Abstract
This chapter reviews the literature concerning the evolution of cultural traits in general and preferences in particular, and the emergence and persistence of rules or norms, from a family perspective. In models where every new person is effectively the clone of an existing one (either a parent or anyone else), there may be evolution only in the demographic sense that the share of the population who hold a certain trait increases or decreases. Evolution in the strict sense of new traits making their appearance occurs in models where the trait characterizing any given member of any given generation is a combination of traits drawn at random from those represented in the previous generation. Preferences may be altruistic or non-altruistic, but individuals may behave as if they were altruistic even if they are not, because a rule or norm may make it in their interest to do so. Evolutionary stability and renegotiation-proofness play analogous roles, the former by selecting altruistic preferences, and the latter by selecting cooperation-inducing rules.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Acemoglu D, Wolitzky A (2020) Sustaining cooperation: community enforcement versus specialized enforcement. J Eur Econ Assoc 18(2):1078–1122
Akerlof GA, Kranton RE (2000) Economics and identity. Q J Econ 115:715–753
Albanese G, de Blasio G, Sestito P (2016) My parents taught me: evidence on the family transmission of values. J Popul Econ 29:571–592
Alesina A, Giuliano P, Nunn N (2013) On the origins of gender roles. Q J Econ 128:469–530
Alger I, Cox D (2020) Evolution of the family: theory and implications for economics. Toulouse School of Economics working papers 20.1139
Alger I, Weibull JW (2013) Homo moralis: preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching. Econometrica 81:2269–2302
Alger I, Weibull JW (2019) Evolutionary models of preference formation. Ann Rev Econ 11:329–354
Ashraf QH, Galor O (2013a) The out of Africa hypothesis, human genetic diversity, and comparative economic development. Am Econ Rev 103:1–46
Ashraf QH, Galor O (2013b) Genetic diversity and the origins of cultural fragmentation. Am Econ Rev 103:528–533
Attema AE (2012) Developments in time preference and their implications for medical decision making. J Oper Res Soc 63(10):1388–1399
Axelrod RM (1984) The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books, New York
Axelrod RM (1986) An evolutionary approach to norms. Am Polit Sci Rev 80:1095–1111
Bader M, Leuzinger S (2019) Hydraulic coupling of a leafless Kauri tree remnant to conspecific hosts. iScience 19:1–6. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2019.05.009
Baland J-M, Robinson JA (2000) Is child labor inefficient? J Polit Econ 108:663–679
Baland J-M, Robinson JA (2002) Rotten parents. J Public Econ 84:341–356
Barnett R, Bhattacharya J, Puhakka M (2018) Private versus public old-age security. J Popul Econ 31:703–746
Basu K (2011) Beyond the invisible hand. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Baudin T (2010) A role for cultural transmission in fertility transitions. Macroecon Dyn 14:454–481
Becchetti L, Solferino N, Elisabetta Tessitore M (2016) Education not for money: an economic analysis on education, civic engagement and life satisfaction. Theor Econ Lett 6:39–47
Becker GS (1973) A theory of marriage: part I. J Polit Econ 81:813–846
Becker GS (1974) A theory of marriage: part II. J Polit Econ 82:S11–S26
Becker GS (1976) Altruism, egoism, and genetic fitness: economics and sociobiology. J Econ Lit 14:817–826
Becker GS (1981a) Altruism in the family and selfishness in the market place. Economica 48:1–15
Becker GS (1981b) A treatise on the family. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA/London
Becker A, Enke B, Falk A (2020) Ancient origins of the global variation in economic preferences. AEA Pap Proc 110:319–323
Bergstrom TC (1989) A fresh look at the rotten kid theorem and other household mysteries. J Polit Econ 97:1138–1159
Bergstrom TC (1996) Economics in a family way. J Econ Lit 34:1903–1934
Bernheim D, Ray D (1989) Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games. Games Econ Behav 1:295–326
Billari FC, Galasso V (2014) Fertility decisions and pension reforms. Evidence from natural experiments in Italy. IdEP economic papers 1403, USI Università della Svizzera Italiana
Binmore K (2010) Social norms or social preferences? Mind Soc 9:139–157
Bisin A, Verdier T (2000) Beyond the melting pot: cultural transmission, marriage and the evolution of ethnic and religious traits. Q J Econ 115:955–988
Bisin A, Topa G (2003) Empirical models of cultural transmission. J Eur Econ Assoc 1:363–375
Bisin A, Verdier T (2001) Agents with imperfect empathy might survive natural selection. Econ Lett 2:277–285
