Abstract
We show that the extension of the one-third law of evolution from the 2-player game to the d-player game is the same for all exchangeable models in the domain of application of the Kingman coalescent in the limit of a large neutral population. The extension relies on an approximation of the probability of fixation of a single mutant in terms of expected times in ancestral sample states that are calculated by induction. An interpretation based on the concept of projected average excess in payoff is discussed.
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Research supported in part by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
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Lessard, S. On the Robustness of the Extension of the One-Third Law of Evolution to the Multi-Player Game. Dyn Games Appl 1, 408–418 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0010-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0010-y