Abstract
A novel approach for assessing the robustness of an equilibrium in conflict resolution is presented. Roughly, an equilibrium is robust if it is resilient, or resistant to deviation. Robustness assessment is based on a new concept called Level of Freedom, which evaluates the relative freedom of a decision maker to escape an equilibrium. Resolutions of a conflict can be affected by changes in decision makers’ preferences, which may destabilize an equilibrium, causing the conflict to evolve. Hence, a conflict may become long-term and thereby continue to evolve, even after reaching an equilibrium. The new robustness measure is used to rank equilibria based on robustness, to facilitate distinguishing equilibria that are relatively sustainable. An absolutely robust equilibrium is a special case in which the level of freedom is at an absolute minimum for each individual stability definition.
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Yasser T. Matbouli successfully completed the requirements for his PhD degree in systems design engineering at the University of Waterloo in Canada during the fall of 2015. He is currently a faculty member in the Department of Industrial Engineering within the Faculty of Engineering at King Abdulaziz University in Rabigh, Saudi Arabia. He received his BASc degree in industrial engineering (2007) from King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and MEng degree in civil engineering (2011) from Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada. His research focus in conflict resolution is the development of methodologies for the modelling and analysis of conflicts evolving over time to provide strategic insights into the sustainability of equilibria. He has applied his methodologies to decision problems arising in industrial engineering, environmental engineering, and energy.
D. Marc Kilgour is a professor of mathematics at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada and Adjunct Professor of Systems Design Engineering at the University of Waterloo. He holds BASc, MSc, and PhD degrees in (respectively) engineering physics, applied mathematics, and mathematics from the University of Toronto. His extensive publications, which fall into many research areas, can be described as the mathematical analysis of decision problems. He has contributed innovative applications of game theory and related techniques to international relations, arms control, environmental management, negotiation, arbitration, voting, fair division, and coalition formation, and pioneered the application of decision support systems to strategic conflict. He is active in 12 professional societies and has many editorial responsibilities, including co-editing the Springer Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation. He was President of the Peace Science Society in 2012-13, and is currently President of the INFORMS Section on Group Decision and Negotiation.
Keith W. Hipel is a university professor of systems design engineering at the University of Waterloo, the president of the Academy of Science within the Royal Society of Canada, senior fellow of the Centre for International Governance Innovation, and fellow of the Balsillie School of International Affairs. He received his BASc in civil engineering (1970), MASc in systems design (1972), and the PhD in civil engineering (1975) from Waterloo. His interdisciplinary research interest is the development of conflict resolution, multiple objective decision making and time series analysis techniques from a system-of-systems engineering perspective. Dr. Hipel is recipient of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Eminent Scientist Award; Joseph G. Wohl Outstanding Career Award (IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics (SMC) Society); IEEE SMC Norbert Wiener Award; Docteur Honoris Causa (France); Doctor Honoris Causa (Hungary); Sir John William Dawson Medal (Royal Society of Canada); and Engineering Medal for Research and Development (Professional Engineers Ontario).
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Matbouli, Y.T., Kilgour, D.M. & Hipel, K.W. Robustness of equilibria in the graph model for conflict resolution. J. Syst. Sci. Syst. Eng. 24, 450–465 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11518-015-5291-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11518-015-5291-z