Bisin A, Topa G, Verdier T (2004) Religious intermarriage and socialization in the United States. J Polit Econ 112:615–664
Björklund A, Lindahl M, Plug E (2006) The origins of intergenerational associations: lessons from Swedish adoption data. Q J Econ 121:999–1028
Borjas GJ (1992) Ethnic capital and intergenerational mobility. Q J Econ 107:123–150
Borjas GJ (1994) Long-run convergence of ethnic skill differentials: the children and grandchildren of the great migration. ILR Rev 47:553–573
Boyd R, Richerson PJ (1992) Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethol Sociobiol 13:171–195
Boyd R, Richerson PJ (2002) Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population. J Theor Biol 215:287–296
Boyd R, Richerson PJ (2009) Voting with your feet: payoff biased migration and the evolution of group beneficial behavior. J Theor Biol 257:331–339
Buchanan JM (1987) Constitutional economics. In: The new Palgrave: a dictionary of economics. Macmillan, London
Bulow JD, Geanakoplos J, Klemperer PD (1985) Multimarket oligopoly: strategic substitutes and strategic complements. J Polit Econ 93:488–511
Caillaud B, Cohen D (2000) Intergenerational transfers and common values in a society. Eur Econ Rev 44:1091–1103
Callaway RM, Mahall BE (2007) Family roots. Nature 448:145–147
Camera G, Gioffré A (2017) Asymmetric social norms. Econ Lett 152:27–30
Campbell DE (2006) What is education’s impact on civic and social engagement? In: Measuring the effects of education on health and civic engagement: proceedings of the Copenhagen symposium. OECD, Paris, pp 25–118
Cavalli-Sforza LL, Feldman MW (1981) Cultural transmission and evolution: a quantitative approach. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Cavalli-Sforza LL, Feldman MW, Chen K-H, Dornbusch SM (1982) Theory and observation in cultural transmission. Science 218:19–27
Chiapa C, Juarez L (2016) The schooling repayment hypothesis for private transfers: evidence from the PROGRESA/Oportunidades experiment. Rev Econ Househ 14:811–828
Chowdhury S, Sutter M, Zimmermann KF (2020) Economic preferences across generations and family clusters: a large-scale experiment. CEPR discussion papers 14998
Cigno A (1991) Economics of the family. Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, New York/Oxford, UK
Cigno A (1993) Intergenerational transfers without altruism: family, market and state. Eur J Polit Econ 9:505–518
Cigno A (2006) A constitutional theory of the family. J Popul Econ 19:259–283
Cigno A (2012) Marriage as a commitment device. Rev Econ Househ 10:193–213
Cigno A (2014) Is marriage as good as a contract? CESifo Econ Stud 60:599–612
Cigno A (2022) A strictly economic explanation of gender roles: the lasting legacy of the plough. Rev Econ Househ 20:1–13
Cigno A, Rosati FC (1992) The effects of financial markets and social security on saving and fertility behaviour in Italy. J Popul Econ 5:319–341
Cigno A, Rosati FC (1996) Jointly determined saving and fertility behaviour: theory, and estimates for Germany, Italy, UK, and USA. Eur Econ Rev 40:1561–1589
Cigno A, Rosati FC (1997) Rise and fall of the Japanese saving rate: the role of social security and intra-family transfers. Jpn World Econ 9:81–92
Cigno A, Rosati FC (2005) The economics of child labour. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK
Cigno A, Werding M (2007) Children and pensions. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Cigno A, Casolaro L, Rosati FC (2003) The impact of social security on saving and fertility in Germany. FinanzArchiv 59:189–211
Cigno A, Giannelli GC, Rosati FC, Vuri D (2006) Is there such a thing as a family constitution? A test based on credit rationing. Rev Econ Househ 4:183–204
Cigno A, Komura M, Luporini A (2017) Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention. J Popul Econ 30:805–834
Cigno A, Gioffré A, Luporini A (2021) Evolution of individual preferences and persistence of family rules. Rev Econ Househ 19:935–958
Cohen-Zada D (2006) Preserving religious identity through education: economic analysis and evidence from the US. J Urban Econ 60:372–398
Coleman JS (1988) Social capital in the creation of human capital. Am J Sociol 94:S95–S120
Cooper RW (1999) Coordination games: complementarities and macroeconomics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Darwin C (1859) On the origin of species by means of natural selection. John Murray, London
Diamond J (2005) Guns, germs, and steel: the fates of human societies. W. W. Norton, New York
Dixit A (2004) Lawlessness and economics: alternative models of governance. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Dudley SA, File AL (2007) Kin recognition in an annual plant. Biol Lett 3:435–438
Dunbar RIM (1992) Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in primates. J Hum Evol 22:469–493
