Keywords

1 Introduction

For years, the attention of researchers interested in European integration was limited to explain, describe, and theorize the European construction, up to predict the future of the European Community. Since the implementation of the Single Market in 1992, researchers have focused on the functioning of the European Union and its policies. Hassenteufel and Surel (2000) distinguish three types of approaches of EU policies: the approach which examines action co-production by different levels of government; one that promotes the implementation of Community policies; one that is interested in the European Union as a place of production of Community policies. As for us, we will put more emphasis on the action co-production without neglecting the implementation of European urban initiatives.

A dense scientific production is available on the institutions of the European Union and European regions. The literature on cities and urban issues in the European Union has not experienced the same development. In recent years, studies were especially interested in cities as collective actors in a neo-Weberian sense (Häußermann and Haila 2004; Le Galès 2003). However, urban policies do not attract much attention. This deficiency is due, firstly, to the absence of explicit Community competence in the urban area and on the other hand, governments of Member States and European institutions, except the European Commission, were always more concerned about regional problems. Hence, the interest of a research focuses on European Urban Initiatives and the relationship between the European Commission and Local Governments.

First, we will put into perspective the interest of European Commission in urban issues, than a presentation of the first European Urban Initiative, namely Urban Pilot Projects, and its potential impacts on urban governance. Through the example of Lyon, the chapter will examine urban problems and determine the capacity of local government to cross their strategies and needs with the objectives of the European Commission. The next section will highlight the constraints in the implementation of EU programs. Last but not least, our ambition is to understand the process through which the European Commission is trying to act on urban knowledge and assert itself as a body of expertise for public action.

2 Urban Pilot Projects: Lyon Experience

The interest of the European Commission in urban problems began with the entry of the UK and Ireland into the European Community in 1973. These two countries, which had more important regional economic problems than those found in the other Member States—with the exception of Italy—had requested, among other things, the establishment of a financial instrument dedicated to regional development as a prerequisite for membership. The beginning of deindustrialization observed in these countries and elsewhere in the Community highlighted the urban question. The European Commission seized upon the problem, introducing a specific chapter in its first action report on the environment for the period of 1973–1976. This report pointed out that some problems related to urbanization and the geographical distribution of populations and activities in the countries of the Community would be treated more effectively at the Community level.

A milestone was reached with the enlargement of the Community to Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The economic situation in these countries pushed the European Commission to rethink macroeconomic development tools. This resulted in a de facto redefinition of objectives and resources of the European integration process, especially since the spillover dynamics seemed to be blocked (George 1993).

All these factors contribute to the reform of institutions (Smith 1996). Initiated by Jacques Delors, the reform sought to restore interest in “The European idea”. A new target was introduced, namely economic and social cohesion. It was also necessary to improve the efficiency of decision-making and democratize it. In order to convince reluctant countries, the European Commission recalls that it acts according to the guidelines of the EU Council and the European Commission is best placed to ensure the common interest versus the particular interests of Member States. A management embellishing in the name of the effectiveness of Community action, which hides a rebalancing of relationships within the institutional triangle—European Council, European Commission, European Parliament—in favor of the European Commission.Footnote 1

If the European Commission had substantial power of initiative and production of regulatory standards, it remained devoid of real means of implementation and its action did not cover all sectors. The 1988 reform enshrined the right of the European Commission to intervene directly in the implementation of structural policies. In substance, the European Commission could “on its own initiative and in accordance with the procedures provided for in Title VIII, decide to propose to the Member States that they submit applications for assistance with respect to measures of significant interest to the Community” (JOCE 1988a). Following Article 10 of the ERDF,Footnote 2 the European Commission co-financed two types of action: on the one hand studies and research and on the other hand pilot projects and innovative measures of economic development. There was no direct mention of the urban question or cities in the article.Footnote 3 Indeed, the European Commission, knowing the reluctance of some Member States with regard to the expansion of its areas of intervention, preferred to speak of “building infrastructure” with a “marked Community interest” and “innovative actions” while referring to the regional and not the city level. Moreover, the European Commission relied on the absence of economic eligibility indicators to the Funds of Article 10 to ensure the support of northern Member States. These countries, net contributors, favored any action likely to increase funding to which they were entitled. It is in this framework that the Urban Pilot Projects (UPP) were initiated in 1990, on an experimental basis, in the cities of London and Marseille, in order to explore new approaches to tackle urban problems. Since then, and under Article 10 of EEC Regulation No. 4254/88224, the European Commission has co-financed thirty-one other UPPs, in 11 of the 12 countries then in the EEC. The selection of the beneficiary cities was made by mutual agreement, little formalized, following the example of the UPP of Lyon.

