Abstract
Glymour’s theory of bootstrap confirmation is a purely qualitative account of confirmation; it allows us to say that the evidence confirms a given theory, but not that it confirms the theory to a certain degree. The present paper extends Glymour’s theory to a quantitative account and investigates the resulting theory in some detail. It also considers the question how bootstrap confirmation relates to justification.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
L. BonJour (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge Harvard University Press Cambridge MA
L. Bovens S. Hartmann (2003) Bayesian Epistemology Oxford University Press Oxford
N. Cartwright (1989) Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement Oxford University Press Oxford
D. Christensen (1983) ArticleTitle‘Glymour on Evidential Relevance’ Philosophy of Science 50 471–481 Occurrence Handle10.1086/289130
D. Christensen (1990) ArticleTitle‘The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping’ Philosophy of Science 57 644–662 Occurrence Handle10.1086/289584
D. Christensen (1997) ArticleTitle‘What is Relative Confirmation?’ Noûs 31 370–384
D. Christensen (1999) ArticleTitle‘Measuring Confirmation’ Journal of Philosophy 96 437–461
I. Douven (1999) ArticleTitle‘Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent’ Philosophy of Science (Proceedings) 66 S424–S435
I. Douven (2002a) ArticleTitle‘A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 391–410 Occurrence Handle10.1093/bjps/53.3.391
I. Douven (2002b) ArticleTitle‘Testing Inference to the Best Explanation’ Synthese 130 355–377 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1014859910339
Douven, I.: 2003a, ‘Empirical Equivalence, Explanatory Force, and the Inference to the Best Theory’, in R. Festa, A. Aliseda, and J. Peijnenburg (eds.), Logics of Scientific Cognition: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers, Rodopi, Atlanta GA, in press.
I. Douven (2003b) ‘On Bayesian Logic’ M.C. Galavotti (Eds) Observation and Experiment in the Natural and Social Sciences Kluwer Dordrecht 321–326
Douven, I.: 2004, ‘Basic Beliefs, Coherence, and Bootstrap Support’, in S. Roeser, R. Rood, and R. van Woudenberg (eds.), The Epistemology of Basic Belief(publisher to be determined), in press.
I. Douven J. Uffink (2003) ArticleTitle‘The Preface Paradox Revisited’ Erkenntnis 59 389–420 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1026092226306
J. Dreier (1996) ArticleTitle‘Rational Preference: Decision Theory as a Theory of Practical Rationality’ Theory and Decision 40 249–276 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00134210
Duhem, P.: 1906/1954, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory(translated by P. Wiener), Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
J. Earman (Eds) (1983) Testing Scientific Theories University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis
J. Earman (1992) Bayes or Bust? MIT Press Cambridge MA
J. Earman C. Glymour (1988) ArticleTitle‘What Revisions Does Bootstrap Testing Need?’ Philosophy of Science 55 260–264 Occurrence Handle10.1086/289431
J. Earman W. Salmon (1992) ‘The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses’ M. Salmon (Eds) Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Prentice Hall Upper Saddle River NJ 42–103
Edidin, A.: 1983, ‘Bootstrapping Without Bootstraps’, in Earman (ed.), pp. 43–54.
E. Eells (1985) ArticleTitle‘Problems of Old Evidence’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 283–302
E. Eells B. Fitelson (2000) ArticleTitle‘Measuring Confirmation and Evidence’ Journal of Philosophy 97 663–672
E. Eells B. Fitelson (2002) ArticleTitle‘Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support’ Philosophical Studies 107 129–142 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1014712013453
Fitelson, B.: 2001, Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory, PhD. dissertation, University of Wisconsin–Madison.
B. Fitelson (2003) ArticleTitle‘A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence’ Analysis 63 194–199 Occurrence Handle10.1111/1467-8284.00420
H. Gaifman (1985) ArticleTitle‘On Inductive Support and Some Recent Tricks’ Erkenntnis 22 5–21 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00269957
Garber, D.: 1983, ‘Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory’, in Earman (ed.), pp. 99–131.
K. Gemes (1993) ArticleTitle‘Hypothetico-Deductivism, Content, and the Natural Axiomatization of Theories’ Philosophy of Science 60 477–487 Occurrence Handle10.1086/289748
K. Gemes (1994) ArticleTitle‘A New Theory of Content I: Basic Content’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 596–620 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF01052779
K. Gemes (1997) ArticleTitle‘A New Theory of Content II: Model Theory and Some Alternatives’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 449–476 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1004291217792
D. Gillies (2000) Philosophical Theories of Probability Routledge London
C. Glymour (1980a) Theory and Evidence Princeton University Press Princeton NJ
C. Glymour (1980b) ArticleTitle‘Bootstraps and Probabilities’ Journal of Philosophy 67 691–699
W. Goosens (1976) ‘A Critique of Epistemic Utilities’ R. Bogdan (Eds) Local Induction Reidel Dordrecht 93–113
I. Hacking (2001) An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic Cambridge University Press Cambridge
J. Halpern (2003) Reasoning about Uncertainty MIT Press Cambridge MA
J. Hampton (1994) ArticleTitle‘The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason’ Economics and Philosophy 10 195–242
B. Hansson (1988) ‘Risk Aversion as a Problem of Conjoint Measurement’ P. Gärdenfors N.-E. Sahlin (Eds) Decision, Probability, and Utility Cambridge University Press Cambridge 136–158
C. Howson (2000) Hume’s Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief Clarendon Press Oxford
C. Howson (2003) ‘Bayesian Evidence’ M.C. Galavotti (Eds) Observation and Experiment in the Natural and Social Sciences Kluwer Dordrecht 301–320
R. Jeffrey (1983) The Logic of Decision EditionNumber2 University of Chicago Press Chicago IL
Joyce, J.: 2004, ‘On the Plurality of Probabilist Measures of Evidential Relevance’, manuscript.