Dunbar RIM (2010) How many friends does one person need? Dunbar’s number and other evolutionary quirks. Faber and Faber, London/Boston
Dutrochet RJH (1833) Observations sur la longue persistance de la vie et de l’accroissement dans la racine et dans la souche du Pinus picea L., après qu’il a été abbattu. Ann Sci Nat 29:300–303
Ellickson RC (1994) The aim of order without law. J Inst Theor Econ 150:97–100
Ellison G (1994) Cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma with anonymous random matching. Rev Econ Stud 61:567–588
Farrell J, Maskin E (1989) Renegotiation in repeated games. Games Econ Behav 1:327–360
Fenge R, Scheubel B (2017) Pensions and fertility: back to the roots. J Popul Econ 30:93–139
Fernandez R, Fogli A (2009) Culture: an empirical investigation of beliefs, work, and fertility. Am Econ J Macroecon 1:146–177
Folbre N (1994) Children as public goods. Am Econ Rev 84:86–90
Friedman M (1953) Essays in positive economics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Friedman JW (1971) A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Rev Econ Stud 38:1–12
Fudenberg D, Maskin E (1986) The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 50:533–554
Gábos A, Gál RI, Kézdi G (2009) The effects of child-related benefits and pensions on fertility by birth order: a test on Hungarian data. Popul Stud 63:215–231
Galasso V, Gatti R, Profeta P (2009) Investing for the old age: pensions, children and savings. Int Tax Public Financ 16:538–559
Galor O (2011) Unified growth theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Galor O, Moav O (2002) Natural selection and the origin of economic growth. Q J Econ 117:1133–1191
Greif A (2006) Institutions and the path to the modern economy: lessons from medieval trade. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L (2016) Long-term persistence. J Eur Econ Assoc 14:1401–1436
Güth W (1995) An evolutionary approach to explaining co-operative behavior by reciprocal incentives. Int J Game Theory 24:323–344
Güth W, Kliemt H (1998) The indirect evolutionary approach:: bridging the gap between rationality and adaptation. Ration Soc. https://doi.org/10.1177/104346398010003005
Güth W, Yaari M (1992) An evolutionary approach to explain reciprocal behavior in a simple strategic game. In: Witt U (ed) Explaining process and change in a simple strategic game. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
Guttman JM (2001) Self-enforcing reciprocity norms and intergenerational transfers. J Public Econ 81:117–151
Iyigun M, Walsh RP (2007) Building the family nest: premarital investments, marriage markets, and spousal allocations. Rev Econ Stud 74:507–535
Jellal M, Wolff F-C (2002) Cultural evolutionary altruism: theory and evidence. Eur J Polit Econ 18:241–262
Kandori M (1992) Social norms and community enforcement. Rev Econ Stud 59:63–80
Kimbrough EO, Vostroknutov A (2015) Norms make preferences social. J Eur Econ Assoc 14:608–638
Klimaviciute J, Perelman S, Pestieau P, Schoenmaeckers J (2017) Caring for dependent parents: altruism, exchange or family norm? J Popul Econ 30:835–873
Kosse F, Deckers T, Pinger P, Schildberg-Hörisch H, Falk A (2020) The formation of prosociality: causal evidence on the role of social environment. J Polit Econ 128:434–467
Laffont J-J (1975) Macroeconomic constraints, economic efficiency and ethics: an introduction to Kantian economics. Economica 42:430–437
Lewontin RC (1961) Evolution and the theory of games. J Theor Biol 1:382–403
Loehlin JC, Nichols RC (1976) Heredity, environment and personality. University of Texas Press, Austin
Lotka AJ (1925) Elements of physical biology. Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore
Lowenstein A, Daatland SO (2006) Filial norms and family support in a comparative cross-national context: evidence from the OASIS study. Ageing Soc 26:203–223
Lundberg S, Pollak RA (1993) Separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market. J Polit Econ 101:988–1010
Malthus TR (1798) An essay on the principle of population as it affects the future improvement of society, with remarks on the speculations of Mr. Goodwin, M. Condorcet and other writers. J. Johnson in St. Paul’s Churchyard, London
Manser M, Brown M (1980) Marriage and house-hold decision-making: a bargaining analysis. Int Econ Rev 21:31–44
Maynard Smith J (1976) Evolution and the theory of games. Am Sci 64:41–45
Maynard Smith J (1982) Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Maynard Smith J, Price G (1973) The logic of animal conflict. Nature 146:15–18
McElroy MB, Horney MJ (1981) Nash-bargained household decisions: toward a generalization of the theory of demand. Int Econ Rev 22:333–349
