Background

Space is a strategic domain in which both major and emerging space powers seek a place. States are shifting gears to maintain their position in space in twenty-first century primarily because of both military and economic benefits. After the end of Cold War, the world is witnessing a gradual increase in the military and peaceful space assets and technologies of states other than USA and Russia. States like India, China, Japan, South Korea, etc. are expanding their international partnership to send other states’ satellites in outer space. This has made space a competitive domain; in fact, China and India have sent provided alternative platforms for developing countries to send their satellites more cheaply than from the USA and Russian launching pads. Key challenges to making space a more safe and secure environment include the increasing pool of actors, growing commercialization, expanding military space programs, and lack of agreement by states on a conclusive and universally negotiated treaty to prohibit an arms race in space. The expanding number of spacefaring actors has made the skies and space more competitive. Likewise, these factors are increasingly contributing toward key challenges to international space governance and ensuring space remains a safe and secure domain for commercialization and scientific exploration.

To pursue scientific endeavors and to meet commercial as well as security needs, the reliance of states on space-based capabilities has increased significantly. Along with the commercial and economic uses of space, states have been ambitiously investing in military exploitation of this global commons that has now emerged as an arena of potential confrontation. While space has a lot to offer to human growth and prosperity, this potential is hijacked by risks of conflict escalation. The recent trends in technological developments suggest that the space is being rapidly weaponized with little prospect of establishing an agreeable and verifiable framework for global space governance. Divergent policy approaches, coupled with competing strategic aspirations, constrain pursuit of collective action toward achieving this goal. Space activities are generally categorized into three sectors including civilian, military, and commercial. This chapter focuses on the military sector to explicate what drives the arms competition in outer space and argues that cooperation and space governance may enhance mutual security and decrease possibilities of conflict. However, the primary challenge to this is that states tend to see the domain of space as a field of competition whereby one’s considerable presence equates to enhanced national stature among the comity of nations. One such example is recently witnessed euphoria among Indian leaders after the country successfully test fired its first Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapon system.

Challenges to International Space Governance

Currently, spacefaring nations seek to establish decisive dominance at least in the military aspect. This approach consequently heightens competition by stimulating tensions and encouraging military countermeasures. Given the ongoing geopolitical competition in space, whereby this domain has emerged as the fourth medium of warfare, any model for space governance must not overlook the inherent competitive tendencies among states, and should rather aim to promise more incentives through cooperation (Khan and Khan 2019). The rationale behind global space governance revolves around the notion that despite having competing interests, the irrational behavior of spacefaring nations would be equally disadvantageous for their pursuits in this domain. Recognizing the states’ inherent instinct to pursue competitive objectives, this chapter suggests cooperation toward space governance in a manner that does not overlook their grounded self-interest but aims to reduce threats in a cooperative manner. The idea of global space governance, therefore, seeks to maximize the prospects of peaceful exploitation of this global commons by encouraging responsible behavior.

Increasing Competition in Space

Spacefaring nations are developing their space programs at a fast pace. What really drives this unabated exploitation of space is a question that largely remains unaddressed. While some argue that these programs are driven by “techno-nationalism” to demonstrate technological prowess, a state’s natural instinct to hedge against the others in a global commons also cannot be ignored (Sheehan 2010). Likewise, since an advanced space program is an indication of nation’s military and industrial strength, states tend to see progress in this domain as a token of national prestige (Mission Shakti … 2019) (One such example is Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement after India conducted a successful Anti-Satellite Missile Test on 27 March 2019. Notwithstanding that the experts raised concerns regarding possible negative implications that ASAT’s debris may have, Prime Minister Modi asserted that this capability placed India among the handful of space superpowers).

While the USA and Soviet Union were the only competitors for supremacy in space during the Cold War, the post-Cold War era has witnessed new entrants in this competition – all aiming to secure advantageous position through dual-use capabilities. The ongoing trends of commingling space and counterspace capabilities give rise to new warfare strategies that not only implicate national securities of other states but also undermine the prospects of peaceful exploration of outer space.

No Consensus on Space Arms Control

One reason behind states’ reluctance to enter into any space-related arms control agreements can be the urge to amass maximum technological capabilities. It appears that the major actors intend to buy maximum possible time to develop enough capabilities before fully agreeing to put limits to numbers and types of their capabilities. Nevertheless, it must be realized that the future of global arms control considerably depends upon the arms buildup in the domain of space. If an arms race in space continues to go unchecked, it would seriously jeopardize other efforts to arrest arms competition. The primary reason behind this is the growing diversity of space-based military assets and their unfolding roles in different military strategies. One such example is nuclear deterrence.