After an informal meeting between the European Commissioner for Regional Policy (Bruce Millan) and the Mayor of Lyon (Michel Noir), in March 6, 1991, the European Commissioner informed the Mayor of the existence of Community initiative Urban Pilot Projects. He encouraged him to submit a project, guaranteeing him an ERDF allocation. On March 12, 1991, the Mayor passes along files on initiatives undertaken by the City—Success at School, On-site Action Plan, and Social Development of Districts (RÉGION RHÔNE-ALPES 1991)—to the European Commissioner. Subsequently, the European Commissioner sent a letter, on May 9, 1991, to the mayor, in which he expressed his interest in a project that would be presented by Lyon and would in particular aim to strengthen the links between schools and business. After an exchange between both entities, a definitive project is submitted by the City of Lyon to the European Commission on November 13, 1991. The example of Lyon also sheds light on the difficulties encountered in the implementation of the UPP Community Initiative.

Under the terms of ERDF Article 10, La Duchère,Footnote 4 a neighborhood in the 9th arrondissement of Lyon, benefited from European funding by decision of ERDF number 91/03/29/006, of December 9, 1991, for the realization of an UPP. The allocation (1.9 million €) represents 50 % of the predicted cost of the project. The UPP of Lyon La Duchère wanted to make “a contribution to the problem of upgrading the peripheral urban districts of social housing which pauperize, withdraw on themselves and become marginalized, by demonstrating the impact that an active development of the scientific and technical culture can have to stimulate the people to qualify professionally and to enhance the value of the district in the city” (Commission Européenne 1992). To do this, five objectives were established: academic achievement; orientation toward qualifications for access to employment; social and cultural integration; economic insertion of the most marginalized people; economic development of La Duchère and its integration in the city. These five objectives are related to five actionsFootnote 5: the construction of a discovery center; the creation of the house of employment, training, and enterprise; the establishment of a local employment structure; the construction of workshops for artisans and artists; and project promotion and exchange of experiences with other European cities.

To facilitate the involvement of institutional partners of the project—State, Region, County—and locate funding outside the ERDF, the authorities of the City of Lyon set up a steering committee whose mission was as follows: implementation of the project, its funding, its administration, and its financial management. This steering committee was co-chaired by the Mayor of Lyon and the Prefect of the region to put an end to the tension between the City of Lyon and the Prefecture of the region, each party wanting to lead the project. The Prefect, in a letter to the Mayor underlines that it is “contrary to the rules of the State to establish direct relations between the European Commission and the City of Lyon.” In France, only the Prefect of the region handled the implementation of European policies and programs. However, the project design was done by the municipality without the participation of the Prefecture of the region. The latter made it clear, during a meeting (Comité de pilotage 1992), that the State had no plans to put in the UPP, of which it was kept little informed, additional financial resources. This tension between the Prefecture of the region and the City has complicated a little more the management of the project. Indeed, the project management chain—transit of funds and information—involved complex financial and administrative circuits, sources of conflict between the actors, and delays in the allocation of funds.

