Introduction

Existing literature on public perceptions of legal authorities has highlighted the importance of examining trust in these institutions. Trust in legal institutions, such as the police and courts, helps maintain the legitimacy and effectiveness of the criminal justice system and subsequently enhances people’s willingness to cooperate with regulatory agencies (Tyler, 1990). Previous studies have identified the correlates of trust in the police and the courts across various global contexts (Cao et al., 2015; Cao & Dai, 2006; Jackson & Bradford, 2009; Johnston & Bartels, 2010; Reisig & Parks, 2000; Sun et al., 2016, 2019; Wu, 2014; Wu et al., 2012). Although many studies have analyzed public attitudes toward legal authorities in full democracies and authoritarian regimes, very few studies have assessed public perceptions of the police and courts in “flawed democracies,” such as the Philippines, where notable weaknesses in governance, participation, and political culture are observed (Putzel, 1999)

This study explores relevant factors that predict Filipinos’ trust in legal institutions, namely the police and the courts in the criminal justice system. More specifically, this study considers three frameworks (i.e., social trust, institutional performance, and media exposure) utilized in past evaluation studies concerning public trust in the police and courts. Despite being one of the earliest democracies in Asia, the Philippines has gradually moved away from a democracy since the 1960s. In the last decade, two authoritarian politicians, Rodrigo Duterte and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr, have assumed the presidency. The Duterte administration, in particular, has received critical domestic and international attention due to its controversial anti-drug campaigns and numerous extrajudicial killings (Lasco, 2018). The current president, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr, who is the son of past dictator Ferdinand Marcos, Sr., has expressed his intention to continue Duterte’s anti-drug policies, raising concerns for the future of the Philippine’s criminal and legal system (Ruud & Endresen, 2022). Under these broad sociopolitical developments in the Philippines, it is theoretically and practically significant to assess public views of two key social control institutions: the police and courts.

This study contributes to the criminal justice literature in several ways. First, although the past three decades have witnessed the burgeoning of studies on public assessments of the police and, to a lesser extent, the courts globally, the Philippines has been absent in this line of inquiry. Except for one recent study (Zhang et al., 2021), past research has yet to investigate factors related to Filipinos’ views of their criminal justice agencies. This study’s findings are likely to enrich our understanding of factors underlying public attitudes toward legal authorities in a society where democratic principles of accountability, transparency, and human rights are compromised.

Second, past studies have focused on public attitudes toward either the police or courts, with less than a handful of studies considering both institutions simultaneously (Cao et al., 2015; Inoguchi, 2017; Lai et al., 2010; Wu, 2014). Available information, albeit limited, reveals that Filipinos’ perceptions of the police and courts could vary due to their organizational structures, goals, and primary responsibilities (Sidel, 1999). The police are the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system, with officers engaging in frequent contact with the public and deciding who will and will not enter the system. The growing attention toward ongoing police violence and abusive behavior makes it plausible for the public to have more critical perceptions toward the Philippine police compared to the courts (Hapal & Jensen, 2017; Lasco, 2018; Maxwell, 2019). By including both institutions’ trustworthiness as evaluative items, this study comparatively assesses Filipinos’ general attitudinal patterns toward the police and courts and identifies whether such trust evaluations are connected to similar or distinctive factors.

Finally, drawing from existing theoretical frameworks surrounding social trust, institutional performance, and media exposure, this study incorporates three sets of predictors reflecting such perspectives into the data analysis. This study deepens our understanding of the relative explanatory power of significant factors. It also determines which framework becomes better suited to understanding public trust in the Philippines. By applying these frameworks within a Filipino context, this study extends past evaluation studies on the criminal justice system. Using recent survey data from the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), this study examines whether social trust, institutional performance, and media exposure and consumption are linked to Filipinos’ trustworthiness of legal authorities. This study is designed to address two research questions:

  1. 1.

    What are the general patterns of Filipinos’ trust in the police and courts?

  2. 2.

    Are variables reflecting social trust, institutional performance, and media exposure and consumption correlated to Filipinos’ trust in the police and courts?

Literature Review

Government-Citizen Relations in the Philippines

Since the Philippines’ earliest political history, public confidence in legal authorities has undergone various changes. After World War II, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation from the U.S. and began to maintain its own democratic governance. Nevertheless, since the presidential election of Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. in 1965, the country gradually shifted toward an authoritarian regime (Cao & Dai, 2006). Re-elected in 1969, Marcos engaged in fraudulent campaigns, where politicians and voters were revealed to be bought and corrupted (Thompson, 2018). His second term was accompanied by civil unrest, and in 1972, Marcos declared martial law. This period resulted in extreme political suppression, economic instability, and widespread corruption (Thompson, 2018). Tensions between the public and the government intensified, resulting in civil protests and international pressure to change the existing political system. With martial law ending in 1981 and the presidential election re-instated, it was not until the assassination of oppositional leader Benigno Aquino, Jr. in 1983 that an uprising among citizens began. As public support eroded, Marcos was forced out of his position and fled the country (Kuntz & Thompson, 2009). This erosion in public trust would also be found in subsequent democratic presidents, such as Joseph Estrada and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, both of whom were accused of corruptive acts and misusing public funds (Curato, 2017; Fuller, 2000). Despite being one of Asia's oldest democracies, the democratic process of the Philippines has been fragile, where elite dominance, institutional weakness, and widespread abuse by public officials have persisted (Dressel, 2011; Putzel, 1999).

