Abstract
We defend a set of acceptance rules that avoids the lottery paradox, that is closed under classical entailment, and that accepts uncertain propositions without ad hoc restrictions. We show that the rules we recommend provide a semantics that validates exactly Adams’ conditional logic and are exactly the rules that preserve a natural, logical structure over probabilistic credal states that we call probalogic. To motivate probalogic, we first expand classical logic to geo-logic, which fills the entire unit cube, and then we project the upper surfaces of the geo-logical cube onto the plane of probabilistic credal states by means of standard, linear perspective, which may be interpreted as an extension of the classical principle of indifference. Finally, we apply the geometrical/logical methods developed in the paper to prove a series of trivialization theorems against question-invariance as a constraint on acceptance rules and against rational monotonicity as an axiom of conditional logic in situations of uncertainty.
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Lin, H., Kelly, K.T. A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic. Synthese 186, 531–575 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9998-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9998-1