Abstract
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of fee income in Norweigan local governments. The point of departure is a representative voter model emphasizing the effects of pure economic variables. The benchmark model is extended by including two aspects of the political system: ideology and strength. It is evident that increased socialist influence increases the size of the local public sector, while a strong political leadership has an advantage in opposing pressure to increase spending.
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Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the Åsgårdstrand Conference on Local Public Finance, June 1993, and the Annual Meeting of the Norwegian Economic Association, Bergen, January 1994. The paper was awarded the Wicksell Prize at the Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society, Valencia, April 1994. I am grateful for comments from the participants at these conferences, in particular from Jørn Rattsø, Tom Romer and Rune J. Sørensen. Some of the data are obtained from The Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). However, NSD is not responsible for the analysis of the data nor the conclusions that are drawn. The research is funded by the Norwegina Research Council.
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Borge, LE. Economic and political determinants of fee income in Norwegian local governments. Public Choice 83, 353–373 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047752
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047752