Introduction

In 2011, anti-Roma marches began to be organized to a larger extent throughout the Czech Republic. These protests were no longer the domain of the extreme-right as they had been in the past. Due to the economic decline (2009), increased unemployment, related budget cuts and a decline in the standard of living (Čada 2012), the so-called decent citizens were attending the marches and demonstrations in increasing numbers. The attitude of politicians who for several months turned a blind eye to the growing tensions in the society did not alleviate the situation either. The turmoil soon spread, particularly in the northern part of Bohemia, and anti-Roma demonstrations took place (repeatedly) in Varnsdorf, Nový Bor, Rumburk, Ústí nad Labem and other cities.

Various Romani allies and sympathizers and the Roma themselves took a stand against the anti-Roma marches. After the initial setback (Nový Bydžov, Krupka), when police harshly intervened against the anti-marches protesters, a breakthrough came with the blockade organized by pro-Roma and anti-racist “BRNO Blocks” initiative in May 2011 in Brno, the second largest Czech city. The blockade demonstrated the positive potential of this strategy: The 400 anti-Roma marchers were confronted with about 2000 counter-protesters, illegally blocking the march. The police were reluctant to intervene against such a large number of people and rather diverted the originally planned march route, which was understood as a success of the blockade. This tactic, applied in other cities, became a new element in Roma and pro-Roma/anti-marches protest repertoire, and blockades took place in the cities of Jihlava, Plzeň, Ostrava, České Budějovice and others.

The anti-Roma riots did not cease in the following year (2012). However, six out of the nine legally planned and publicly announced Roma and pro-Roma demonstrations were subsequently canceled. Instead, the local (pro-) Romani non-governmental organizations (NGOs) organized festivals of tolerance and mutual understanding or roundtables that brought them and the representatives of local governments together. Why? Is this shift toward a more conventional repertoire typical for the Roma and pro-Roma sector? And what role has the influx of foreign patronage (i.e., direct or indirect financial support) and European funds—often discussed as one of the possible factors of co-optation and de-mobilization—played? Or it is rather the opposite, as several studies dealing with the channeling thesis and other sectors of the post-communist civil society assume, and foreign funding in the post-communist civil society yields a more assertive stance in political conflicts? What conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the Czech Roma and pro-Roma field in relation to mobilization, framing and foreign funding of (the post-communist) civil society?

The article is organized as follows: First, it briefly introduces previous approaches to examining the effects of foreign funding on NGOs and civil society in Central and Eastern European countries. Then, the article connects it to the channeling and co-optation thesis while showing difficulties and differences in their operationalization. Third, it focuses specifically on the Roma and pro-Roma field and previous studies in relation to its funding. Fourth, the study reviews the methodology of the conducted micro-frame and claim-making analysis of Czech Romani and pro-Romani activists’ framing and collective action. Fifth, it provides background information on the state of Romani integration, political, social and economic environment and the development of European funding with focus on the Roma and pro-Roma field in the Czech Republic. The next section presents the findings of the research. It shows that in contrast to the other previously analyzed areas in the Czech civil society, there has not been a higher level of contentious action and protest among Romani and pro-Romani activists and NGOs after the influx of the European funding. Rather, the opposite can be observed. The conclusion summarizes different modes of participation of various actors in the Roma and pro-Roma field, the development of their discourse in regard to the channeling thesis and European funds, differences in the effects of foreign funding in relation to other previously analyzed sectors of the (Czech) post-communist civil society and possible limitations of the channeling thesis application. But to start with, the article will focus in the next chapter on evaluations of impacts of foreign funding in post-communist civil society in general.

Effects of Foreign Funding in Central and Eastern European Countries

The discussion about mobilization or participation in the post-communist countries and the debate of how foreign (especially European) financial patronage has impacted civil society often resemble the glass half-full or half-empty idiom. The former and a rather pessimistic wave of analyses pointed, on the one hand, to the “weakness of civil society in post-communist countries,” the weak involvement of people in civic organizations and to a post-communist disappointment (Howard 2003). On the other hand, this approach referred to the co-optation of NGOs that reflect the interests of donors instead of grassroots communities (Fagan 2005) and depend on foreign financial resources, resulting in inter-organizational competition and fragmentation (Henderson 2003; Narozhna 2004).

The latter and more positive evaluations focus on the organizational meso-level structure of post-communist civil society. According to this view, civic activism should not be assessed solely through the lens of traditional mass mobilization but also on the transactional basis of “relations among civil society groups and between them, political parties, and power holders, all of which may flourish in the face of a low level of mass participation” (Petrova and Tarrow 2007, p. 7). Foreign patronage should provide to civil society organizations the necessary resources for cooperation (Císař and Navrátil 2015), transnationalization (Císař and Vráblíková 2013) and mobilization (Císař 2010). Instead of organizations and activists being co-opted, external funding channeled them into a process whose “central outcome … is the rise of professional movement organizationsFootnote 1 as the dominant form of political representation” (Brulle and Jenkins 2005, p. 156). This “process has not necessarily been accompanied by de-politicization and de-radicalization on the part of activist organizations and their predicted co-optation,” on the contrary, “activists dependent on foreign funding have often displayed a more assertive stance in political conflicts than their domestically embedded counterparts” (Císař 2010, p. 737).

Among these views, there is a discrepancy in the evaluation of effects of foreign funding which follows the discussion about the channeling and co-optation concepts. Before the study focuses specifically on foreign funding and mobilization in the Roma and pro-Roma sector, it is therefore necessary to introduce these theoretical concepts as well as their different operationalization that are echoed in various assessments of impacts of foreign funding on the post-communist civil society.

The Channeling Thesis and Its Differences

The different evaluations made of the effects of foreign patronage do not just have to do with how post-communist civil society (in general) is assessed but also with the different operationalizations of the theoretical concepts that are used. The problems associated with applying the concepts of channeling/co-optation can be generally divided into three connected areas.