Locally, the mobilization of private partners and inhabitants was below the stated goals. Indeed, the involvement of associative structures and inhabitants did not exceed the data-gathering stage.Footnote 6 The reluctance of having to manage the involvement of associations, perceived as too reactive to any municipal project, was the main motivation. Furthermore, these associations have expressed their opposition to the UPP, and acts of vandalism have targeted the local employment structure shortly after its opening as well as the Discovery Centre from the beginning of its construction. Regarding the lack of financial commitment from private partners, it was due to the adoption of a “ticket office logic” by the City toward solicited businesses. The latter did not want to be confined to the simple role of sponsors, but expected roles of full actors with their own goals. As a result, the financial participation of private partners, or rather of an informal group of industrialists and business managers, did not exceed 4 %Footnote 7 of the total cost of the project and was limited to the Discovery Centre. Doubts have long remained as to the very possibility of a financial plan.Footnote 8 Finally, the diversity of resources required by each of the actions has brought about the intervention of a large number of partners. It was essentially an institutional partnership, which has expressed itself through an important dialogue at the level of the actions, but which was not realized at the project level. The Steering Committee in which these partners participated was more a place of information and validation than of exchanges and collective construction. Most of the partners associated with the UPP were there in a function of representation of a department—Education, Insertion, Social Affairs, and Economic Development—and not in a function of realization of a project as beneficial to the Community as for each of them.

As of February 19, 1993, 14 months after the decision of the European Commission to grant funds for Lyon UPP, the financial plan still did not distinguish in a precise manner what is acquired and what was put forward. Ultimately, the cost of UPP was 5.9 million €, instead of the 3.9 million € initially envisaged, and was completed after 4 years instead of two. A UPP completed more under the empirical mode than from a previously defined method. The authorities in charge of the UPP favored the operational aspect to the detriment of the global objectives—qualification of the inhabitants, the involvement of the companies, and the opening up of the district. These bodies argued that the implementation of a European project was a process of discovery and learning. Nevertheless, it was essentially the basic elaboration of the project which was the major obstacle in the realization of the UPP. The actions then developed according to their own logic, without reference to or linkages with other actions, and to the detriment of the integrated approach, promoted in the project presented to the European Commission. For example, to achieve consistent and qualifying pathways of insertion, synergy between the House of the employment and the local employment structure was targeted but did not materialize by any action. The interest of the local employment structure resided in its ability to generate an ongoing process from the emergence of carriers of new business start-ups, at the House of Employment and the incubator until the stage of maturation symbolized by the exit from the incubator, not to mention the rapid attainment of benefits in terms of jobs in the La Duchère District.

As regards the innovation and the exchange of experience, two key aspects for the European Commission, the results were very disappointing. The innovation, asserted in the project presented by Lyon, was shaken by the confrontation with the logic of reality during the implementation, which sometimes “brought them down” on more “traditional” logic. This is the case for the House of employment where the concrete contribution of business managers did not continue beyond the 2 years of realization. Another example, the ability of the “Local employment structure” apparatus to generate a continuing process, from the emergence of carriers of projects through to exiting the business incubator, remained virtual. In the same way, the innovative will to establish an artisanal and artistic pole with high added value was drained away. Each action had, in theory, an innovative dimension. However, it is the interdisciplinarity of actions with regard to the impoverishment of La Duchère that was innovative in many respects. Yet, as we indicated before, the coherence of the UPP was put to the test by the operational aspects.

As for the exchange of experience component, offers from the cities of Belfast, Dublin, Salamanca, and Swansea were made to the City of Lyon, but were not pursued. The Mayor of Lyon wanted to communicate on the UPP only once the project had been achieved. Furthermore, the City made a commitment to organize a seminar on the UPP for the end of the year 1995. As of today, this seminar has not been held. Generally speaking, communication within the UPP was neglected, making the image of the project “fuzzy” to the point of giving the impression of a project revised downwards compared with the initial version. Also, the redefinition of the UPP has made the transfer of the Lyon experience much less relevant. Creating commercial and artisanal premises, building workshops and offices or opening an employment agency has no demonstrative effect susceptible to interest other European cities. In a way, the Lyon UPP has enabled reflection on the development of disadvantaged neighborhoods.