In the Philippines, it is evident that several procedural dimensions have eroded, including the actors involved in upholding and enforcing the rule of law, such as the police. Decades of institutional neglect and corruption have bred widespread police misconduct during the 20th century (Hapal & Jansen, 2017). Under Marcos’ regime, the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) was formed through centralizing local and municipal police under the Armed Forces. The PC-INP was responsible for thousands of deaths and disappearances among residents (Hapal & Jansen, 2017). In 1991, attempts towards a decentralized police structure led to the creation of the Philippine National Police (PNP) (Sidel, 1999). However, local political families and elites maintained control of law enforcement, eroding any bureaucratic autonomy and tarnishing the professional image of the police (Sidel, 1999). As the Philippines’ political past continues to shape police relations with the public, this puts into question their institutional legitimacy.

Only a few studies have empirically evaluated Filipinos’ ratings of law enforcement. Cao and Dai (2006) found that the Philippines has lower confidence in the police compared to South Korea and Taiwan. When focusing solely on the Philippines, however, over half of the respondents reported having greater confidence in the police (Cao & Dai, 2006). This latter finding is also reflected in a recent article by Zhang et al. (2021), where the researchers reported that the mean levels of confidence in police increased from 2.43 to 2.62 between 2002 and 2014. The limited evidence calls for more research examining Filipinos’ trust in the police.

Compared to the police, the courts were historically viewed more positively. It was noted that the Philippine Supreme Court represented the most important institution of the criminal justice system, overseeing the three levels of courts of criminal and civil jurisdiction and several specialized courts (Tate & Haynie, 1993). High-profile cases involving human rights issues, separation of powers, and economic policies have been heard by the Supreme Court, generating public support and respect post-Marcos. Nevertheless, controversial decisions and incidences of judiciary bribery have also caused variation in public approval over time (Deinla, 2014; Dressel et al., 2024). During Marcos’s presidency, there is suggestion that justices are susceptible to partisanship and bias, potentially influencing the Supreme Court’s decision-making autonomy. Tate and Haynie (1993) found that the onset of martial law decreased the performance of social control (e.g., the number of cases of criminal procedure rights violation) but did not impact the performance of conflict resolution (e.g., the number of cases involving civil suits). In other words, fear of coercion and pressures from Marcos’s administration may have resulted in some judges altering their decision-making on certain cases. High-level corruption cases, typically those against previous leaders, were also noted to be rarely prosecuted by the Supreme Court (Dressel, 2011). Despite limited empirical evidence, the flawed Philippine judicial system possesses implications for government-citizen relations and evaluations, especially under the recent Duterte administration (Dressel et al., 2024).

Compared to policing literature, the Philippines courts received even rarer empirical attention. In one comparative study (Inoguchi, 2017), the author found that the Philippines had higher levels of confidence in the courts than in other Asian countries, such as Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, and European countries, such as France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Other studies assessing the predictors of institutional trust have used a composite variable of trust in political institutions, including the police and courts (Pernia, 2022a, 2022b). Since no other study has examined the perceptions of the courts in the Philippines independently, there is a need to fill this knowledge gap.

The Philippines has also received critical domestic and international attention for its recent presidential leadership in recent years. During Rodrigo Duterte’s term as president from 2016 to 2022, the government carried out controversial anti-drug campaigns, referred to as the “war on drugs,” resulting in extra-judicial killings, violence, and disappearances (Lasco, 2018). It has also been well documented that Philippine law enforcement was linked to perpetuating such violence, as well as involvement in corrupt acts (Curato, 2017; Hapal & Jensen, 2017; Jensen & Hapal, 2018; Lasco, 2018; Maxwell, 2019; Thompson, 2018). As for the courts, there was some indication that this institution acted independently from Duterte, though public concerns about judicial independence persisted (Dressel et al., 2024). In fact, Duterte made intimidation attempts and threatened to declare martial law if the courts were against his anti-drug operation (Jerusalem & Ramos, 2016). Despite their distinct roles in operations and enforcement of the law, the ongoing scrutiny of the Philippine police suggests that the public perceptions of the police and courts may vary. This study aims to fill the gap in literature by considering the public assessments of the courts along with the police and identifying which specific factors predict trust in the police and courts.

It is also important to consider the current presidency of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. As the son of Ferdinand Marcos, Sr., Filipinos’ trust in their legal authorities is likely to decline. Ruud and Endresen (2022) suggested that Filipinos were often reminded of Marcos, Sr.’s regime, leading to political, cultural, and social anxieties within the country. A recent study found that those with lower support for Marcos, Sr., and his martial law policies were less likely to support and vote for Marcos, Jr. (Dulay et al., 2023). This historical context may continue shaping public trust in criminal and legal institutions, including the police and courts.

