Abstract
In this work, we describe how to realize rational cryptographic protocols in practice from abstract game specifications. Existing work requires strong assumptions about communication resources in order to preserve equilibria between game descriptions and realized protocols. We argue that for real world protocols, it must be assumed that players have access to point-to-point communication channels. Thus, allowing signaling and strategy correlation becomes unavoidable. We argue that ideal world game descriptions of realizable protocols should include such communication resources as well, in order to facilitate the design of protocols in the real world. Our results specify a modified ideal and real world model that account for the presence of point-to-point communication channels between players, where security is achieved through the simulation paradigm.
The rights of this work are transferred to the extent transferable according to title 17 §105 U.S.C.
Access provided by Autonomous University of Puebla. Download to read the full chapter text
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to play any mental game. In: STOC 1987: Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 218–229. ACM, New York (1987)
Izmalkov, S., Micali, S., Lepinski, M.: Rational secure computation and ideal mechanism design. In: 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2005, pp. 585–594 (2005)
Alwen, J., Shelat, A., Visconti, I.: Collusion-free protocols in the mediated model. In: Wagner, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2008. LNCS, vol. 5157, pp. 497–514. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Alwen, J., Katz, J., Lindell, Y., Persiano, G., Shelat, A., Visconti, I.: Collusion-free multiparty computation in the mediated model. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 524–540. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Lepinksi, M., Micali, S., Shelat, A.: Collusion-free protocols. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2005, pp. 543–552. ACM, New York (2005)
Alwen, J., Katz, J., Maurer, U., Zikas, V.: Collusion-preserving computation. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Canetti, R. (eds.) CRYPTO 2012. LNCS, vol. 7417, pp. 124–143. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
Kamara, S., Mohassel, P., Raykova, M.: Outsourcing multi-party computation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2011/272 (2011), http://eprint.iacr.org/
Fuchsbauer, G., Katz, J., Naccache, D.: Efficient rational secret sharing in standard communication networks. In: Micciancio, D. (ed.) TCC 2010. LNCS, vol. 5978, pp. 419–436. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Halpern, J., Teague, V.: Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: Extended abstract. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2004, pp. 623–632. ACM, New York (2004)
Lysyanskaya, A., Triandopoulos, N.: Rationality and adversarial behavior in multi-party computation. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 180–197. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Canetti, R., Vald, M.: Universally composable security with local adversaries. In: Visconti, I., De Prisco, R. (eds.) SCN 2012. LNCS, vol. 7485, pp. 281–301. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
Nielsen, J.B., Alwen, J., Cachin, C., Nielsen, J.B., Pereira, O.: Summary report on rational cryptographic protocols (2007)
Poundstone, W.: Prisoner’s Dilemma: John Von Neumann, Game Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb, 1st edn. Doubleday, New York (1992)
Wallrabenstein, J.R., Clifton, C.: Privacy preserving tatonnement: A cryptographic construction of an incentive compatible market. In: Financial Cryptography and Data Security. LNCS. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)
Gordon, S.D., Katz, J.: Rational secret sharing, revisited. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/142 (2006), http://eprint.iacr.org/
Micali, S., Shelat, A.: Purely rational secret sharing (extended abstract). In: Reingold, O. (ed.) TCC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5444, pp. 54–71. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Groce, A., Katz, J., Thiruvengadam, A., Zikas, V.: Byzantine agreement with a rational adversary. In: Czumaj, A., Mehlhorn, K., Pitts, A., Wattenhofer, R. (eds.) ICALP 2012, Part II. LNCS, vol. 7392, pp. 561–572. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
Groce, A., Katz, J.: Fair computation with rational players. In: Pointcheval, D., Johansson, T. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2012. LNCS, vol. 7237, pp. 81–98. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
Zhang, Z., Liu, M.: Rational secret sharing as extensive games. Science China Information Sciences 56, 1–13 (2013)
Shamir, A.: How to share a secret. Commun. ACM 22(11), 612–613 (1979)
Maleka, S., Shareef, A., Rangan, C.P.: Rational secret sharing with repeated games. In: Chen, L., Mu, Y., Susilo, W. (eds.) ISPEC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4991, pp. 334–346. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Nojoumian, M., Stinson, D.R.: Socio-rational secret sharing as a new direction in rational cryptography. In: Grossklags, J., Walrand, J. (eds.) GameSec 2012. LNCS, vol. 7638, pp. 18–37. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
Kol, G., Naor, M.: Games for exchanging information. In: Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2008, pp. 423–432. ACM, New York (2008)
Kol, G., Naor, M.: Cryptography and game theory: designing protocols for exchanging information. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 320–339. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Zhang, Z., Liu, M.: Unconditionally secure rational secret sharing in standard communication networks. In: Rhee, K.-H., Nyang, D. (eds.) ICISC 2010. LNCS, vol. 6829, pp. 355–369. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
Ostrovsky, R., Yung, M.: How to withstand mobile virus attacks (extended abstract). In: Proceedings of the Tenth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 1991, pp. 51–59. ACM, New York (1991)
Katz, J.: Bridging game theory and cryptography: Recent results and future directions. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 251–272. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Osborne, M.J., Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press Books, vol. 1. MIT Press (1994)
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J.: Game Theory. MIT Press (August 991)
Asharov, G., Canetti, R., Hazay, C.: Towards a game theoretic view of secure computation. In: Paterson, K.G. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2011. LNCS, vol. 6632, pp. 426–445. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
Dodis, Y., Halevi, S., Rabin, T.: A cryptographic solution to a game theoretic problem. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 112–130. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Miltersen, P.B., Nielsen, J.B., Triandopoulos, N.: Privacy-enhancing auctions using rational cryptography. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 541–558. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Goldreich, O.: Foundations of Cryptography, vol. 2. Cambridge University Press (2004)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this paper
Cite this paper
Wallrabenstein, J.R., Clifton, C. (2014). Realizable Rational Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols. In: Poovendran, R., Saad, W. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8840. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-12600-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-12601-2
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)