Increasing Reliance on Space Assets

Ever since the launch of first satellite in outer space, reliance on space has only increased. The rapid scientific and technological advancements have surged the utilization of outer space for wide range of purposes. Also, the exploitation of this global commons no longer remains the prerogative of a handful of great powers; rather even the developing countries are now the beneficiaries of this domain. The enhanced reliance on space-based assets for a wide range of operations – like remote sensing, communication, and so on – further necessitates effective global space governance that could ensure the favorable environment for peaceful ventures. While our dependence on space has immensely increased in the past few decades, the international community has failed to adequately respond to the rising threats and vulnerabilities. A state’s reliance on space assets is directly proportional to the increasing risks, vulnerabilities, and challenges to its operational space assets. The more the numbers of space assets are operationalized, the more vulnerable they are to attacks in space from the state adversary that also includes non-state actors. The superpowers in Cold War era took a promising start in the form of new treaties and norms to develop consensus in achieving a peaceful outer-space environment. In the 1960s, both the rivals carried out nuclear explosions above the atmosphere but later agreed on non-testing of nuclear weapons in atmosphere and have complied with this restriction so far. However, with passing times, the international community has largely failed to develop a concrete mechanism to avoid evolving threats confronting a peaceful environment in space.

The competitive or cooperative engagement among states dates back to the Cold War period when the two superpowers were engaged in the Moon race and sought to develop space-based capabilities to support their military and intelligence operations. The space endeavors of the two adversaries seemed to be driven more by the struggle for political and military advantages, instead of pursuit of scientific explorations. Although the two states agreed on peaceful cooperation in space after the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project emerged as a symbol of détente between the competing superpowers in the 1970s, their continued fight for predominance in this domain converted space into a battleground of the arms race (Apollo-Soyuz Test Project).

Security-Driven Self-Interests of States

The key challenge to global space governance remains in the very nature of states’ behavior. As argued earlier, the self-interested members of international community generally tend to overlook the negative consequences of their behavior and only seek to maximize their benefits. Particularly in the absence of shared strategic goals, states find it difficult to compromise their ambitions and accept limitations on the behavior that otherwise promises relative advantages. In this context, what may encourage states to enter into arms control arrangements is the realization of their mutual vulnerabilities in a destabilizing environment. Likewise, putting “high value on collective benefits” may also encourage them to avoid any irresponsible behavior that could threaten the international peace and security. Therefore, as rightly identified by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, the threefold objectives of any arms control arrangement include reducing the likelihood of occurrence of war, costs of preparations, and destructive consequences of war (Larsen 2002).

At present, states joining hands to develop and operate the International Space Station, joint production and launch of satellites, and greater integration in the use of space-based services such as communication networks are testament of ongoing international cooperation in this domain. While it hints at the huge prospects of any mutually agreeable governance framework, the same is also marred by significant challenges owing to differing aspirations of states toward this domain. Besides peaceful uses of these capabilities, the security implications of space-based technologies are driving interstate competition. Along with jointly pursued peaceful uses, great powers have been exploiting space for their vested military advantages, thus depicting the emerging face of interstate relations where strategic rivalries predominantly define the geopolitical environment. The diverse use of space applications, where the distinguishing line between peaceful and military use of space-based capabilities is too blurry to clearly reflect the difference, further exacerbates one’s urge to misinterpret other’s actions and respond accordingly. One such example is Global Positioning System (GPS) that, despite it enabling a huge array of peaceful uses in different activities, is considered as a military capability (Ohlandt 2014). Likewise, even the high-resolution commercial remote sensing satellites, which can strengthen stability by providing a real-time picture of an adversary’s military operations, may also be used for missile warning, target identification, and other military roles .

Dual-use of Space Assets

The political consequences of the employment of dual-usable assets in space are undesirable. If one were to see the role of military capabilities in geopolitical competition among great powers, it would be plausible to assume that the military values that competing powers attach to their space capabilities would be of paramount significance in shaping the evolving great power competition.

