Commitments. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 19–41. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Canetti, R., Lindell, Y., Ostrovsky, R., Sahai, A.: Universally Composable Two-Party and Multi-Party Secure Computation. In: The 34th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2002), pp. 494–503 (2002)
Chandran, N., Goyal, V., Sahai, A.: New Constructions for UC Secure Computation Using Tamper-Proof Hardware. In: Smart, N.P. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2008. LNCS, vol. 4965, pp. 545–562. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Cimato, S., Galdi, C., Persiano, G. (eds.): SCN 2002. LNCS, vol. 2576. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: A practical public key cryptosystem provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. In: Krawczyk, H. (ed.) CRYPTO 1998. LNCS, vol. 1462, pp. 13–25. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Damgård, I., Nielsen, J.B., Wichs, D.: Universally composable multiparty computation with partially isolated parties. In: Reingold, O. (ed.) TCC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5444, pp. 315–331. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Damgård, I.B., Nielsen, J.B.: Perfect hiding and perfect binding universally composable commitment schemes with constant expansion factor. In: Yung, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 581–596. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Dent, A.W. The hardness of the DHK problem in the generic group model (2006) a.dent@rhul.ac.uk13277 (received April 24, 2006), (last revised May 9, 2006)
Drimer, S., Murdoch, S.J.: Keep your enemies close: distance bounding against smartcard relay attacks. In: Proc. of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium, SS 2007, pp. 7:1–7:16. USENIX Association, Berkeley (2007)
Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: Proofs that yield nothing but their validity and a methodology of cryptographic protocol design. In: 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 174–187 (October 1986)
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Rackoff, C.: The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems. In: Proc. of the Seventeenth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 1985, pp. 291–304. ACM, New York (1985)
Herzog, J.C., Liskov, M., Micali, S.: Plaintext awareness via key registration. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 548–564. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Kalai, Y.T., Lindell, Y., Prabhakaran, M.: Concurrent general composition of secure protocols in the timing model. In: Proc. of the Thirty-Seventh Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2005, pp. 644–653. ACM, New York (2005)
Katz, J.: Universally Composable Multi-party Computation Using Tamper-Proof Hardware. In: Naor, M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4515, pp. 115–128. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Liskov, M., Lysyanskaya, A., Micali, S., Reyzin, L., Smith, A.: Mutually independent commitments. In: Boyd, C. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2248, pp. 385–401. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Mayes, K., Cobourne, S., Markantonakis, K.: Near field technology in challenging environments. In: Smart Card Technology Int., NFC and Contactless, pp. 65–69 (2011)
Micali, S., Rogaway, P.: Secure computation (abstract). In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 392–404. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)
Welzl, E., Montanari, U., Rolim, J.D.P. (eds.): ICALP 2000. LNCS, vol. 1853. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Moran, T., Segev, G.: David and Goliath Commitments: UC Computation for Asymmetric Parties Using Tamper-Proof Hardware. In: Smart, N.P. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2008. LNCS, vol. 4965, pp. 527–544. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Okamoto, T., Uchiyama, S.: A new public-key cryptosystem as secure as factoring. In: Nyberg, K. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1998. LNCS, vol. 1403, pp. 308–318. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Paillier, P.: Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes. In: Stern, J. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 223–238. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Teranishi, I., Ogata, W.: Relationship between standard model plaintext awareness and message hiding. IEICE Trans. Fundam. Electron. Commun. Comput. Sci. E91-A, 244–261 (2008)
Ventre, C., Visconti, I.: Message-aware commitment schemes (2008) (unpublished manuscript)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Boureanu, I., Vaudenay, S. (2013). Input-Aware Equivocable Commitments and UC-secure Commitments with Atomic Exchanges. In: Susilo, W., Reyhanitabar, R. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8209. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41227-1_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41227-1_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-41226-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-41227-1
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)