The first issue is the different definitions there are for channeling (cf. Earl 2013; Jenkins 1998; McCarthy et al. 1991, etc.) and co-optation (cf. Gamson 1990; Coy and Hedeen 2005, etc.) processes. According to Jenkins, the co-optation [i.e., “the incorporation of movement personnel into elite-sponsored positions and the subsequent goal displacement and reduced militancy” (Ash cited from Jenkins 1998, p. 212)] thesis “oversimplifies the intent of social movement founders, which varies widely and combines genuine support for the movement group with social control” (Jenkins 1998, p. 212). “The general pattern is far more complex and is better described as channeling” (Brulle and Jenkins 2005, p. 154): a process where “in response to popular mobilization, foundations fund professional organizers to launch new advocacy and technical support organizations to address issues raised by these mobilizations” (Jenkins 1998, p. 212). Its main consequence is the professionalization of the movement through “the formation of professional movement organizations as well as the creation of permanent staff positions in indigenous organizations” (Jenkins 1998, p. 212). However, the channeling concepts often applied to the post-communist environment have slightly evolved over time—e.g., in evaluation of the effects of channeling on mobilization and participation of NGOs. While the earlier definition of channeling concept highlighted greater mobilization and movement success (Jenkins 1998, p. 212), the later interpretation focuses on channeling movement activities into routine and moderate forms of political action (Brulle and Jenkins 2005, p. 156).

As a result of these changes, there is consequently greater divergence in evaluations of the effects of patronage. For example, channeling is (in the case of Czech environmental activists and NGOs) considered to result in “a more assertive stance in political conflicts” (Císař 2010, p. 737) and an increase in the frequency of protest events. Although,

the impact of this funding has been to channel (…) into more moderate discourses and conventional forms of action” and “creating incentives for specific discourses, styles of organization, and tactics, thereby drawing the movement into the institutional system (Brulle and Jenkins 2005, p. 167–168).

Thus, while Císař (2010) talks about the rise of protest activities as an effect that occurred after the arrival of (European) funding, Brulle and Jenkins (2005) consider the protests of radical organizations to be an impulse that existed before the increase in funding of more moderate NGOs. And the impact of the funding is more moderate action repertoires [i.e., inherit forms of collective action (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, p. 4)].

Second, the channeling thesis is a concept drawn from a particular environment, namely the USA/North America. The history and development of the foundations sector there are different from what occurred in post-communist countries (Anheier and Siobhan 2007; Toepler 2007 cf. Salamon and Toepler 2015, p. 2157), even if we overlook other specific features of social movements and civil societies in Eastern Europe (see, e.g., Piotrowski 2015). One of the main differences is the dominant role of the state as a donor in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries since the late nineties when European funds became the dominant source of funding in the civic sphere. These are administrated primarily through government offices, ministries and local/regional authorities, and funding is based on very detailed program priorities.

Additionally, the terms and conditions that accompany its provision require demanding project administration. This is sometimes at odds with the freer conditions that accompany foundation patronage (private- or state-owned) in North America, where “instead of explicit directives, foundations largely work indirectly by promoting organizational competition and selecting organizations that fit their priorities” (Brulle and Jenkins 2005, p. 154). This connection between NGOs and the State (as the major donor) in CEE countries is so strong that it begs the question whether the effects of funding might be more relevantly assessed using concepts that focus not on foundations but on the relationship between the State and nonprofit organizations (see, e.g., Banks, Hulme and Edwards 2015; Salamon et al. 2015).

Finally, in the post-communist environment, analyses of the effects of foreign patronage primarily focus on one specific actor—NGOs. However, even with this particular actor, there are differences that can influence its use of protest tactics. Cleavages could be identified between grassroots organizations and professional/international/advocacy ones (Kóczé and Rövid 2012, p. 117) or between “long-term participation in governance structures based on the expert knowledge on one side” (collaborative policy work) and those who favor “confrontation, media work and political empowerment of the excluded minority on the other” (and critical policy work) (Čada and Ptáčková 2014), between service-/social inclusion-oriented and political-activist organizations,Footnote 2 Romani and pro-Romani NGOs, etc. (for more details about divisions in the Czech Roma and pro-Roma field see Koubek 2017). Nevertheless, these dichotomous typologies are subject to criticism because activists “do not face a simple dichotomous choice: either professionalization (NGO-ization) or mobilization but pursue both of these strategies and add many others as well” (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013, p. 18). To analyze the impacts of the foreign funding, it is necessary to focus not only on NGOs and positive radical flank effectFootnote 3 as one of the impacts of channeling on social movement organizations (and thus interactions between the more progressive/conventional and radical organizations), but also on other actors (for example, the less formal ones) and their interactions with political and social opportunities and constraints.

Moreover, the differences regarding the impact of funding can be important not only between specific actors but also between various sectors of civil society—as the conducted analysis will show. The Roma and pro-Roma domain is a highly relevant example of application of the channeling thesis in this regard. This is a part of the post-communist civil society where the foreign patronage (and EU funding) is very strong, perhaps the strongest, and it is therefore a good case on which to examine the effects these funds have—including those on the (often discussed) participation and mobilization of Romani and pro-Romani NGOs and activists. Also, because these NGOs have long been one of the most frequently mentioned civil society beneficiaries of European funding, protest mobilization is relatively rare in this sector (in the Czech Republic). To begin, let’s review some of those studies to date that have focused on the impact of foreign funding on the Roma and pro-Roma sector.

Romani and Pro-Romani NGOs and Foreign Funding

It is somewhat surprising that, unlike the environmental (Císař 2010), animal-rights (Jacobsson 2013), and feminist (Císař and Vráblíková 2013) social movement sectors, the channeling thesis has not been applied to the Roma and pro-Roma sphere. Perhaps because there is less interdisciplinary research in Romani studies, an area that is said to exist in a kind of “splendid isolation” (Willems cited from Tremlett and McGarry 2013, p. 4).

