Abstract
In Chapter 3 we have seen that – under the usual assumptions of monotonicity and superadditivity, and for a finite set of alternatives (social states) – effectivity functions (constitutions) can be represented by Nash consistent game forms if and only if the intersection condition on individual polar sets (3.6) is satisfied. This condition is quite restrictive, for instance, it is not satisfied by the effectivity function derived from the familiar 2 × 2 bimatrix game form (cf. Example 3.3.11).
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Peleg, B., Peters, H. (2010). Nash consistent representation through lottery models. In: Strategic Social Choice. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1_6
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