3 Constraints in the Implementation of UPP

The difficulties encountered in the Lyon UPP or in the other projects refer first of all to the absence of a call for proposalsFootnote 9 in the procedure for selecting initiatives and to the basic preparation of the projects. The European Commission maintains that for the selection of initiatives “the focus has always been on identifying projects that would enable the selected area to assist the functioning and well-being of the city rather than to handle directly its social or housing problems” (Commission Européenne 1992). Yet, the action of most of the projects targeted small areas facing social problems. Only the six UPPs targeting the revitalization of historic city-centers were part of a dynamic that focused on the urban structure as a whole.

Also, more than half of the UPP beneficiary cities are located outside of Priority Objectives areas of regional policy and therefore were not eligible for funding by the ERDF, whose mission is to reduce regional disparities. Some cities are among the richest cities in the European Union—London, Copenhagen, Brussels, Madrid, Rotterdam, Berlin, Lyon, Antwerp, Toulouse, Bordeaux, and Venice. The most revealing example is that of Rotterdam, which received 2.63 million € from the European Commission (50 % of total cost) to revitalize and fight urban decay and poverty in the Kop Van Zuid district. In fact, this UPP is only the social component of a large operation in this area, the cost of which has reached 2.5 billion €. In the case of Brussels, the ERDF financed the activities of local associations, some of which were already receiving aid from the European Social Fund.

In addition, the few applications or projects presentedFootnote 10 by the cities to the European Commission show a lot of inaccuracy as well as a brief preparation of operations to be carried out. Some requests made to the European Commission barely constitute a working hypothesis. In employment, rehabilitation, or renovation of buildings, no quantitative targets have been set. In half of the UPPs, the proposed actions have not been carried out, even though the project implementation period was doubled compared to the initial schedule. Thus, in Copenhagen, the main UPP action, achieving an urban Ecotechnology center that recycles waste from the construction industry, was abandoned because of noise pollution and fire risks due to the use of flammable materials. In the case of Genoa, the renovation and the upgrading of the acropolis of Genoa, as well as the conversion of Santo Salvatore church into a cultural center, were not realized. In Gibraltar, the development of centralized waste treatment facilities was not concretized. For Marseille, no action has materialized on the improvement of public transportation. Finally, in Aalborg, the urban renewal center closed its doors after being opened for 6 months.

According to the provisions governing the Structural Funds (JOCE 1988a, b), the Community aid, from which the cities of the UPPs have benefitted, should be forfeited in whole or in part if the nature or conditions of implementation of the projects experience significant changes. Although the quasi-majority of UPPs are in this case, the European Commission has only sanctioned the city of Thessaloniki by deducting € 250,000 of its initial allocation, which represents 4.5 % of the total amount (Commission Européenne 1997b).

The innovative action desired by the European Commission presupposes the idea of a new alternative to existing solutions and procedures. In reality, the measures designated jointly by the cities and the European Commission (Commission Européenne 1995; RECITE 1995) as innovative were similar to those already in practice. For Antwerp, innovation lies in “an interview between a counselor and client to identify a way forward and identify customer needs in terms of training and support.” In Bilbao “self-rehabilitation is a major innovation.” Another example, Stoke-on-Trent where “to provide opportunities for training and employment is an innovation” (Regional Policy 2014). All of these measures are similar to those implemented in most Member States and even in the operational programs on the renovation of historic centers or on the return to employment of objectives 1 and 2. One of the most common actions in employment and the fight against social exclusion was the creation of service centers, which propose information services, career guidance and/or training to the local population, as well as support services or counseling for small- and medium-sized enterprises. These mechanisms used in German, Belgian, British, French, and Dutch UPPs were already a current practice in those countries (Van Den Berg et al. 1998). UPP local managers consider that the sluggishness in European and national financial and administrative channels led to the renunciation of the rare innovative aspects of the projects. By giving the priority to the procedures at the expense of the process, the interest of European Commission initiatives in the urban field is much more limited in terms of new model development or acquisition of transferable knowledge.