Even in this sector the view of the impacts of foreign funding is prevailingly negative at present, in part because of the limited progress that has been made on Romani integration in CEE countries. Critics frequently mentioned, for example, switching priorities of Romani and pro-Romani NGOs (in particular those well established and professionalized) to conform to the donors’ ones and the thematic focus of grant calls (Sigona 2009), their demobilizing effect on Roma protest participation (Rostas 2009, p. 159), their disconnecting from Romani grassroots communities (Guy 2009; Kóczé and Rövid 2012), etc. Roma integration thus according to some scholars does not take the form of an empowerment process, where one should see “the transformation of the beneficiaries into stakeholders and active citizens” (Popova 2015, p. 8). In fact, integration strategies are “developed ‘for Roma’ and rarely (if at all) ‘by Roma’” (ibid., p. 6). And the large volume of foreign funding “has led to an adjoining phenomenon that many Romani intellectuals cynically refer to as the ‘ethno-business’ or ‘Gypsy industry’” (Trehan 2001, p. 139). NGOs therefore “rely upon stories of discrimination and an overemphasis on poverty… they construct the Roma as ‘needy subjects’” (Timmer 2010, p. 264). The growth and volume of these funds during the late 1990s is also said to have led to a deterioration of relations between the Romani NGOs and the (formerly professionalized) pro-Romani NGOs that were better at administering grants (Šiklová 1999 cf. Císař and Navrátil 2015).

Nevertheless, most of these studies have not examined the impact of foreign funding in the long term and in closer connection with the action repertoire, mobilization or discourse of these actors. However, as the analysis demonstrates, this is crucial for tracking and analyzing the development of activists’ participation and mobilization regarding the long-term presence of foreign funding in CEE countries. Moreover, one of the most important impacts of foreign patronage according to the channeling thesis could be a change in discourse and in the accents placed on the topics and policies targeted by the activists. In order to analyze these impacts as well, several research methods had to be used in the research design and methodology.

Research Design

This paper is based on a case study of Romani and pro-Romani activists that covered a period of 20 years, which was analyzed at 5-year intervals (1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012). The main research methods used in the study are claim-making analysis (Koopmans and Statham 1999) and micro-frame analysis (Johnston 1995, 2002). They were chosen given the longitudinal design of the research and the need to capture the discursive elements representative of the time without the possible distortive effects of a retrospective approach.

Two Czech daily newspapers, the right-wing Mladá Fronta DNES (Young Front Today) and the left-wing Právo (Right), served as the sources of data in the claim-making analysis. Instead of “protest event,” the more inclusive “political claim-making”Footnote 4 is defined as the unit of analysis (Koopmans and Rucht 2002, p. 235). The reason was to track a more moderate repertoire of professionalized NGOs, as well as the large institutionalization (i.e., formalization in social movement organizations’ structure, while these organizations are headed by professional leaders operating within social institutions and organization) of the Romani movement, given the type of access activists have to the political system (e.g., via government advisory bodies) (Vermeersch 2006, p. 229). Because the focus is on financial patronage, the analysis also identifies the various outcomes of public grant funding (associated with, for example, public launch of a project by an NGOs, or the opening of a funded social center, the start of funded social work, etc.) and a special supplementary category is added (“projects and funding”).

For a better understanding of the findings of the research, modes of repertoire were grouped into analytical categories following a classification similar to that used in other texts and studies dealing with the effects of foreign funding (e.g., Císař and Vráblíková 2014). The analytical category protest includes “extra-institutional” or “protest” action outside of the conventional political participation (Norris 2002, p. 190)—violent direct action (attack); (violent) demonstrations, rallies, marches; (non-violent) demonstrations, rallies, marches; strikes; blockades, sit-ins, building occupations; performances, happenings; protest camps; petitions and boycotts. Public persuasion includes repertoire and public activities that “are aimed at influencing public opinion, or selected segments, or the media or individual politicians and officials …and usually do carry some political message…” (Císař and Vráblíková 2013, p. 152). However, they do not voice a specific demand (ibid.) (e.g., festivals, street parties, exhibitions) and/or uses more conventional claims/repertoires (e.g., seminars, debates, conferences; press conferences/public statements; press releases/public records). Lobbying consists of meetings as a mode of transactional repertoire (Petrova and Tarrow 2007). And the last analytical category labeled “other” comprises specific forms of action that were not observed in those studies, such as projects and funding, criminal complaints and other activities (see also Table 1). In total, the research includes 216 claims connected with 228 activist strategies (forms of action).

Given the importance of analyzing in detail the framing and discursive changes as “the most important aspect of the channeling thesis” (Brulle and Jenkins 2005, p. 154), the interpretive frames connected to the claims are taken into account (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000). Three broad spheres—socioeconomic, civic-political, and cultural (see, e.g., Entzinger 2003)—divide the frames horizontally in order to trace the main developmental trends of the interpretive frames.

The core-framing tasks (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 615) divide this map of frames of Romani and pro-Romani activists vertically. These tasks take place on and have three distinct levels—(1) self-naming (“who are we?”) and other diagnostic frames (“what is the cause of the problem?”); (2) prognostic frames (“what is the solution?”); and (3) motivational (“call to arms”) frames (ibid.). The third (motivational) element occurred rarely in the selected mainstream newspapers, and therefore, it was not added to the analysis. In order to clarify the structure and arguments of the manuscript, both analyses include only frames that occurred more than five times. The claim-making analysis further analyzes 21 different diagnostic and prognostic frames (and their 280 occurrences).

The claim-making analysis follows a micro-frame analysis of Romani and pro-Romani periodicals (most of which depend on grant funding).Footnote 5 This analysis is more suited to capturing the discourse of the activists themselves. Thus, we can trace the way in which activists act and make claims (in the claim-making analysis) and how they talk (in the micro-frame analysis), including self-definition strategies, which are an important part of framing tasks and are “critical for activists’ efforts in recruiting participants” (Polletta and Jasper 2001, p. 291). Self-naming also “configure the space available to the extent that it generates resources, identities, allies and opponents, and directs the routing of claims” (Jenson 1995, p. 115).

The unit of analysis is the “micro-frame” (a code) identified in articles within the same 5-year intervals. We chose and analyzed frames in the micro-frame analysis along the same principles and scope as in the claim-making analysis. Concerning activists’ self-naming or “efforts to strategically ‘frame’ identities” (Polletta and Jasper 2001, p. 291), the analysis distinguishes eight (8) micro-frames according to their focus: in the socioeconomic sphere—“socially excluded” and “community”; in the civic-political sphere—“national minority,” “citizens” and “European nation”; and in the cultural sphere—“ethnic group,” “nomads” and “Roma folk.”

