Abstract
The concepts of coherence and confirmation are closely intertwined: according to a prominent proposal coherence is nothing but mutual confirmation. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that both are confronted with similar problems. As regards Bayesian confirmation measures these are illustrated by the problem of tacking by conjunction. On the other hand, Bayesian coherence measures face the problem of belief individuation. In this paper we want to outline the benefit of an approach to coherence and confirmation based on content elements. It will be shown that the resulting concepts, called genuine coherence and genuine confirmation, can be used in order to solve the two mentioned problems. In a final section we present some results on degrees of genuine coherence and genuine confirmation.
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Schippers, M., Schurz, G. Genuine Coherence as Mutual Confirmation Between Content Elements. Stud Logica 105, 299–329 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-016-9690-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-016-9690-z