Correlates of Public Trust of Legal Institutions

Many studies in both Western and non-Western societies have examined the correlates of public trust in the police and courts. Among literature in Asia, growing research in this area has largely focused on East Asian societies such as China (e.g., Han et al., 2017; Lai et al., 2010; Sun et al., 2019; Wu & Sun, 2009), Taiwan (e.g., Cao et al., 2015; Cao & Dai, 2006; Sun et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2012), and South Korea (e.g., Hwang et al., 2005; Kwak & McNeeley, 2019; Park et al., 2021). However, empirical studies on Filipinos’ attitudes toward legal authorities remain limited (see Cao & Dai, 2006; Inoguchi, 2017; Lasco, 2018; Zhang et al., 2021), especially in comparing public trust in the police and the courts. While there have been several studies in the Philippines tapping into public perceptions of institutions, they did not assess trust in the police and courts or treat police and court trust as separate measures (Abun et al., 2021; Denton & Sanborn, 2024; Pernia, 2022a, 2022b). The police and courts are two major criminal justice agencies, functioning as distinct legal institutions separate from other political institutions and government systems. This study considers three frameworks (social trust, institutional performance, and media exposure) utilized in past studies to evaluate trust in the police and courts. By examining the relationships between these three groups of predictors, police trust, and court trust, this study offers additional perspectives into significant factors that shape institutional trust in the Philippines.

Social Trust

Social or interpersonal trust is proposed as a key contributor to institutional trust. More specifically, individuals with high levels of social trust are equally trusting of others and political intuitions (Keele, 2007; Rahn & Rudolph, 2005). It is also noted that social trust and political trust have a reciprocal relationship, while each is conceptually distinct (Brehm & Rahn, 1997).

Prior literature has identified two types of social trust: general trust and particularized trust (Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009). General trust is about one’s relational distance from another and involves trust with those outside of one’s immediate social circle. Trust with intimate or familiar others, such as family, friends, and relatives, is a function of particularized trust (Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009). Ultimately, the ability to trust others signals a society’s level of cohesion and cooperation, which is integral for democratic societies (Keele, 2007). Social trust is also significant in the literature on social capital, where civic engagement and interpersonal trust are reciprocally related to government confidence (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Keele, 2007; Rahn & Rudolph, 2005).

Existing research has confirmed the connection between social trust and evaluations of the police. For instance, U.S. and U.K. literature found that social trust is positively connected to trust in the police (Jackson & Sunshine, 2007; MacDonald & Stokes, 2006). For instance, Jackson and Sunshine (2007) reported that greater perceptions of social cohesion and social trust increased satisfaction with police effectiveness in addressing crime and police engagement with the local community. These patterns are also supported within Asian contexts (Han et al., 2017; Sun et al., 2019; Wu, 2014; Wu et al., 2012). For example, using survey data from China, Sun et al. (2019) revealed that social trust was significantly related to Chinese residents’ trust in both county and town police.

Similar patterns are also found when examining the relationship between social trust and confidence in the courts. In their study, Brehm and Rahn (1997) demonstrated that higher interpersonal trust increased confidence across the U.S. Executive Branch, Congress, and the Supreme Court. Cao et al.’ (2015) cross-national study also revealed similar findings, showing that particularized trust significantly predicted confidence in courts across the U.S., Taiwan, and Turkey. Wu’s (2014) study illustrated a similar relationship between social trust and trust in the police and courts when comparing China and Taiwan. This study includes both general and particularized trust to assess their relationships with police and court trustworthiness.

Institutional Performance

The institutional performance perspective describes how public satisfaction with legal institutions depends on their perceived performance (Citrin & Green, 1986; Hetherington, 1998). This linkage is evident within police evaluation literature, where performance is tightly related to confidence in law enforcement (Jackson & Bradford, 2009; Reisig & Parks, 2000; Sun et al., 2019; Wu et al., 2012). As forms of institutional performance, Wu et al. (2012) found that the government’s responsiveness and people’s ease of receiving police help increased trust in police officers in China and Taiwan. In South Korea, police effectiveness was reported to be positively related to confidence in the police (Park et al., 2021). Other international studies have also indicated that perceived public safety was tightly linked to police trust (Jackson & Bradford, 2009; Jackson & Sunshine, 2007; Sun et al., 2019; Wu, 2014). In contrast, government corruption, as an indicator of institutional integrity and performance, was inversely related to trust in the police (Wu et al., 2012; Wu & Sun, 2009).

The current literature contains minimal evidence linking institutional performance to public trust in the courts. Wu (2014) revealed that citizens’ sense of safety was positively related to trust in Chinese courts, while government corruption was associated with lower trust in courts in both China and Taiwan. While not implicitly conceptualized as institutional performance, these findings align with patterns found in police-related performance research. To expand the trust literature, this study assesses the connections between multiple performance indicators reflecting the government’s helpfulness, responsiveness, sense of safety, corruption, and people’s trustworthy views of the police and courts.

Media Exposure and Consumption

Media exposure demonstrates a complex association regarding public evaluations of legal authorities. Previous studies identified factors, such as the content, type of media, and frequency of media exposure, as important to consider (Sun et al., 2016; Wu, 2014). When it comes to media content, the media malaise theory (Robinson, 1976) posits how the consumption of negative television news media impacts citizens’ political engagement and commitment. It also assumes that such exposure increases legal cynicism and distrust in government authorities. Sun et al. (2016) found that negative reports on police were negatively predictive of trust and satisfaction with police. Similarly, news reports on police misconduct reduced public satisfaction with the police (Kaminski & Jefferis, 1998). While the media content matters, the media type also plays an important role.