Further, the analysis classed these micro-frames a) according to their collective or individualistic character (Jenson 1995)—the former includes “national minority,” “European nation,” “community,” “ethnic group” and “Roma folk,” while the individualistic micro-frames include self-naming frames “citizens,” “socially excluded” and also “nomads”; and b) according to their position in the pluralism/assimilation dichotomy as the two integration master-frames (Berbrier 2004). The assimilation focus is primarily connected with individualistic micro-frames (“socially excluded” and “citizens”).

Subsequently, diagnostic micro-frames (14) or causes of (Roma) problems that the analysis described in the socioeconomic sphere are: “ghettos,” “poverty,” “unemployment” and “debts/usury”; in the civic-political sphere—“disputes in the (Romani) movement,” “responsibility of politicians,” “lack of interest’ by the Roma” (in political participation). In the cultural sphere, the analysis identified following frames—“a loss of Roma identity” and “discrimination.” For analytical purposes, the central frame “discrimination” was further divided into “racial discrimination” [including analytically separate cases relating to attacks by the “skinhead subculture” or (later) “neo-Nazis”], “social discrimination” (which mainly refers to refusing Roma admission into various (social) places—e.g., clubs or restaurants),Footnote 6 “discrimination in the workplace,” “discrimination in the education system” (which mainly refers to the segregation of Romani children in “special” or “practical” schools) and “multiple discrimination” (e.g., discrimination as a Roma and as a woman; including institutional discrimination, for instance in the form of forced sterilization).

And finally, the research classified 21 prognostic micro-frames proposing solutions for the Roma minority: in the socioeconomic sphere—“success in the (labor) market and employment,” “help for the Roma from society,” financial assistance in the form of “European,” “national,” “regional” and “other funds,” “community or social work,” “requalification,” “equal opportunities” (in the labor market or in politics—in this case the micro-frame was associated with the civic-political sphere); in the civic-political sphere: building a united “Roma political party,” or conversely participation in an existing “non-Roma political party” (the reason for this frame often was the 5% vote threshold to enter the Chamber of Deputies, which would be nearly impossible for an ethnic party to cross), the strengthening of Roma “political participation,” the crucial role of Romani “NGOs” or political “elites”/leaders, the unity of “the Romani movement,” and “quotas” (in politics or in the labor market—in this case the micro-frame was included in the socioeconomic sphere). In the cultural prognostic sphere, the focus was on “support for Romani identity” and culture, “multicultural education,” “education” in general, “tolerance,” “examples of good practice” (in the education process, sports, etc.). The micro-frame analysis identified a total of 481 occurrences of self-naming micro-frames, 1350 diagnostic micro-frames and 932 prognostic micro-frames.

The research drew as an additional source on a survey of political activism in the Czech Republic (October 2007–December 2008) with information on 220 Czech social movement organizations and specifically on 23 Roma and pro-Roma NGOs in the sector. The organizations were selected for the survey using the snowball sampling technique, and data were collected using elite interviews, during which representatives of the organizations completed a standardized questionnaire. The author of the manuscript has also been working for more than 8 years as a project manager at various environmental and (pro-)Romani NGOs. However, before presenting the findings of this research, it is necessary to describe its context, factors that create opportunities and constraints for Romani or pro-Romani actors, and the environment, which have an effect on the form of participation and mobilization in this area. These may be, for example, governmental reforms, legislative measures and policies adopted to support the integration of the Roma minority, the development of funding, or other potentially interfering factors, such as the unemployment rate, the number of socially excluded localities or anti-Roma sentiments in society, etc.

The Development of Czech Roma Integration and European Funding

By the end of the 1990s, the initial post-revolutionary hopes of the Roma minority in the Czech Republic had evaporated (for a more detailed description of the development of Czech Roma and pro-Roma activist social field, see, e.g., Koubek 2013, 2017; Pečínka 2004; Guy 2001; Barany 2002; Csepeli and Simon 2004). Public squares were no longer chanting “long live the Roma” (Pečínka 2004, p. 115), as they had been in 1989, and the Roma had become “the biggest losers of the transition” (Soros and Wolfensohn, cited from Sigona and Trehan 2009, p. 3). The Roma minority was struggling with high unemployment, which averaged at an estimated 70% (in some places as high as 90%) (Czech Government 1997 cited from Guy 2001, p. 296).

Racially motivated attacks and racism were on the rise—in 1993, the first year of the independent Czech Republic, the Czech police recorded 51 cases of crimes with racial overtones. In 1997, it was 159 cases and in 2002 as many as 473. However, while in the late 1990s it was violent crimes that prevailed, after 2000 it was cases that involved the support and promotion of movements violating human rights and freedoms.Footnote 7 The Roma responded by emigrating in multiple waves (Koubek 2013; Stroschein 2002, p. 5), a trend that was further boosted by a 15-min television report aired in August 1997 showing émigré Roma living a carefree and comfortable life in Canada. By October, the number of (Roma) asylum-seekers from the Czech Republic had risen to 1300 (compared to 144 in 1996) (Sobotka 2009).

The Czech government’s inability to address these problems prompted growing criticism from both Czech and international institutions. There was even mounting pressure from the European Commission (1997), whose Agenda 2000 defined the situation in the then candidate countries for EU accession as generally satisfactory, “except for the situation of the Roma minority in a number of applicant(s) (countries), which gives cause for concern” (European Commission 2003, p. 4). Therefore, in the late nineties, addressing Roma issues and integration started to be understood as an integral part of the accession process and acquis communautaire.