Since the international anarchic system offers no guarantee that a state with considerable military power would not use it in an offensive manner to subdue others, it is only natural that the rival states view each other’s technological advancements with skepticism and may even resolve to respond in kind. This is particularly significant in an environment that lacks institutional structures that could assure general security by regularizing the behavior of states and ensuring transparency. It consequently generates a security dilemma that continues to fuel the mutual mistrust, intensify the prevailing arms race, and diminish the prospects for global space governance (Jervis 1978). (Robert Jervis defined security dilemma as a state of affair in which security of one state decreases the security of another state.) Since one state’s accumulation of power, as put by John Herz, makes others feel insecure and compel them to take remedial measures, this consequently leads to chain reaction that undermines general security (Herz 1950).

The inherent “ambiguous symbolism” of technology, as referred to by Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, makes the security dilemma more intense as other states may see one’s weapons as offensive or defensive depending on their own presupposition and threat perceptions (Booth and Wheeler 2008). The ambiguity regarding a dual-use capability is particularly more intense in the domain of space. The claimed roles of space-based assets may alter dramatically during peace and the times of crises. The dilemma of interpretation and dilemma of response are therefore the two most significant factors that constrain the pursuit of agreeable governance structures in the domain of space (Booth and Wheeler 2008).

When a state develops a certain military capability, the leadership of a rival state confronts the dilemma of interpretation in ascertaining whether that development is for offensive purpose or it is just a measure to bolster defensive capability. Likewise, the dilemma of response also constrains one’s options to respond to any such development by adjusting force posture. The traditional response of a state in an uncertain environment may include disengagement from other actors and arms development and deployment. If the state goes for such an action that generates military confrontation, it leads to mutual hostility and further diminishes the prospects of reducing threats through cooperation. In such an environment of uncertainties, the best course of action that a state can think for itself, as put by John J. Mearsheimer, is to maximize its relative power and be a hegemon in the system by ensuring that there is no peer competitor with equally offensive or overwhelming capabilities (Mearsheimer 2013). After land, air, and sea, space has now emerged as a domain where competing powers vehemently pursue predominance through technological advancements and refrain, at least at the moment, from committing to limitations on this pursuit.

Such an understanding of security dilemma in international politics is evident from Chinese and Russian perceptions of growing US presence in space. The USA has long maintained unequivocal supremacy in space by virtue of its unmatched civilian as well as military space capabilities. While it successfully superseded Soviet Union in this rivalry for hegemony, China has recently emerged as the most potent competitor to US dominance in this domain. As put by Defense Intelligence Agency, adversary’s integration of space and counterspace capabilities into military operations pose a challenge to US space dominance (Challenges to Security in Space 2019). The notion of “congested, contested, and competitive” space domain also signifies how the USA views the growing adversarial capabilities that may erode its strategic advantage. Thus, the USA considers it imperative to deny space to its rivals (Outer Space Increasingly 2012).

The USA, Russia, and China in Space

The USA, Russia, and China are currently the major space powers – with India trying to steadily catch up – which have developed significant space-related weapon systems. These states possess the most sophisticated capabilities and have also shown the intent to test and launch space-based weapon systems.

Russia sees the US space-based capabilities in connection with the growing asymmetries in the military equilibrium between the two states and seeks to contain the USA by modernizing its own assets (Zervos 2011). The USA believes that China and Russia seek to challenge the US position in space, exploit its dependence on space-based assets, and reduce its military effectiveness through counterspace capabilities (Challenges to Security in Space 2019). Given that there are no serious efforts to address disagreements over a desirable code of conduct in space, the strategic distrust among them continues to grow. For China, the advanced space program is a means to project its soft power in terms of technological development and also to accrue strategic advantage by challenging the US supremacy.