Research has shown that different media types produce varying trust in legal institutions. Johnston and Bartels (2010) demonstrated that exposure to sensational media (i.e., political radio and cable news) lowered trust in the U.S. Supreme Court, whereas sober media (i.e., newspapers and network news) had no impact. While foreign news consumption decreased trust in both the police and courts in Taiwan, television, newspaper, and internet exposure had no significant effect (Wu, 2014). Interestingly, Zhang et al. (2021) reported that internet use was negatively related to confidence in Philippine police. Though less explored in current studies, further examination of the impact of the Internet must be considered.

The frequency of media exposure is also likely to affect trust in the police and courts. According to Norris’s virtuous circle theory (Norris, 2000), frequent media use can result in greater civic engagement and government trust. In other words, politically interested, engaged, and trusting people will likely watch more news on politics and learn more about the government, producing greater trust and engagement in this virtuous cycle. Contrary to this assumption, evidence from Zhang et al. (2021) demonstrates that Filipinos who frequently use the Internet have lower trust in the police. It is unclear whether the same pattern can be found in people’s trust in the courts, warranting further research. In this study, measures reflecting Internet use frequency, engagement in political news, and usage of traditional media sources (i.e., television, newspaper, or radio) are considered to assess the impact of the media on police and court trust.

Current Study

This study attempts to fill gaps in the literature on public evaluations of the police and courts within a non-Western context. Although recent scholarly attention has been paid to the political climate of the Philippines, little is known about the factors shaping people’s assessments of police and court trust in the country. This study provides new insights by 1) exploring the general patterns of public trust in both the police and courts in the Philippines and 2) evaluating the relationships between three groups of predictors and Filipinos’ trust in these institutions. Drawing from theoretical frameworks of social trust, institutional performance, and media exposure, the following study hypotheses are formulated and tested:

H1a: Filipinos’ social trust is positively related to their trust in the police.

H1b: Filipinos’ social trust is positively connected to trust in the courts.

H2a: Filipinos’ positive evaluations of institutional performance (e.g., police help, government responsiveness, and sense of safety) tend to raise their trust in the police, whereas their negative assessments of institutional performance (e.g., corruption) tend to lower their trust in the police.

H2b: Filipinos’ positive evaluations of institutional performance (e.g., police help, government responsiveness, and sense of safety) tend to raise their trust in the courts, whereas their negative assessments of institutional performance (e.g., corruption) tend to lower their trust in the courts.

H3a: Filipinos with greater media exposure and consumption are likely to have lower trust in the police.

H3b: Filipinos with greater media exposure and consumption are likely to have lower trust in the courts.

Methods

Data and Sample

This study uses data from the fifth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) (2018-2021). The ABS is one of the largest cross-national survey projects focusing on public opinion topics related to political values, economic conditions, democracy, and governance. The ABS is housed in the Center for East Asia Democratic Studies at National Taiwan University. Since its launch in 2001, the survey has now been administered to 17 countries and regions across East, Southeast, and South Asia, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, mainland China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. A national research team normally conducts face-to-face survey interviews with each country’s residents.

This paper focuses on the ABS data collected from the Philippines in 2018, the most recent available ABS data. The survey instrument contains various questions concerning people’s attitudes toward political institutions, political participation, opinions on democracy, and views on economic growth and globalization. It also includes questions related to perceptions of family, traditions and norms, citizenship, the internet, and social media. To ensure construct validity, theoretical concepts were composed of several items. The wording of questions was determined by the comprehensibility and effectiveness of each item, which was tested in the previous waves of the ABSFootnote 1.

The Philippine survey data were collected using stratified multistage probability sampling techniques. First, four areas of the country (i.e., the National Capital Region, Balance Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao) were chosen as data collection sites. Among these regions, a total of 20 sampling units of provinces were identified. Second, the sampling of 62 municipalities was performed within each group. The same procedure was conducted within each sampling spot among the municipalities. Respondents were selected randomly from each spot for a sample size of 1,200 (300 from each region). Census-based population weights were also employed to ensure representative figures. All respondents were 18 or older and resided in one of the four regions mentioned. Lastly, cases with missing values were dropped from the analysis, leading to a final sample size of 1,043 respondents.

Measures

Dependent Variables

Two measures, trust in the police and trust in the courts, are constructed as dependent variables. Respondents were asked to indicate how much trust they have in the police and the courts. The response categories were: "distrust fully" (1), "distrust a lot" (2), "distrust somewhat” (3), “trust somewhat” (4), “trust a lot” (5), and “trust fully” (6). The original response categories were used to display percentage distributions in the later section. However, preliminary analysis revealed that both ordinal-level outcome variables violated the proportional odds assumption. Therefore, both variables were recoded into dummy variables, with 0 representing “distrust” (i.e., distrust fully, distrust a lot, and distrust somewhat) and 1 signaling “trust” (i.e., trust fully, trust a lot, and trust somewhat) in the regression analysis.