With the fall of the Klaus government (1998), the first signs of the involvement of civil society, which had been rather rejected under Klaus (Salamon and Toepler 2015; Green 1999, p. 222), began to appear and the Czech approach to Roma integration (with its discursive environment) began to change. There was a slight turn away from the previously “civic principle” (Cashman 2008) that had been criticized but nonetheless asserted by Klaus, whereby “ethnic diversity was not considered a legitimate basis for granting group-differentiated rights” (Vermeersch 2006, p. 80) and the Roma had an undifferentiated citizenship status, where ethnic difference was regarded as a private manner (ibid.). In the late 1990s “equalizing measures” (Vašečka 2005, p. 159) and “multicultural policies” (Ramadan 2008, p. 186) to be practiced by the Czech government were developed and first mentioned in the Bratinka Report (1997), which was the government’s response to criticism of its inaction on Roma issues. The report was the first conceptual document to deal specifically with the Roma as a community and besides discrimination it focused on the socioeconomic integration of the Roma. One of its outcomes was the first government advisory body on Roma issues (the Interdepartmental Commission for Roma Community Affairs) which (at least formally) further opened the doors for Romani and pro-Romani activists to develop a transactional repertoire (such as lobbying).

At the same time, the volume of funds flowing into the candidate countries from the European Union grew. In addition to other earlier donors,Footnote 8 the EU became the dominant source of funding for the civic sector and NGOs [most notably the PHARE and TACISFootnote 9 programs administrated through the Civil Society Development Foundation (NROS)] in the (late) nineties. Grants from these sources focused mainly on the coexistence of the majority and the Roma, multicultural education, strengthening (Roma) civil society and NGOs (European Commission 2003, p. 16) that were working to respond to, among other things, the above-mentioned increase in racism in the Czech Republic.

Also, the very complicated situation of the Roma on the labor market, their housing situation, further exacerbated by efforts of the Roma segregation [for example, well-known case of the wall in Maticni street, Ústí nad Labem (1999) separating Czech and Roma inhabitants] deepened the socioeconomic issues of Roma in the late nineties. Since the start of the new millennium, the focus of Roma integration policies has thus been shifting more and more toward the socioeconomic sphere. The paradigm has been turning from the previous accent on human rights violations toward the poorly stressed issue of social and economic inclusion (Kóczé and Rövid 2012, p. 110). This trend has gradually established itself in the Czech Republic (as it has at the European level), accompanied by a sharp debate (especially in 2003–2005) between advocates of the (liberal) multicultural approach and advocates of this “new” social approach to integration. The latter position is tied to the issue of social exclusion and the concept of a “culture of poverty” (Koubek 2013) and refers to the call for an individualistic and assimilationist integration policy. It does not focus on the Roma as members of a (national, ethnic) minority, but rather as “people at risk of social exclusion” [or, e.g., “individuals experiencing employment difficulties” (Vašečka 2005, p. 164)]. The approach partly accentuated the biggest Czech pro-Romani NGO People in Need (Člověk v tísni), and it is this stance that has gradually gained ascendancy in the discourse and the Roma integration policy, despite the fact that more Czech Romani leaders (for example, Karel Holomek and Ivan Veselý) stood in opposition (for details, see Pečínka 2004; Koubek 2013).

One of the reasons this approach came to hold sway was the fact that a similar integration policy prioritized European structural and investment funds and programs (Ramadan 2008). The attitudes of “EU institutions, who see EU funding [such as the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)] as a key instrument in addressing the socio-economic deprivation of Roma” (Delcour and Hustinx 2015, p. 93) then affected in varying degrees also “the ideology and practice of social policies of individual EU countries—including the Czech Republic” (Mareš 2006, p. 5). After the country moved on from the pre-accession sources of funding from the European Commission [such as PHARE or EQUAL Community Initiative (2002–2007)], this discourse of “social exclusion” on Roma issuesFootnote 10 continued to be developed through the operational programmes (OP) that the country had access to as an EU member entering the second programming period (2007–2013). For example, the OP Human Resources and EmploymentFootnote 11 and the OP Education for Competitiveness (financed by the ESF) focused on priorities such as employment, flexible workforce, the integration of socially disadvantaged or excluded people, housing, health care, and the development, adaptability, and flexibility of human resources through education and support for equal opportunities (especially in the labor market). Among other, the focus of the programmes also responded to the little attention the previous EU funds (for example PHARE) had given to the social sphere and unemployment (EMS 2004; Guy 2011).

A similar focus was evident in the National Action Plan (2005) of the Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005–2015) (sometimes contradictory accepted—see Jovanović 2015; Bojadjieva 2014), the National Action Plans on Social Inclusion (prepared by the government for 2 years in 2004–2010) and, later on, the Strategies for Combating Social Exclusion (2011–2015), which were supposed to be complementary with Concepts (later Strategies) for Roma Integration.Footnote 12 During the second EU programming period, other foreign donors supported the Czech Roma sector—the most important ones in the long term include the Open Society Fund or the EEA (European Economic Area) Grants and Norway Grants. However, in terms of the amount of funding, the EU’s structural funds were and remain the dominant source.

Meanwhile, social exclusion and socially excluded localities began to be a prominent issue in the Czech Republic, highlighted in another important document published 9 years after the Bratinka Report—“An Analysis of Socially Excluded Roma Localities in the Czech Republic” (2006), the first comprehensive report on this subject. The integration policy was also (at least formally) broadened by the reinstated post of the Minister for Human Rights and the National Minorities (2007–2010, headed by members of the Czech Green Party or independent personalities nominated by it).

After the enlargement of the European Union (2004), the European institutions began to see the Roma “as a group in need of special attention.” Their situation started to be a European issue and priority, but concerns emerged as to whether this European approach could be misused by national or local politicians in order to “try to minimize or evade their countries’ domestic responsibility by highlighting the role and responsibility of the EU” (Vermeersch 2012, p. 1195). Another and more recent conceptual document, “EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies” (2011), maintained similar approach; nevertheless, in this case it was followed by national strategies.Footnote 13 However, criticism of this policy of “special privileges” gave rise to the question of whether it is not this very approach that in fact lays “the foundation on which the mass anti-Roma attitudes and stereotypes were rethought and developed” (Marushiakova and Popov 2015, p. 27).

