Abstract
While the setting of this question may appear implausible, this is precisely the environment in which services that span multiple administrative domains (MAD) must function. In such services—which include applications such as content dissemination (e.g.., [2]), file backup (e.g., [6]), volunteer computing (e.g., [5]),multihop wireless networking (e.g., [4]), and Internet routing—resources are not under the control of a single administrative domain, so the necessary cooperation cannot simply be achieved by fiat. Instead, it is imperative that the service be structured so that nodes—which are administered by different, potentially selfish entities—have an incentive to help sustain it. Indeed, such issues are not imaginary: ample evidence suggests that a large number of peers will free-ride or deviate from the assigned protocol if it is in their interest to do so (e.g., [3,9,16,21]).
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Alvisi, L., Wong, E.L. (2013). Reasoning with MAD Distributed Systems. In: D’Argenio, P.R., Melgratti, H. (eds) CONCUR 2013 – Concurrency Theory. CONCUR 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8052. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40184-8_1
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