Independent Variables

The independent variables are classified into three groups: social trust, institutional performance, and media exposure and consumption. Social trust comprises four single-item variables: general trust, trust in relatives, trust in neighbors, and trust in othersFootnote 2. In measuring general trust, respondents were asked the question, “General speaking, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement that ‘most people are trustworthy’?” (1= “strongly disagree”; 4= “strongly agree”). Trust in relatives and trust in neighbors were both measured by asking how much trust respondents have in relatives and neighbors, respectively. Responses included: “distrust fully” (1), “distrust a lot” (2), “distrust somewhat” (3), “trust somewhat” (4) “trust a lot” (5), and “trust fully” (6). Similarly, trust in others involved asking respondents to report how much trust they had in other people they interact with (1= “distrust fully”; 6= “trust fully). To keep interpretations for the analysis straightforward, all four variables were recoded into dichotomous variables for the analysis (0= “distrust”; 1= “trust”).

Institutional performance includes four single-item measures that reflect respondents' perception of performance: police help, government responsiveness, sense of safety, and corruption. Respondents were asked for police help: “As far as you know, how easy or difficult is it to obtain help from the police when you need it?” The response categories were: “difficult” (0) and “easy” (1). Government responsiveness involves asking respondents how well they think the government responds to what people want. Responses included: “not responsive at all” (0) and “responsive” (1). To capture the sense of safety, respondents were asked how safe is living in their city/town/village (0= “unsafe”; 1= “safe”). Corruption was measured by the question “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?”: “hardly anyone is involved” (1), “not a lot of officials are corrupt” (2), “most officials” (3), and “almost everyone is corrupt” (4). This variable was later recoded to express dichotomous outcomes to ensure ease in reporting results (0= “not all or hardly anyone”; 1= “most or almost everyone”).

The media exposure and consumption group consists of three single-item variables, internet use, following political news, and reliance on traditional media. Internet use was captured by asking respondents how often they use the internet, whether through a computer, tablet, or smartphone. Responses were: “never” (1), “hardly ever” (2), “a few times a year” (3), “at least once a month” (4), “at least once a week” (5), “less than half hour a day” (6), “half to one hour a day” (7), “several hours a day” (8), and “connect all the time” (9). These were later recoded into “once a month or less” (0) and “at least once a week or more” (1). For the variable follows political news, respondents were asked how often they followed news about politics and government: “practically never” (1), “not even once” (2), “once or twice” (3), “several times” (4), “everyday” (5). To simplify interpretation, this was also recoded into dichotomous outcomes: “once or twice a week or less” (0), “several times a week or more” (1). Reliance on traditional media uses the question “Which one is the most important channel for you to find information about politics and government?” The response categories comprised of: “television” (1), “newspaper (print and online)” (2), “internet and social media” (3), “radio” (4), and “other channel” (5). To reference traditional media sources in the Philippines (see Arceo, 2017; Newman et al., 2023), this measure was recoded into a dummy variable with 0 representing “internet and social media” and “other channel,” and 1 representing “television,” “newspaper (print and online),” and “radio.”

Control Variables

The analysis treated several sociodemographic characteristics as control variables, including respondents’ sex, age, household income, educational attainment, and residence type. Sex, education, and residence type are coded as dummy variables, with 1 representing female, completed secondary/high school education, and urban residence, respectively. Age is measured in years. Household income is captured using an ordinal variable (1= Fifth Quintile, less than P 5,500; 5= First Quintile, P 40,001 and above).

Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis. About 49% of the total respondents are female and have a mean age of 42. Respondents have an average lower level of income of P 5,501 to P 10,000 (about $97 to $178) or are in the Fourth Quintile (mean= 2.28). Finally, 55% live in an urban area, and at least 58% of respondents have received at least a completed secondary/high school education. Possible multicollinearity problems were examined by analyzing independent and control variables’ variance inflation factors (VIFs) (Fisher & Mason, 1981). All VIFs were below two (both means=1.22); thus, no multicollinearity was detected.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics (n= 1,043)
Full size table

Analytical Plan

The analysis proceeds in two steps to assess Filipinos’ trust in their legal institutions. To answer the first research question (e.g., what are the general patterns of Filipinos’ trust in the police and courts), percentage distributions using the original 6-category responses of trust in the police and trust in the courts are reported to display the general patterns of institutional trustworthiness.

Regression analysis was used to address the second research question about whether variables reflecting social trust, institutional performance, and media exposure and consumption are correlated to Filipinos’ trust in police and courts. As both dependent variables were recoded into dichotomous measures, binary logistic regression was utilized to evaluate the relationships between the explanatory variables and institutional trust measures. To assess the explanatory power of the three groups of predictors, each group was also introduced into the models in an order using a hierarchical logistic regression. All regression models were estimated using StataSE 16.1.