This aspect partly explains the virtual absence of procedures for exchange of experiences between cities, apart from organizing conferences, and publishing information letters on the projects. Out of 33 UPPs, 11 have organized conferences and 3 have organized workshops. Mere coincidences, or perhaps a condition of the European Commission, the cities which have organized these meetings, with the notable exception of Athens and Dublin, are the last to have been chosen for the UPP program. The participation level at these seminars was 23 %, and it is practically the same cities that attend these meetings. To explain, the variable interpretation of the “exchange and transfer of experiences at the Community level” component, our interlocutors, in the cities, invoke difficulties with the language of communication and the differences in politico-administrative culture. This latter argument is consolidated by the establishment of networks of exchange, mainly on administrative procedures of the Structural Funds, between cities of the same Member States: Germany, Austria, France, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Moreover, some UPP local managers have expressed willingness to share their experience, but “did not know what the European Commission wanted because nothing was asked from them.” On the contrary, other managers did not see the interest in the exchange of experiences.

In light of these factors, we can argue that the establishment of the urban initiatives was a pretext for institutionalization of relations, up to that point informal, between local governments and the European Commission. Solving urban problems was not an end in itself, but a means to mobilize cities without the control of Member States. This first program developed by the European Commission can be regarded as display logic.Footnote 11 Ease of Community aid has driven a dynamic incentive to mobilize cities on the occasion of the launch of the second UPP series. Following the call for proposals of November 30, 1995, the European Commission received 503 proposals. If in the first series of UPP all cities had received Community subsidies, only 26 of 503 cities had acquired it in the second series after a drastic selection.Footnote 12 The second series of UPP perfectly illustrates the passage of “incentive” mobilization to “selective” mobilization. Initially, the European Commission was in search of recognition and direct dialogue with cities, and then, the cities began looking for European Commission “favors”. Virtually, all EU cities over 250,000 inhabitants in 1995 had submitted a proposal in the framework of the second series of UPP.

Moreover, this incentive mobilization is behind the implementation of the URBAN program. According to Bruce Millan, European Commissioner for Regional Policy, the European Commission is simply responding to a growing demand from cities affected by the same problems in some of their neighborhoods (Cour des Comptes Européenne 2001). However, the granting of a Community allocation has become conditional and only the cities that develop projects in line with the European Commission agenda obtain it. Furthermore, UPP or URBAN, whose demonstrative value cannot be measured in terms of the Community allocation—on average € 2.8 million by UPP and € 8.7 million for URBAN—must be assessed in terms of their ability to change the way cities tackle urban problems. The European Commission considers that the relative failure of local authorities to deal with urban problems is a matter of procedure (Commission Européenne 1997a). Thus, efforts were focused on the methodology and incentive virtues of obtaining EU funds. This is based on the results of the actions undertaken in UPP and URBAN programs. In more than two-thirds of cases, the programs have not achieved their objectives in terms of job creation. On the other hand, the procedures developed in the framework of these programs, especially partnership and the integrated approach, figure as reference in the Member States with little experience in urban policy.

4 Europeanization of Urban Policies: URBACT Program

This last point leads us to speak about the institution of the European Commission as a body of expertise on the stage of public action. European integration, according to Jean Monnet, establishes a special relationship between knowledge and public action. This is done by gathering currents of thought to challenge existing paradigms. The introduction of these new ways of thinking and doing is done through the exchange of experience programs and projects certified as “good practice” by the European Commission. The idea is ultimately to circulate and share values to make them common.