Despite the aforementioned measures and policies, the number of ghettos in the Czech Republic did not decrease—just the opposite, it almost doubled.Footnote 14 After the worst Czech economic crisis (2009) since 1997–1998 and with an onset of another economic recession (2012), the right-wing Petr Nečas government (2010–2013) implemented a series of government budget cuts and neoliberal reforms, which negatively impacted mainly the socially disadvantaged, the unemployed, and persons with low economic status, many of whom were Roma. The reforms did not provoke a (strong) direct reaction, the way they did in the neighboring Slovakia in 2004 (Marušák and Singer 2009, p. 194). However, they were one of the factors that contributed to making the social atmosphere more strained. Roma started to be portrayed as “inadaptable” people abusing social benefits and living at the expense of society. Coincidentally, the anti-Roma marches and protests (2011–2013) described in the beginning of the article reached a high point (not only) in the Czech Republic (Čada 2012).

This contentious episode (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, p. 36) showed that the Czech (would-be “ethnically blind”) integration policies (somewhat different in character from the European ones) created a “double-bind” situation, because the “ethnically neutral” discourse of these policies appeared not to be speaking about the Roma but about the “socially excluded” in general (or “inadaptables”). And yet these terms were only becoming additional “code words” for the “old ethno-racial wine in a new bottle with a formally ethnically-neutral vignette” (Čada 2012, p. 76), against which it was even harder to take a stand as it had no overt ethnic coloration. This is also evidenced by a part of the research findings in the next chapter.

Findings

Changes in NGO Funding

The fact that European funds were for Romani and pro-Romani NGOs a significant change or element is supported by the results of the aforementioned questionnaire survey (2007–2008). Over the course of the 10 years before the date of the survey (up to 2007), 70% of Romani and pro-Romani organizations had at some point changed their main sources of funding (16 NGOs out of 23). In more than 80% of them, the change was associated with (a shift to) European funds (in 13 out of 16). It must be added that those organizations that had not undergone a fundamental change in funding were mostly established after 2000 and have been using the European funds since their foundation. The importance of European funds is also apparent in light of the fact that 20 out of 23 organizations consider their EU-funded projects to be their most important ones. It is also necessary to add that unlike, for example, the environmental sector (or more precisely its major organizations such as Greenpeace CZ or Friends of the Earth Czech Republic-Hnutí DUHA) (Císař 2010), grants from public/European funds are a key for Romani or pro-Romani organizations. An exception within the broader organizational networks in the pro-Roma area would be the Czech branch of Amnesty International, but it is not one of the largest NGO players.

The result of this change in funding caused by the arrival of European finances then is, as the channeling thesis assumes, “professionalization.” This is reported as the most frequently mentioned consequence of this change in funding (affecting 62% of the NGOs). However, the impact of EU funds was also manifested in “less emphasis on the organization’s mission” and/or on “freedom in the implementation and use of financial resources and topics.” If we compare the action repertoire of the interviewed Romani NGOs, it does not seem that the organizations that made this switch in funding use a more protest repertoire (i.e., organizing petitions, happenings, demonstrations—more radical repertoire wasn’t mentioned by the respondents) than the NGOs that did not. In fact, more than 80% of all questioned Romani NGOs have never organized a protest.

Changes in Action Repertoires and Mobilization Strategies

The activities of NGOs (whether Romani, pro-Romani, non-Roma allies, and whether Czech or foreign) recorded in the claim-making analysis account for just one-third of claims of all the actors in this sector. This is in contrast, for example, to the environmental domain, where NGOs are the authors of three-quarters of claims (Císař 2010, p. 744). Nevertheless (Romani and pro-Romani), NGOs are making up a growing share of the action repertoire—increasing from 16% in 1992 to 48 and 44% in 2002 and 2007. An exception is the last year of the analysis (2012), which was marked by anti-Roma protests, and the share decreased again (to 25%). At the same time, there has been a significant increase in spontaneous actions and “civic self-organization” [i.e., “a collective action that is not supported or controlled by any organization or group” (Císař 2008, p. 156)]. It accounts for nearly half of all the actors identified (47.5%) in this year. In this regard, what is interesting is the fact that with the increase in anti-Roma protests (like in 1997) the number of claims by Romani NGOs decreased significantly.

The influx and increasing volume of European funds has not brought about an increase in the extra-institutional or protest repertoire, rather the opposite. In contrast to previous research in post-communist countries, the arrival of European funding in this sector resulted instead in a decrease in protest participation. And we find this regardless of whether we observe the development of the repertoire in the Roma and pro-Roma social sector as a whole or whether we focus on its protest part in absolute or relative terms (Table 1).

Table 1 The collective action repertoire over time
Full size table

If we look at the different types of actors (and their repertoires), we find that Romani NGOs account for at most 1.6% of the actors that use a protest repertoire (the events may have more than one participating actor). Even pro-Romani and other supportive NGOs account only for 11.5% of actors with protest claims and are not the main actors participating in protest events (despite a possible bias in the data stemming from the fact that the organizer of the protest event may not in every case have been mentioned in the media, even though there was an organizer); spontaneous, informal, or independently organized civic initiatives make up 77% of the actors with protest strategies (Table 2).

Table 2 Repertoire versus actors (%—share of claims in each strategy)
Full size table

Not only did the protest activities of Romani NGOs not increase after the arrival of EU funds, they had not engaged in protest activities even before that time (with the exception of one demonstration recorded in 1992). The same can be said of pro-Romani NGOs. There was no increase in protest activities after the influx of European funding. It was only in 2012 when the protest repertoire of pro-Romani and other NGOs began to grow more significantly (Table 3).