With China surpassing Russia as the second leading space power, the US-China rivalry in space may have grave implications for global peace and security. China has been emerging as a rising global power, and its increasing footprint in space now challenges decades-long US supremacy. The two strategic rivals are skeptical of each other’s technological developments and space capabilities. This situation is further exacerbated in the absence of any concrete dialogue mechanism over a prospective agreeable code of conduct in space. There have been perceptions within China that the US-led space weaponization not only implicates peaceful uses of outer space but also is also driven by an intent to neutralize China’s nuclear deterrent capability (Zhang 2008). This growing fear has shaped the Chinese behavior on two different accounts: at strategic level, it resolves to take the countermeasures and enhance its own space capabilities to neutralize any such threats, and at diplomatic level, it strongly advocates the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty (PPWT) to prevent weaponization of outer space. CD first proposed PPWT in CD in 2008. In addition to these concerns, projecting its own space power has also become paramount for China to register itself as a rising power that could position itself among the other advanced spacefaring nations (Khan and Khan 2019). While dominating space, these developments also exacerbate US fears of a “Space Pearl Harbor,” thus contributing to unending security spiral where action-reaction dynamics result in unending arms race (Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management 2001). (The term “Pearl Harbor” has gained the salience of a metaphor for being caught unaware. The 2001 Space Commission of the USA cautioned of a Space Pearl Harbor stating that the USA needed to be better prepared as its assets in space were vulnerable against a surprise attack.) This is particularly evident in the development of a more destabilizing capability, i.e., the anti-satellite weapons system . China tested its ASAT missile capability in 2007 when it launched SC-19 interceptor to hit a defunct satellite at an altitude of 865 kilometers. A year later, the USA also demonstrated its capability to neutralize a failed satellite with an SM-3 missile. Though an ASAT capability is a Cold War technological development, this development suggests that states are moving on a path from space militarization to weaponization.

The USA emphasizes on sustaining its supremacy in space while ensuring its “freedom of action,” by dissuading or deterring others from developing similar capabilities (National Space Traffic Management Policy 2018). Such hegemonic aspirations, combined with Chinese and Russian resolve to challenge US predominance, set the stage for potential conflict .

Proliferation of ASAT Weapons

Besides its claimed deterrent imperatives, India’s testing of ASAT weapon system appears to signify a symbol of national pride and prestige. However, the destabilizing consequences of this technology far outweigh such potential benefits, thus posing a question on the strategic and military rationale behind its development and operational deployment. Introduction of ASAT weapon systems only exacerbates the risks of crisis escalation and eruption of conflict at lower levels. By reducing the early warning capability or disrupting the satellite-dependent communication channels, the ASAT weapon directly undermines one state’s ability to effectively retaliate against a possible strike that implicates the strategic stability (Oznobishchec 1989). Likewise, ASATs are also inherently aggressive weapon systems that increase the vulnerabilities of other state’s command and control & intelligence, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (I2SR) systems against a possible attack. This particular attribute of neutralizing some of an adversary’s critical infrastructures makes ASATs a potent counterforce weapon. It consequently not only raises nuclear alert levels but also emboldens response options that may not remain within the confines of the law of proportionality (Ullah and Imam 2019). This scenario only contributes to an uncertain strategic environment and intensifies the dilemmas of interpretation and response by increasing the element of unpredictability between the two adversaries (Lele 2019). In a nuclear environment, the possessors of this capability may argue for the deterrent role of ASAT weapon systems and consider this capability as a contributor to strategic stability (U.S. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Program 1987). (For instance, the USA has since long considered its ASAT program as an essential component of its deterrence.) However, the aforementioned aspects suggest that ASAT weapon systems may only have some role in fighting a war, but not in averting one, and thus contribute very little deterrent value. ASAT weapons can put at the risk the very satellites – including early warning systems, communication satellites, and so on – which are believed to be vital for strategic stability.

There is also a possibility that given the growing vulnerabilities to space-based assets, particularly in context of kinetic or other threats to revolving satellites, states may eventually resolve to invest more in ground-based and aerial systems to ensure survivability of their critical infrastructures. Major powers need to realize that any use of ASAT weapons in counterforce roles may lead to crisis instability and possible nuclear escalation. Besides these growing risks of escalation, the kinetic use of weapons in space, as argued by Michael Krepon, would be self-defeating (Krepon 2013). For instance, the use of ASAT offers limited military advantage as the resulting debris would pose an equally dangerous threats to one’s own space assets. By recognizing this inherent character of ASAT weapon, major stakeholders may attempt to develop consensus on considering this tool of warfare as a destabilizing weapon. This would not only reinforce strategic equilibrium in space but also pave way toward more encompassing arms control mechanisms .

Stalemate on Arms Control Treaty Negotiations

Given that the military and peaceful uses of space-based technologies generate competition among spacefaring nations, the undesirable political and strategic consequences of this arms race require that concerted efforts be made to reach a legal framework to govern space. As the advancing technologies offer more potent and survivable space weapon systems and the distinguishing lines between civilian and military use of space capabilities become more blurred, the chances of accidental use of weapons would increase the dangers of crisis instability. The continued dismissive attitude of concerned states would steadily bring us closer to a point where it will be difficult to arrest the buildup of space-related weapons systems. Further delays in reaching an agreeable legal framework of governance will result in increasingly irresponsible behavior involving ambitious use of military capabilities in this global common.