In the official brochure of Exchange of Experiences Program, which dates to 1990, it is mentioned that “the exchanges of experiences aim at encouraging communities to adopt, at their level, an European point of view, and thus to participate more actively in the implementation of Community policies, as well as to facilitate the dissemination of ideas and know-how between the decentralized communities.”Footnote 13 In the urban field, the European Commission was confronted with the lack of interest of cities in the exchange of experiences, in initiatives such as UPP or URBAN, whether during the implementation of the projects or after their completion, and that even though it was a priority for the European Commission. The common interest, namely discovering other ways and to judge its own ways, was not enough to spontaneously generate collective action. For Olson (1965), collective action is impossible without distribution of individualized remunerations. The participation of cities remains dependent on support by the European Commission of the costs of cooperation. The European Commission had to set up a program with a specific budget (24.76 million €, 16 million from ERDF), URBACT, to establish an exchange between beneficiary cities of UPP and URBAN.

The work of creating thematic exchange networks of URBACT program was relatively easy. However, the conversion process of the information held by each actor in useful and exploitable resources by all program partners was more difficult. On one hand, the “portability,” which is one of the keywords of the Community discourse, is based on a proactive process of learning and appropriation of external knowledge. On the other hand, the implementation of UPP and URBAN, supports of the exchange, was made in different economic, social, and environmental contexts and with a particular vision of the role of the State which makes the comparisons and the transfer of practices difficult. The example of Bremen and Groningen UPPs illustrates well the question of the “localization” for the treatment of urban problems. Sharing the same objective, namely the socioeconomic reactivation of a district characterized by a strong proportion of unemployment, both cities had adopted a similar type of intervention and a set of actions with a joint collaboration in the implementation of the two projects. The relative success of GroningenFootnote 14 UPP contrasts with the failure of Bremen’s.Footnote 15 Nearly 5 years after its approval by the European Commission, the URBACT program work led to the development of a knowledge transfer kit.Footnote 16 The purpose of this device is to “facilitate the transfer of know-how dispersed between different levels of government by helping the emergence of a capability of local expertise” (URBACT 2009). Let us recall that the initial objective of the URBACT program, according to the terms of the European Commission, was that “the exchanges are used to develop better integrated local policies and also in the design of national policies” and “to learn from the analysis of these experiences, and from policies led locally and to propose innovative approaches to address these difficulties” (JOCE 2000).

Under cover of a policy of consensual approach and open consultation, organizational mechanisms are set up to control mobilization and exchange.Footnote 17 In the ILE program, EEP, RECITE, DIRECTORIA, Open Days, or URBACT, the logic behind the action of the European Commission is not only the manifestation of a lack of knowledge that would indicate the difficulties related to the inability of local governments to solve urban problems. It is situated more broadly in a theoretical perspective of creating new knowledge to redefine the terms of the action and to disseminate and introduce new ways of thinking and doing. We are witnessing in some ways an Europeanization of knowledge.Footnote 18 Europeanization, in the sense of a strengthening of organizational ability of the European Commission as a level of action absolutely necessary to the local mobilization. Indeed, the proliferation of urban programs, under cover of the objective of economic and social cohesion, leads to the recognition of the local as a legitimate level of Community intervention. The European Commission wants to be a full actor, interacting with a maximum of interlocutors (Hooghe and Marks 2001). That is to put issues of partnership and subsidiarity at the center of debates on the process of European integration.

As a principle of programming, partnership is also a principle of political structuring and of the legitimacy of the actors in close relationships. It carries an integrating current in the direction of a constant expansion of the combined action of the European Commission and local government. However, it does not solve the problem of prerogatives assigned in each country, to the state and local authorities, for the implementation of Community policies. Part of the answer lies in the establishment of exchanges and transfer of experiences. The existence of these procedures can erase the political and administrative boundaries intended to govern the blocks of competence at every territorial level. Meanwhile, these procedures reveal new forms of collective learning by which the European Commission “Europeanizes” knowledge (Goldsmith 1993) and seeks to assert itself as a body of expertise on the stage of public action. Exchanges often pass through the associations of cities. The European Commission helped the creation of these associations and contributes to their maintenance by the allocation of funds for the implementation of cooperation projects or through study contracts and assistance. In return, the European Commission expects support from local governments for the adoption of its propositions by Member States. The proliferation of transnational networks of cities is a good indicator of the development of horizontal interactions.

