Abstract
In the context of indivisible public objects problems (e.g., candidate selection or qualification) with “separable” preferences, unanimity rule accepts each object if and only if the object is in everyone’s top set. We establish two axiomatizations of unanimity rule. The main axiom is resource monotonicity, saying that resource increase should affect all agents in the same direction. This axiom is considered in combination with simple Pareto (there is no Pareto improvement by addition or subtraction of a single object), independence of irrelevant alternatives, and either path independence or strategy-proofness.
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Ju, BG. Unanimity and Resource Monotonicity. Theor Decis 59, 1–17 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-0576-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-0576-1