Unlike other domains of warfare including air and sea, space is more prone to risks of collateral damage as any disruption of infrastructure would also directly implicate international commercial ventures. The debris caused by any kinetic-energy warfare would not only implicate military satellites of competing states but also result in unstable space environment for all stakeholders. It is, therefore, important that all spacefaring nations push for collective action to reach an agreeable mechanism to put limits on weaponization of space and work toward creating a more transparent environment in space. Nevertheless, collective action is a function of mutual trust and transparency. The lesser the security dilemma, the greater are the prospects of developing consensus. It is the uncertain environment in space that has thus far prevented states from achieving that level of mutual trust. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) serves as a baseline for a collective action. It recognizes space as a potential “province of all mankind” and emphasizes the peaceful exploration of this global commons (Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 1967). The major provisions of the Treaty call for adherence to international law to ensure international peace and security, agreement on not to place nuclear weapons in Earth orbit or on any celestial body, and establish liability for damages. (Article III of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, deals with the provision related to adherence to international law. Article IV provides for a commitment on not to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space. Articles VI and VII deal with the liability clauses and specify that the state parties to the Treaty shall be responsible for their national activities. Any activities in space carried out by nongovernmental entities would require authorization by the concerned national authority, and the latter shall be held responsible for any violations to the principles of the Treaty.) Though the Treaty offers a foundation for further global cooperation through more treaties, a number of shortcomings in the scope of the Treaty serve as obstacles in achieving this broader goal. These include, first, the anarchic nature of international system whereby there is no central authority to regulate the behavior of states. Second, there is no effective verification mechanism to check the member states’ compliance with agreed framework, and the OST regime has largely failed to generate collective action toward ensuring well specified and rules-based global space governance. Third, as pointed out by Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, the states are unwilling to offer transparency about their technical ventures and tend to classify these developments under secrecy (Gallagher and Steinbruner 2008). It only exacerbates the dilemma of interpretation for adversarial states in assessing the true motivations of other states. Fourth, to arrest the weaponization of space, the Treaty only banned placement of weapons of mass destruction in space. The limited scope of the Treaty thus could not address the post-Cold War evolving trends in the development of space weapons including the Conventional Prompt Global Strike capabilities, ASAT weapons, and their technological links with the antiballistic missile systems.

Effective space governance requires that in absence of a central authority that could verify compliance, spacefaring nations take on the responsibility and observe restraint though voluntary or less formal means. Eligar Sadeh suggests that these may include establishing global norms, codes of conduct, confidence building measures, and diplomacy (Sadeh 2015). Nevertheless, the greatest constraint in driving a collective action in this regard remains to be the prevailing mistrust among states and absence of any verification mechanism. Strategic distrust among major spacefaring nations demonstrates how growing mistrust may put existing legally binding commitment in jeopardy. This challenge is further magnified in an environment where there are no verification mechanisms to ensure member states’ compliance to the agreed framework.

The divergent approaches of major spacefaring nations toward global space governance further add complexities to the problem. While the USA and its allies, including the European Union (EU) and Japan, argue for an international code of conduct that could enhance rules-based space order, China and Russia emphasize negotiating a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space (Krepon 2013). The divergent approaches of different states are partially shaped by how they viewed the defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the USA and Russia. Many legal experts held the opinion that this bilateral treaty directly dealt with the weaponization of space as it included the space-based ABM systems (Johnson-Freese 2007). For three decades, ABM Treaty proved to be an effective tool to prevent deployment of space weapons, but US withdrawal from the Treaty in June 2003 was a serious blow to the norms against weaponization of space. Withdrawal from this Treaty created incentives for the USA to deploy space-based element of its multilayered missile defense system and also other war-fighting capabilities as part of military uses of space (Outer Space and Global Security 2003). The vacuum created by US decision to withdraw encouraged states not parties to the treaty to press for a treaty-based mechanism to ban use of weapons in outer space. Furthermore, in February 2008, Russia and China jointly drafted and submitted a Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) Treaty in Conference on Disarmament to prohibit the weaponization of space. However, the USA opposes the proposed PPWT as it continues to vote against the UN Resolutions prohibiting an arms race in outer space.