Results

Percentage Distributions of Police and Court Trustworthiness

The first research question addresses the general pattern of Filipinos’ police and court trustworthiness. Table 2 reports the percent distributions for trust in the police and trust in the courts, using the original response categories. As depicted in the table, two general patterns emerge. First, Filipino respondents expressed generally favorable ratings of police and court trustworthiness. As demonstrated in the column of (3)+(4)+(5), about 80% of the respondents stated that they trust the police and courts “somewhat,” “a lot,” or “fully.” Nonetheless, when the category “somewhat” was removed from the analysis, the favorable ratings (i.e., “trust a lot” and “trust fully”) dropped noticeably to 36.5% for the police and 31.9% for the courts. In other words, as seen in the column (5)+(6), only one-third of the respondents trust a lot or fully of the police and courts. Second, the results indicate general similarities between respondents’ trust in the police and trust in the courts. Although the respondents rendered a higher mean to the police (4.23) than to the courts (4.18), the mean difference is not significant. More respondents rated the courts as "trust somewhat" but few fell into the categories of "trust a lot" and "trust fully," resulting in a slightly lower evaluation of the courts than the police.

Table 2 Percent distribution for trust in legal institutions (n=1,043)
Full size table

Regression Analyses of Police and Court Trustworthiness

The second research question considers whether variables reflecting social trust, institutional performance, and media exposure and consumption are predictive of Filipinos’ trust in the police and courts. Table 3 presents the logistic regression results on respondents’ trust in the police. Results in Model 1 indicate that sociodemographic predictors, such as living in an urban area, decreased the odds of trust in the police by 49%. Once adding the social trust covariates, as seen in Model 2, all four variables reflecting social trust significantly predicted the odds of trusting the police, where 11% additional variation in police trust is explained by such group. Having general trust, trust in relatives, trust in neighbors, and trust in others known personally increased the odds of police trust by more than 90%, net of all other factors.

Table 3 Binary logistic regression predicting trust in the police (n= 1,043)
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In Model 3, three of the four institutional performance variables significantly predicted the odds of police trustworthiness, net of all other variables. For every one-unit increase in the ease of receiving police help, the odds of trust in the police increase by 135% (OR= 2.35, p<.001)Footnote 3. Government responsiveness raises the odds of police trust by 42% (OR=1.42 p<.05), whereas witnessing greater government corruption or bribe-taking decreases the odds of trusting police by 31% (OR=.69, p<.05). With the r-squared coefficient increasing to 16%, it is evident that about 3% of the variation in police trustworthiness is explained by these three institutional performance predictors.

As the full model, Model 4 incorporates the media exposure and consumption variables. Here, none of the media variables were significantly related to the odds of having police trust, and thus, H3a is not supported. It is important to note that results from Model 4 show that all four social trust variables (general trust, trust in relatives, trust in neighbors, and trust in others known personally) continued to increase the odds of trust in the police by about 70% to 100%, even after controlling for other factors. The ease of receiving police help and having the government responsive were also related to trust in the police. On the other hand, witnessing government corruption remained negatively significant, net of all variables (OR=. 69, p<.05). Overall, results from the full model provide support for H1a and H2a and none for H3a.

Table 4 presents the logistic regression results for trust in the courts. The results of Model 1 indicate that respondents who are older and are living in urban areas are less trusting of the courts by about 1% and 37%, respectively. In Model 2, after controlling for sociodemographic characteristics, three of the four variables reflecting social trust significantly predicted the odds of trusting the courts. Having general trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in others known personally enhanced the odds of trust in the courts by roughly 70 to 90%, holding all other factors constant. Additionally, 9% of the variation in court trustworthiness is explained by this model.

Table 4 Binary logistic regression predicting trust in the courts (n= 1,043)
Full size table

Concerning institutional performance variables, Model 3 shows that only one variable was significantly associated with the odds of court trustworthiness, net of all sociodemographic characteristics, and social trust covariates. Specifically, receiving help from the police increased the odds of trust in the courts by 97%, net of all controls (OR=1.97, p<001). It is also evident that the r-squared coefficients increase to 11% compared to Model 2. In other words, 2% of the variation in court trust is explained by receiving police help.

Model 4 presents the full model of all explanatory variablesFootnote 4, including the media exposure and consumption covariates. As shown, only internet use was significantly related to the odds of court trust. For every unit increase in internet use, the odds of trusting the courts decreased by 38%, holding all controls constant (OR=.62, p<.05). It is also shown that age remains significantly related to trust in the courts, where younger respondents are more likely signal this trust (OR=.98, p<.001). Having general trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in others known personally continued to predict court trust by roughly 60 to 85%. Further, ease of receiving help from police remained positively significant of trust in the court, holding all other factors constant (OR=2.04, p<.001). With these findings, there is general support for H1b, though minimal evidence for H2b and H3b.