Subsidiarity defines a mode of relations between the European Commission, Member States, and local authorities based on the priority given to the territorial level most relevant to carry out certain goals. Introduced by the Single Act, subsidiarity was limited to environmental issues before being extended to other areas with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. According to its Article 5, the European Commission is authorized to intervene in areas which do not fall within its exclusive powers, under the principle of subsidiarity, “only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at the Community level.” Thus, the establishment of the UPP or URBAN program is not considered as necessity, but it is part of the effectiveness of the public action. These programs therefore fall under the Community added value and are in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. They are designed as support programs and experimentation of local knowledge. The European Commission does not wish to substitute itself for States and Cities which are better placed to carry out most actions, but act in a complementary fashion to their actions. These precautions in the speech are aimed at certain Member States, which are wary of the increasing incursion of the European Commission in areas that are within their competence.

5 Conclusions

The action of the European Commission is not limited to a mere financial contribution. The European urban initiatives, such as UPP, URBAN and URBACT, are vectors of integration, a process through which the political, social, and economic dynamics of the European Union become part of local policies and of urban governance processes. This process, which concerns both individuals and institutions, is not mechanical. It is rather a set of transformations with different extent and nature. Disseminating and introducing new ways of thinking and doing became the main European Commission initiative in urban field.Footnote 19 If UPP and Urban programs have only known two phases, URBACT is in its third phase. The total eligible budget of URBACT III (2014–2020) is 96.3 million € (74.3 million ERDF contribution) that is about four times URBACT I budget (24.76 million €). The program covers all Member States and will develop three types of intervention: transnational exchange; capacity-building; and capitalization and dissemination. Projects financed under URBACT III will address four main objectives: improving the capacity of cities to deliver sustainable urban policies; improving the design of urban policies; improving policy implementation in cities; and building and sharing knowledge (European Commission 2014).

The extension of European Commission action means that legitimate and asymmetric dialogue between European Commission and central governments is replaced by a conversation with several participants. At first, the relationship between cities and the Commission was quite balanced and even favorable to Cities. The Commission, in search of legitimacy, needed political support and relay. To obtain the cooperation of cities, the Commission increased the financial incentives and showed great flexibility on the real Community interest of cities projects that have benefited from the Structural Funds. Subsequently, the criteria to obtain structural funds become stricter and more complex than those of national programs. The relationship between Cities and the European Commission becomes more favorable to the latter.

The formation of a Community action space generates a redistribution of authority. The more the interdependencies between Member States grow, the more the coordination problems are reinforced and promote the extension of European Commission powers. In response, Member States agree to transfer powers to the Commission only if in return they control certain aspects of the delegated powers. In this relationship, central governments are sometimes supported by regional governments with extended powers—Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Spain—that express more and more their reluctance to the expansion of the European Commission’s prerogatives which would signify a limitation of their field of action. Thus, in the field of regional policy, eligibility rules in the programming period 2007–2013 were solely defined at the national level rather than at EU level as in the past. In auditing, inspections can be carried out by national bodies, according to the applicable national regulations.Footnote 20 Another example, in URBAN II program, the Member States have also recovered the most important prerogative, namely the selection of beneficiary cities and the distribution of financial allocations. An operation that has achieved two goals simultaneously: first, to end the position of the European Commission as a direct funding source for cities, and secondly, to select the cities according to domestic political considerations, without considering the innovative aspect of the proposed approach.Footnote 21 To conclude, let us say that what is at stake is less the strict and rigid application of the subsidiarity principle than a spirit of cooperation between the various levels of government. In other words, urban governance in Europe should be seen within the multi-level governance in which the local executives are involved in the development of EU and national policies that affect their territories.