M. Kaplan (1981a) ArticleTitle‘Rational Acceptance’ Philosophical Studies 40 129–145 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00353786
M. Kaplan (1981b) ArticleTitle‘A Bayesian Theory of Rational Acceptance’ Journal of Philosophy 78 305–330
J. Kemeny P. Oppenheim (1952) ArticleTitle‘Degrees of Factual Support’ Philosophy of Science 19 307–324 Occurrence Handle10.1086/287214
P. Klein T. Warfield (1994) ArticleTitle‘What Price Coherence?’ Analysis 54 129–132
T. Kuipers (2000) From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism Kluwer Dordrecht
A. Kukla (1998) Studies in Scientific Realism Oxford University Press Oxford
K. Lehrer (1990) Theory of Knowledge EditionNumber2 Routledge London
I. Levi (1967) Gambling with Truth MIT Press Cambridge MA
P. Maher (1993) Betting on Theories Cambridge University Press Cambridge
T. Merricks (1995) ArticleTitle‘On Behalf of the Coherentist’ Analysis 55 306–309
I. Niiniluoto (1983) ArticleTitle‘Novel Facts and Bayesianism’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 375–379
I. Niiniluoto (1998) ArticleTitle‘Verisimilitude: The Third Period’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 1–29 Occurrence Handle10.1093/bjps/49.1.1
I. Niiniluoto (1999) Critical Scientific Realism Clarendon Press Oxford
R. Nozick (1981) Philosophical Explanations Harvard University Press Cambridge MA
E.J. Olsson (1999) ArticleTitle‘ “Cohering With” ’ Erkenntnis 50 273–291 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1005530006938
S. Psillos (1999) Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Routledge London
Quine W.V. (1953). ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in his From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 20–46.
M. Rabin (2000) ArticleTitle‘Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem’ Econometrica 68 1281–1292 Occurrence Handle10.1111/1468-0262.00158
Ramsey F.P. (1926). ‘Truth and Probability’, in his The Foundations of Mathematics, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931, London, pp. 156–198.
M. Resnik (1987) Choices University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis
D. Satz J. Ferejohn (1994) ArticleTitle‘Rational Choice and Social Theory’ Journal of Philosophy 91 71–87
L. Savage (1954) The Foundations of Statistics Wiley New York
G. Schurz (1991) ArticleTitle‘Relevant Deduction: From Solving Paradoxes Towards a General Theory’ Erkenntnis 35 391–437
G. Shafer (1976) A Mathematical Theory of Evidence Princeton University Press Princeton NJ
T. Shogenji (1999) ArticleTitle‘Is Coherence Truth Conducive?’ Analysis 59 338–345 Occurrence Handle10.1111/1467-8284.00191
W. Spohn (1988) ‘Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States’ W. Harper B. Skyrms (Eds) Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics NumberInSeries(Vol 2) Reidel Dordrecht 105–134
W. Spohn (1991) ‘A Reason for Explanation: Explanations Provide Stable Reasons’ W. Spohn B.C. Fraassen Particlevan B. Skyrms (Eds) Existence and Explanation Kluwer Dordrecht 165–196
W. Spohn (1999) ArticleTitle‘Two Principles of Coherence’ Erkenntnis 50 155–175
B.C. Fraassen Particlevan (1980) The Scientific Image Clarendon Press Oxford
van Fraassen, B. C.: 1983a, ‘Theory Comparison and Relevant Evidence’, in Earman (ed.), pp. 27–42.
van Fraassen, B. C.: 1983b, ‘Glymour on Evidence and Explanation’, in Earman (ed.), pp. 165–176.
B.C. Fraassen Particlevan (1988) ‘The Problem of Old Evidence’ D. Austin (Eds) Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Dordrecht 153–165
P. Weirich (1986) ArticleTitle‘Expected Utility and Risk’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 419–442
P. Weirich (2001) ArticleTitle‘Risk’s Place in Decision Rules’ Synthese 126 427–441 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1005240226961
L.A. Zadeh (1978) ArticleTitle‘Fuzzy Sets as a Basis for a Theory of Possibility’ Fuzzy Sets and Systems 1 3–28 Occurrence Handle10.1016/0165-0114(78)90029-5
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Douven, I., Meijs, W. Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative. Synthese 149, 97–132 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6250-2
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6250-2