The key difference among states remains what constitutes a weapon in space. Also, states tend to justify their space programs while highlighting the deterrent value of their infrastructure. However, even if a weapon is placed in space for defensive purposes, its ambitious and aggressive use would have irreversible consequences for strategic stability as well as peaceful exploration of space. This necessitates that efforts be made to develop consensus on destabilizing implications of certain types of technologies and outlaw the development and placement of those weapon systems in outer space. After having successfully developed a consensus on placement of nuclear weapons in space, global peace and stability requires that similar restrictions be placed on the testing and placement of ASAT weapon systems. By pursuing arms control to constrain the growth of ASATs, the dangers of escalation and preemptive first strikes may be averted. The first requirement for a peaceful or rules-based governance structure for space is to ensure the survival of satellites. The proposals that emphasize only regulating behavior in space tend to overlook the anarchic nature of the system and states’ urge to maximize their relative gains, which often lead to an irresponsible behavior without any regard for the negative consequences for other states (Defrieze 2014) (For instance, it is emphasized that regulating and punishing behavior is the best approach to control the weaponization of space).

Through cooperative engagements, transparency may be ensured to minimize the security dilemma. At present, it appears that the ongoing technological developments and innovations in space programs also cause the dismissive attitude toward arms control. Major powers are seemingly buying time to accumulate maximum capabilities as they are also not sure about the status of research and development in adversary’s space programs. This raises the level of uncertainty .

Conclusion

We conclude that states are following a path from space militarization to weaponization. This indicates that states have the capability to weaponize outer space depending on the political, economic, and strategic circumstances at the global and regional levels. The growing number of actors in outer space has increased space traffic, makes space assets more vulnerable, and creates incentives for major spacefarers to take offensive countermeasures to protect their space assets. Their reliance on space assets has been increased as well as the future requirements to conduct combat missions on the ground. Therefore, outer space has become a strategic field for the major powers. There is a possibility of deployment of weapons in the outer space, which could create conflicts of interest among the nations. Therefore, space is now a strategic domain that could play a determining factor in the future engagements. The US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 and its initiation of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) have prompted Russia and China to revisit their strategic force posture. Both countries are continuously increasing their military capabilities at a moderate level, because of the US missile defense system in Europe and in the Far East. Because of this, there is a chance of horizontal proliferation of space weapons in the world. Now, there is a possibility that emerging space powers in view of their security objectives will move toward building ASATs in upcoming years, which will raise the chances of the vertical proliferation of space weapons.

In the absence of multilateral international agreements to prohibit the weaponization of outer space, there is an urgent need for an international agreement or treaty, which could bar the proliferation of space weapons both horizontally and vertically. In this regard, there is a need to re-evaluate and strengthen prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) issue in CD. The world is facing a looming threat of space warfare. And this threat has emerged as reality due to non-agreement of major powers on framing any legal instrument/treaty which prohibits the weaponization of outer space. Russia and China have proposed several drafts to prevent the weaponization of space, like PPWT and No First Placement of Weapons in Space, but the USA and its allies are not agreeing on such draft proposals. These efforts suggest that Russia and China are not willing to fight the war in space and more inclined toward framing legal instruments to avoid space war. On the other hand, it is the USA which is not interested in having any treaty which restricts its freedom of action in space. The chapter concludes that there is a real threat in space that could germinate the seed of armed conflict. The USA and China don’t trust each other, and there is strategic distrust between two adversaries, which could be the triggering point of an armed conflict in outer space. The USA’s concerns are emanating from China military and economic rise, and the USA wants to contain China in its region of influence. China considers space to be a building block of its national power. This fosters strategic distrust between two space powers, diminishing chances of cooperation between two states. This also provides incentives for both states to build their military space programs to counter each other’s space power. Both countries have developed kinetic and non-kinetic means to disrupt, degrade, and damage each other’s space assets. All these efforts are a perfect recipe for a competition in outer space. Space is one of the global commons providing crucial resources for humanity. The competition is relatively new and different from what the world has observed in nuclear and conventional military buildups. The military buildup in outer space has brought a paradigm shift in international security as the fear of war in space would cause catastrophe on the Earth. The problem of space debris in the aftermath of a future space war may last for centuries. Therefore, the development of space weapons on the Earth by major spacefarers and the doctrines and strategy to fight a war in space has brought a paradigm shift in international security.