Robustness Checks

Given the explanatory power of the social trust variables in predicting police and court trust, we conducted an additional robustness test to ensure that the results from Tables 3 and 4 are representative. Table 5 in Appendix A displays the partial correlation across the social trust and outcome variables, with correlation coefficients suggesting low (.14) to modest (.43) relationships. These further confirm that the effects of the social trust covariates are not caused by the correlation between the covariates. Moreover, alternative binary transformations of the trust in police and trust in court outcome measures along with several social trust variables (i.e., coding the variables by selecting only “trust a lot” and “trust fully” as a positive response) were considered. Appendix B in Table 6 and C in Table 7 display the additional regression resultsFootnote 5. In Model 4 for Appendix B in Table 6, it is evident that three social trust variables remain predictive of trust in the police (general trust, trust in relatives, and trust in neighbors). Perceived help from police, government responsiveness, and urbanicity also remain significantly related to police trust. Model 4 for Appendix C in Table 7 produced somewhat similar results for trust in the courts, as shown in Table 4. Among the social trust factors, general trust, trust in relatives, and trust in others known personally increased the odds of court trust. While perceived help from police and internet use is no longer significant, government responsiveness emerges as a predictor for trust in the courts.

Discussion

The fragile democracy of the Philippines provides a unique context for understanding the correlates of trust in the police and courts. As interconnected functions of the criminal justice system, the police and court system have distinct procedural operations and roles, causing differences in public interaction. In light of the Duterte administration, the growing attention toward the Philippine police suggests potential differences in how the public perceives the police and the courts. However, studies to date have yet to examine and compare public perceptions of the police and courts in the Philippines. With only a few evaluating the correlates of Filipinos’ trust in the police (Cao & Dai, 2006; Zhang et al., 2021) and only one assessing factors related to confidence in the Philippines court system (Inoguchi, 2017), this study contributes to the existing criminal justice literature on public perceptions of legal authorities by assessing the factors that predict trust in the police and courts simultaneously, particularly a weakened democratic society.

Similar to the general attitudinal patterns found in other democracies, most Filipino respondents expressed favorable opinions on police and court trustworthiness, but only one-third strongly endorsed trust in the police and courts (e.g., trust a lot and trust fully). This finding echoes the rise of critical citizens since the 1990s, showing emergent cynical attitudes toward democratic governance (Norris, 1999). This paper uses survey data collected during the Duterte administration, plagued by extra-judicial killings and corruption scandals, and potentially contributes to somewhat reserved support for legal authorities in the Philippines. In 2022, Marcos, Jr. was elected as president of the Philippines, a year in which data has yet to be collected. Concerns about Marcos, Jr. continuing Duterte’s plans today create implications for public evaluation research. Given Marcos’ family history and the potential continuances of authoritarianism, future studies must consider how Filipinos’ trust in legal institutions may shift under his presidency and afterward.

The analyses on the correlates of police and court trustworthiness reveal several important findings. First, the study confirms the importance of social trust when it comes to assessing Filipinos’ trust in the police and courts. All four social trust variables (general trust, trust in relatives, trust in neighbors, and trust in others known personally) were related to police trust, whereas general trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in others known personally were linked to court trust. As such, the predictive power of these variables explained about 9%, and 7% of the variation in police trust and court trust, respectively. These findings are consistent with past studies examining the relevance of social trust and evaluations of the police (Han et al., 2017; Jackson & Sunshine, 2007; Sun et al., 2019; Wu, 2014; Wu et al., 2012) and literature examining the connections between generalized and particularized trust and court trustworthiness (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Cao et al., 2015; Wu, 2014).

Overall, this underscores the significance of the social trust perspective in explaining institutional trust in the Philippines, compared to explanations of perceived institutional performance and media awareness. Building on the social trust thesis, the level of social trust can be extended to Filipinos’ assessments of trust in political institutions (Brehm & Rahn, 1997). The heavy cultural emphasis on family and kin in the Philippines is likely to signal their level of cooperation and civic engagement (Putzel, 1999). As a result, such cohesion can be connected to Filipinos’ perceptions of the police and courts even in the sociopolitical context of the country. This is not to say that social trust is the only explanation that helps us to understand public perceptions of the police and courts, but instead, it provides context into how formal and informal ties matter most in signaling Filipinos’ institutional trust.

Second, we find that the ability to receive help from the police promoted public trust in the police and courts, demonstrating some significance of the perceived performance framework. Our finding aligns with one comparative study on China and Taiwan, where the researchers reported a linkage between ease of receiving police help, government responsiveness, corruption, and trust in the police (Wu et al., 2012). Also, consistent with patterns found in police performance literature, such findings may be related to police visibility. The Philippine National Police (PNP) operates both on a national and local level and has the widest interaction with the public (Sidel, 1999). In turn, their actions are closely examined by Filipinos as they are perceived as a function of the justice system.

Contrary to expectations, experiencing the government’s responsiveness and witnessing widespread corruption or bribe-taking are related to public trust in the police but not the courts. It is possible that these two factors may not be directly associated with court trust in the Philippines compared to other performance indicators, but rather, involve a more complex relationship involving the direct functions of the police. Nonetheless, such results from the police trust model affirm the connections seen in prior police evaluation research (Park et al., 2021; Wu et al., 2012; Wu & Sun, 2009), as well as the corruption trends in the Philippines. Corruption indicators (i.e., TI Corruption Perception Indexes and World Back Governance Indicators) have been used to assess the perceptions of public sector corruption in the Philippines, consistently showing that the country has been ranked at the lower end of these indexes over the past two decades, indicating greater perceptions of corruption (Dressel, 2011; Tidwell, 2016). Decades of corruption undermined the integrity of the police and can explain the link between government performance and trust in the police.