Table 3 Protest repertoire versus actors (%)
Full size table

To put it differently, NGOs (whether Romani or pro-Romani) rarely engaged in protest repertoire, regardless of how much European funding they receive. Since the late 1990s, there has been a noticeable increase in their activities, which may have to do with the increase in European financial patronage, but still within the conventional repertoire (and, e.g., festivals or exhibitions). Moreover, regarding the channeling thesis, the repertoire is de-radicalized as a whole and these NGOs are not funded in response to the activities of more radical actors (cf. Brulle and Jenkins 2005, p. 156). In part, this is because foreign funding was strongly present in the post-communist environment even before the radical wings of the movement crystallized and entrenched themselves. Protest is more the domain of rather self-organized or spontaneous collective action, often reactive in nature. This can be seen in which when these strategies are used above average (1997, 2012). Except the aftermath of the pinnacle of the protest cycle (Tarrow 1983) coupled with the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1992, the protest was more a response to the wave of racial violence directed at the Roma at the end of the 1990s, and in 2012 it was a response to the spread of anti-Roma demonstrations and marches across Europe (Čada 2012). Another factor that accompanied both of these analyzed years was (1997, 2012) was that the Czech Republic faced the impacts and reverberations of the economic crisis, which amplified the anti-Roma sentiments.Footnote 15 In these years, partly as a result of the increase in self-organized or spontaneous collective action, the NGOs’ share in claims correspondingly decreased. Thus, European funding did not have any impact on Romani and pro-Romani NGOs’ action strategies the way it did in other sectors, but it did significantly shape discourse and frames here, and in this respect, it is consistent with the channeling concept (Brulle and Jenkins 2005, p. 168).

Changes in Discursive Strategies

At the end of the 1990s, earlier activists’ self-naming situated in the civic and political sphere of Roma integration (using such frames as “national minority”Footnote 16 or, later, equal “citizens”) started to switch to the cultural sphere. And collective micro-frames such as “ethnic group” and especially “community” began to be more common (from 2% of all self-naming frames in 1992 to 24% in 1997 and 28% in 2002) as a discursive designation that was introduced in the Bratinka Report. The trend then led to individualistic frames in the socioeconomic sphere, which is becoming the dominant sphere (61% in 2007 and 49% in 2012 versus 4% in 1992 and 28% in 1997) and reflects the focus of European funds and grant calls. The designation “socially excluded” mentioned in grant calls as the beneficiaries became the main micro-frame that accounted for almost 40% of all self-naming micro-frames in 2007, and in 2012 this micro-frame was clearly the strongest self-naming frame of activists (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1
figure 1

Self-naming (N = 481) over time. POL civic-political sphere, CUL cultural sphere, SOC socioeconomic sphere

Full size image

There is another shift toward the discursive focus emphasized by European funds in the diagnostic and prognostic frames identified in the micro-frame analysis. With the arrival of this funding, topics related to the discourse and focus of grant calls became significantly more common in the activists’ frames. The socioeconomic sphere reached its peak in 2007. The most common diagnostic micro-frames were “ghetto” and “unemployment” (this sphere accounted for 45% of all diagnostic micro-frames) and “equal opportunities,” “European funds” and “help for the Roma from society” were the most common prognostic micro-frames. The last-named micro-frame is more characteristic for the “beneficiaries” than citizens, or the minority or ethnic group with full rights. And the only prognostic micro-frame more common than “help for the Roma from society” that year is “education,” another strong theme in European funding. By 2007, 50% of prognostic micro-frames were in the socioeconomic sphere, up from just 18% in 1992. There is an obvious difference here from the early 1990s, when activists’ hopes emphasized the unified “Romani movement” and the “Roma party” in the civic-political sphere and “support for Romani identity” in the cultural sphere (Table 4).

Table 4 Three main frames in the micro-frame analysis over time (figures in bold indicate the most common micro-frames)
Full size table

Similar trends (the emergence of socioeconomic frames after the arrival of European funding) are identifiable even in the claim-making analysis. With one difference: these frames (for example, regarding “funds”) are more pronounced in the micro-frame analysis of Romani and pro-Romani periodicals. The reason may be that these are published by NGOs and financed from national or European funds. Nevertheless, in the years with widespread anti-Roma marches or protests it is still possible to identify in the claim-making analysis the growing prominence of the cultural sphere and frames related to discrimination. These “(racial) discrimination” frames (including “skinheads”) are closely tied to the protest repertoire (Koubek 2017)—an area dominated by spontaneous and/or civic self-organization. In other words, different action strategies are accompanied by a different framing, and in the case of NGOs frames these are usually tied to more conventional types of strategies. Thus, like in 1997, when anti-Roma discrimination and riots led to the exodus of Roma, the same growth of these frames is seen in 2012. This immediate social context of the anti-Roma marches outweighed on the diagnostic level issues related to the priorities of European funding or policies (Table 5).

Table 5 Three main frames in the claim-making analysis over time (figures in bold indicate the most common micro-frames)
Full size table

Comparing the trends of the development of diagnostic and prognostic frames reveals in both analyses that the activists’ frames dialogically and discursively correspond to the (financial) opportunities newly offered by the structural context and by European funding. The diagnostic framing is very similar in both analyses, the activists agree on the causes of the problems Roma face and the development of the analyzed spheres is almost identical (see Fig. 2). The activists’ view of the solution to these problems is, predictably, more complicated and thus more varied (see Fig. 3). Nevertheless, both analyses have similar development patterns in each sphere [i.e., a growth of the social sphere and decline of the cultural sphere after 2000; a decline of the political sphere compared to the first years of the research in the 1990s; the growth of the cultural sphere in the years where a more contentious repertoire is identified (1997, 2012), etc.].

Fig. 2
figure 2

Diagnostic frames (claim-making vs. micro-frame analysis) and repertoire. Frames (%) and POL, CUL, SOC spheres (_R (repertoire/claim-making analysis); _P (periodicals/micro-frame analysis); repertoire—REP (score 1–17 calculated as weighted average; for details see Table 1)

Full size image
Fig. 3
figure 3

Prognostic frames (claim-making vs. micro-frame analysis) and repertoire

Full size image

Unlike the analysis of the collective action repertoire, which shows that there was no strengthening of the contentious or protest repertoire after the arrival of foreign patronage (and hence there was no confirmation of this part of the channeling thesis), an analysis of the discourse and activists frames shows that it was affected (at least in part). The frames begin to approach the specific topics emphasized by the European funds and their grant calls. There is thus (an indirect) channeling of activists’ issues and of how to go about addressing them (Brulle and Jenkins 2005, p. 154).