Monod J (1970) Le Hasard et la Nécessité. Essai sur la Philosophie Naturelle de la Biologie Moderne. Éditions du Seuil, Paris. English version: Chance and necessity: an essay on the natural philosophy of modern biology. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1971
Monod J (1974) On chance and necessity. In: Ayala FJ, Dobzhansky T (eds) Studies in the philosophy of biology. Macmillan, London
Myrdal G (1957) Economic theory and underdeveloped regions. Gerald Duckworth, London
Ogaki M, Zhang Q (2001) Decreasing relative risk aversion and tests of risk sharing. Econometrica 69(2):515–526
Okuno-Fujiwara M, Postlewaite A, Suzumura K (1990) Strategic information revelation. Rev Econ Stud 57:25–47
Ottoni-Wilhelm M, Zhang Y, Estell DB, Perdue NH (2017) Raising charitable children: the effects of verbal socialization and role-modeling on children’s giving. J Popul Econ 30:189–224
Persson T, Tabellini G (2000) Political economics. Explaining economic policy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Persson T, Tabellini G (2020) Culture, institutions and policy. Mimeo, New York (forthcoming: Bisin A, Federico G (eds) The handbook of historical economics)
Peters M, Siow A (2002) Competing premarital investments. J Polit Econ 110:592–608
Phelps E (1961) The golden rule of accumulation: a fable for growthmen. Am Econ Rev 51:638–643
Ponthière G (2010) Unequal longevities and lifestyles transmission. J Public Econ Theory 12:93–126
Postlewaite A (2011) Social norms and preferences. In: Benhabib J, Bisin A, Jackson M (eds) Handbook for social economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam
Rapoport A, Chammah AM (1965) Prisoner’s dilemma: a study in conflict and cooperation. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
Richerson PJ et al (2016) Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: a sketch of the evidence. Behav Brain Sci 39:e30. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X1400106X
Robson AJ, Samuelson L (2011) The evolutionary foundations of preferences. In: Benhabib J, Bisin A, Jackson M (eds) Handbook for social economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam
Roemer J (2019) How to cooperate. A theory of Kantian optimization. Yale University Press, New Haven
Rosati FC (1996) Social security in a non-altruistic model with uncertainty and endogenous fertility. J Public Econ 60:283–294
Russo L (1996) La rivoluzione dimenticata. Feltrinelli Editore, Milano. English translation: Levy S (2004) The forgotten revolution: how science was born in 300 BC and why it had to be reborn. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg
Schumpeter JA (1911) Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig. English translation: Opie R (1934) The theory of economic development. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Smith A (1761) The theory of moral sentiments. A. Millan in the Strand, London
Smith A (1776) An inquiry into the wealth of nations. Adam Black, Edinburgh
Tabellini G (2008) The scope of cooperation: norms and incentives. Q J Econ 123:905–950
Volterra V (1926) Variazioni e fluttuazioni del numero d’individui in specie animali conviventi. Memorie R Acc Naz Lincei 2:31–113. English version: Variations and fluctuations of the number of individuals in animal species living together. In: Chapman RN (ed.) Animal ecology. New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1931
Wu J (2020) Labelling, homophily and preference evolution. Int J Game Theory 49:1–22
Zumbuehl M, Dohmen T, Pfann G (2021) Parental involvement and intergenerational transmission of economic preferences, attitudes and personality traits. Econ J 131:2642–2670
Acknowledgments
Responsible Section Editor: Klaus F. Zimmermann. Valuable comments by Ingela Alger, Alberto Bisin, Donald Cox, Annalisa Luporini, Jaibin Wu, and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Remaining errors are the author’s. There is no conflict of interest.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Section Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this entry
Cite this entry
Cigno, A. (2022). Rules, Preferences, and Evolution from the Family Angle. In: Zimmermann, K.F. (eds) Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_266-2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_266-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-57365-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-57365-6
eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Publish with us
Chapter history
-
Latest
Rules, Preferences, and Evolution from the Family Angle- Published:
- 27 April 2022
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_266-2
-
Original
Rules, Preferences, and Evolution from the Family Angle- Published:
- 26 January 2022
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_266-1