Abstract
We discuss the relationships between positional rules (such as plurality and approval voting as well as the Borda count), Dodgson’s, Kemeny’s and Litvak’s methods of reaching consensus. The discrepancies between methods are seen as results of different intuitive conceptions of consensus goal states and ways of measuring distances therefrom. Saari’s geometric methodology is resorted to in the analysis of the consensus reaching methods.
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Nurmi, H. A Comparison of Some Distance-Based Choice Rules in Ranking Environments. Theor Decis 57, 5–24 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-3671-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-3671-9