Conclusions

We can draw several conclusions from the previous sections. Firstly, the example of the Roma and pro-Roma social field shows that the channeling thesis cannot be generally applied to the post-communist civil society as a whole—the effects of foreign funding can differ from actor to actor and be sector-specific. Despite the fact that applying the concept is made more complicated by differences in its operationalization, in the Roma and pro-Roma sector we do not observe any significant mobilization (cf. Jenkins 1998) or a more assertive stance occurring in political conflicts after the influx of foreign (and European) funding (cf. Císař 2010)—in contrast to, for example, environmental NGOs with more contentious claims. Especially long-standing Romani or pro-Romani NGOs (even though their employees may have participated in these activities) seldom organized demonstrations and, for example, blockades (2012) or had an official patronage of these events in media. Possible reasons for this may be that (a) some of these events were spontaneous actions and/or (in 2012) involved illegally blocking officially permitted and legal anti-Roma demonstrations; (b) the activities of established Romani NGOs in particular have also frequently included a social field/street work program, which in terms of how it functions and in terms of other aspects of its nature does not entirely correspond to the confrontational character of demonstrations or other protests events (see also Čada and Ptáčková 2014). Romani (and similarly pro-Romani) NGOs have not significantly made use of the protest repertoire—neither before the influx of a larger volume of foreign (European) funding, nor after.

Secondly, the protest repertoire here is the domain of self-organized or spontaneous collective action, which is somewhat reactive in form. It responds to anti-Roma sentiments in the society, which coincide inter alia with periods of the economic downturn in the Czech Republic, a worsening standard of living, and a sharpening of tensions in society. The 2012 example shows that the current social context is impacting the traditionally conventional repertoire (of nonprofit organizations) that usually prevails in this field. For this reason, it is possible to state that there has been no overall co-optation of the Roma and pro-Roma social sector (cf. Jalali 2013, Lomax in Jenkins 1998, p. 212). Recently, other types of actors have been participating and increasingly entering into collective action—for example, various anti-racist initiatives or the younger generation of Romani and pro-Romani activists especially in the informal, grassroots segment of civil society. These actors have also introduced new repertoire strategies, such as happenings and blockades, to confront the anti-Roma protests.

Thirdly, European funds (and foreign funding) have had a significant impact on the discourse of NGOs and activists as the channeling thesis suggests (Brulle and Jenkins 2005). The analysis of the Roma and pro-Roma field shows that the arrival of European funding was accompanied by (greater) support for particular discourses, i.e., those with a liberal or individual(-rights) accent. It manifests itself most in the self-naming of activists (and NGOs). Unlike the 1990s, when self-identification dominated in the political sphere (through individual frames, such as “citizens” of the Czech state, or collective frames, such as “ethnic minority”) and the cultural sphere (the collective frame “ethnic group”), since 2000 socioeconomic frames have been growing, including the very strongest (individualistic) frame of “socially excluded.” This trend also reflects the way the beneficiaries are often identified in the grant calls of European funds.

The transformation of framing in this field can be seen in other diagnostic and prognostic frames. While on the prognostic level in the 1990s one of the more frequent solutions to the situation of the Roma minority in the Czech Republic was a strong and unified “Romani movement” (or strong “Roma party”), this solution almost disappeared after 2000. Strong and different prognostic frames then emerged, such as “help for the Roma from society,” along with solutions aimed at using “EU funds” or centered on supporting “equal opportunities” and “education”—much more important topics of European funding. The latter frame is part of the cultural sphere, which has been a prominent area of prognostic framing for a long time (and more clearly in the claim-making analysis).

The case is similar at the diagnostic level and with respect to identifying the problems faced by activists and NGOs. The cultural sphere and the frames related to discrimination are still strong. It is no wonder: relations between the Roma minority and the Czech majority have been at a low for a long time (the coexistence of Czechs and Roma was evaluated as bad by 81% of respondents in 1997 and by 82% in 2012Footnote 17). And the Roma have been repeatedly rated by survey respondents as the least favorite minority (only to be recently replaced by refugees and Muslims). However, at the diagnostic level there has been also a trend that reflects and represents a move toward the discourse of grant calls and toward adopting such topics and frames as “ghettos,” “unemployment” and the socioeconomic sphere. That trend peaked mainly in 2007, when there were no strong social shocks, so frames and trends increasingly reflected the focuses of foreign (European) funding. In sum, the analyzed framing of Czech Romani and pro-Romani activists and especially NGOs shows signs of a donor-driven agenda, but to a lesser extent it also responds to the immediate social context. And as shown in the figures above, there are consistent and related trends in both (diagnostic and prognostic) levels of framing and in both analyses (micro-frame and claim-making).

Fourthly, the study shows that one of the consequences of foreign (and European) funding is, without a doubt, the professionalization of NGOs, as the channeling thesis suggests. However, this is a consequence of the (administrative and other) complexity of the European grant calls and subsidies, rather than that of the fact that “in response to popular mobilization, foundations fund professional organizers to launch new advocacy and technical support organizations to address issues raised by these mobilizations” (Brulle and Jenkins 2005, p. 156). The specific setting of European funds as the most important source of funding, which organizations apply for in regular grant calls issued by state (or regional governmental) bodies, is different from “the process by which ‘direct action’ protest stimulated foundation funding of the nonmilitant organizations, thereby strengthening the political visibility and centrality of the moderates in the movement” (Brulle and Jenkins 2005, p. 156). The funding of NGOs is not a response to extra-institutional and protest activities of more radical actors. Nevertheless, there are differences in the Roma and pro-Roma sector between actors who prefer collaborative policy work and those who favor confrontation and critical and media work (Čada and Ptáčková 2014, p. 137).

Last but not least and due to the above, when theoretical concepts are developed in a considerably different environment—in this case that of Western Europe or/and North America—the particular context and specifics have to be considered. In order to obtain a more accurate picture, and to avoid taking a dichotomous view of the effects of foreign financial patronage, it is important to take into account the various types of actors (in a given sector) of the post-communist civil society, the differences between social sectors and the specific structure of donors.