Surprisingly, results also show that a sense of safety produced is not related to trust in the police and courts. Prior research has shown a strong association between perceived safety and institutional trust (Jackson & Bradford, 2009; Jackson & Sunshine, 2007; Sun et al., 2019; Wu, 2014). However, given the importance of social trust, it is likely that other informal control behaviors could be taking place in these settings. Future studies should consider whether Filipinos are likely to engage in individual or communal prevention actions and whether these may connect to their perceptions of safety and risk.

Third, media exposure and consumption unexpectedly are largely ineffective in predicting Filipinos’ trust in legal authorities. Internet use is the only media variable found to be negatively related to Filipinos’ trust in the courts and weakly associated with trust in the police. While this relationship was not found in any Philippine court literature, this is reflected in the findings by Zhang et al.’ (2021) study, where frequent Internet use reduced Filipino residents’ police trust. Unlike assumptions from Norris’s virtuous cycle theory (Norris, 2000), internet use may facilitate more critical residents who are distrustful of authority figures. The Internet may provide greater information on the court system than traditional media sources, and thus, may be linked to Filipinos’ views of this system. Future research should consider the nuances of the type of media used and content provided, given the precarity of journalism in the Philippines.

The insignificant results from following the news on politics and relying on traditional media platforms (i.e., radio, television, and newspaper) can also be attributed to the current media landscape, where attacks on Philippine media and journalism have occurred. Under both the Duterte and Marcos, Jr. administrations, there have been numerous “red tagging” cases where certain journalists and major news organizations were demonized by the government (Newman et al., 2023). While there is a potential link between press violation and media trust, a recent report conducted on the Philippines media demonstrates that such trust varies by different media organizations. Specifically, Newman et al. (2023) noted that long-established media companies, such as GMA Network and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, often have higher levels of trust, whereas independent outlets known to be critical of those in powerful positions are often distrusted by supporters of politicians. The complexity between trust and media bias can complicate the media-institutional evaluation relationship, where partisanship can shape how the public receives messages.

Lastly, age and urban residency matter in predicting public trust in the police and courts in the Philippines. Older age is accompanied by diminished trust in the courts, while living in an urban area is associated with lower trust in the police. As this is less articulated in the Philippine literature, these findings add to the existing evidence analyzing the relationships between demographic characteristics and attitudes toward legal institutions (Lai et al., 2010; Wang & Sun, 2020; Wu, 2014; Wu et al., 2012). Older Filipinos are likely to be more cynical of the courts, given their potential experiences and the historical trajectory of the Philippine government. With the sociopolitical changes over the last several decades, those who witnessed social changes may have declining institutional trust. Additionally, noticeable variations in urbanization and socioeconomic development in the Philippines are also likely to shape the gap between urban and rural residencies. Filipinos living in urban areas most often have access to educational resources, public services, and political information. In line with evidence from Zhang et al. (2021), better-informed and educated Filipino residents are likely more critical of the police given the wealth of information they are exposed to.

Given the exploratory nature of this study, several limitations should be mentioned. First, the cross-sectional nature and distinct coding of this recent ABS data hinder the ability to determine the causal relationships of the study variables. Future research may consider analyzing upcoming waves of the ABS data to strengthen conclusions about the relationships between social trust, institutional performance, media exposure, and institutional trust. Second, secondary data is used for the analysis, creating limits on the items used in the ABS data. For instance, the covariates reflecting institutional performance comprised of respondents’ perceived performance of the police and government, rather than their actual performance. Survey items selected as key variables for this study also downplayed the complexity of the measured concepts, where trust in the police and trust in courts were measured using a single item. Although these measures appear to have good validity, current research has distinguished the differences between trust and other related concepts, such as confidence, satisfaction, and legitimacy (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Cao et al., 2015; Jackson & Bradford, 2009; Reisig & Parks, 2000; Sun et al., 2019; Tyler, 1990; Wu et al., 2012). Finally, the measure of trust in the courts does not distinguish between types of court systems, including special courts dealing with instances of corruption in the Philippines. Similar issues can also be seen with the measures of traditional media. Unlike previous findings about the impact of media exposure, our media measures failed to predict trust in the police and counts. The lack of more specific measures on media consumption, such as asking respondents whether they have heard and read news about police misconduct and whether they believe such reports (see Sun et al., 2016 and Wu, 2014), is likely to contribute to a weak explanatory power of the media exposure and consumption group. Future research should employ measures to better capture the nuances of certain variables and how they can be related to institutional trust.

In sum, these findings have important policy implications. Public trust in legal authorities is not a straightforward concept but a multi-dimensional one, encompassing multiple factors on both communal and institutional levels. Policies aimed at increasing social trust, such as fostering community ties through events and collaboration, would be useful in cultivating institutional trust. Law enforcement in the Philippines should improve their performance and implement meaningful policies to help enhance the responsiveness and integrity of the government. These efforts to build up a fair and just police force can impact perceptions of the police and the court system, given the linkage of police performance. To enhance Filipinos’ trust in legal authorities and ensure the stability of the Philippines, it is necessary to prevent the severe police measures and anti-drug campaigns that were prevalent during Duterte’s term in office.