Pretty much in the middle of Plato’s Theaetetus, the reader will find a digression from the dialogue’s main theme, in which the philosophical and non-philosophical method of leading one’s life is discussed. The well-known story of Thales makes up a part of this excurses. In the story, a Thracian maiden laughs at the philosopher Thales, after he had fallen into a well while his gaze was fixed to the stars above. The maiden ridicules Thales by pointing out that while he indeed may be bent on knowing what is going on in the heavens, he is ignorant regarding things occurring right before him (174b).

Socrates uses the story about Thales in order to exemplify the philosophical method of leading one’s life. In the dialogue, Socrates emphasizes how the philosopher turns away from the affairs of everyday life. In doing so, he directs his attention towards questions concerning the more foundational and overriding aspects of virtue. For this reason, philosophy is ridiculed by the practical man or woman, as they realize that philosophers are apparently inexperienced in dealing with everyday tasks and often deal with them in an awkward and malapropos way. Because he is oblivious with respect to practical affairs, the philosopher not only constantly is in danger of having some sort of accident, but is also felt to be as kind of troublemaker, as somebody who isn’t integrated into the great current of daily routines.

Even today, the story of Thales is often alluded to, in order to characterize philosophical knowledge or the philosophical method of living life. In the view of pedagogical and educational philosophy, the relative distance between the philosopher and the tides of daily existence are simultaneously seen as a prerequisite for understanding as well as a problem. It is seen as a prerequisite for the educational studies, because without this (artificially induced) distance we would remain entangled into the goals and purposes that are inherent to real-life situations. This is also the line of argument that Socrates employs in the Theaetetus. Those who partake in actions within social situations are always the “slaves of talk” (173c), as they are required to submit to the overall framework that is dictated to them. The order and logic dominant in that framework also includes a number of constraints concerning time, which precludes the possibility of an adequate reflection, which, of course, requires time. Consequently, when considering foundational issues in the theory of education, it seems necessary to break with the educational doings—that is: to break with the routines of action and the goals and purposes associated with those routines.

Since the days of Plato, however, the distance to everyday existence is also seen as a problem: There is the potential to lose the contact to lived pratice. The question concerning the legitimacy of philosophy is often tied to the accusation that philosophy were immensely and supremely “un-practical.” In the German-speaking educational discourse, the legitimacy of philosophy or the legitimacy of a philosophical approach is also directed at the philosophy of education—this is especially the case since the social sciences paradigm has gained ground in educational studies during the 1970s. As an effect of this criticism, the philosophy of education is often relegated and confined to “reflection upon foundational issues”—a reflection that is demarcated from so-called applied issues (Tippelt 2006).

When, as in this special issue, one asks about the future alternatives and alternative futures of educational philosophy, then it certainly will not only be important to ask what kind of themes ought to be pursued or what sort of methodical approach ought to be chosen. But it will moreover also be necessary to clarify what task is appropriate for educational philosophy within the entire context of educational reflection. Looking at this issue from the vantage point that we had gained with Plato, we may say that it is necessary to see how the pragma of educational philosophy relates to education or educational practice.

According to Plato, philosophy begins with astonishment (thaumazein). This means that things lose their unquestioned acceptance; a space is opened up that makes room for foundational questions that are of concern to us (cf. Aristotle, Met. 982b 12; Plato, Theat. 155d). For Plato, this is the space to address the basis of our shared human life: virtue. Looking at our contemporary context, we may say that a shared foundation of living has lost its self-evidence to a much greater degree today than in antiquity. At this point, we may be reminded that Lyotard had also declared an “end of the great narratives” (Lyotard 1999), but also Nietzsche’s problematizing of the occidental rationality (Nietzsche KSA 1, Foucault 1974) as well as the diagnoses that seem to indicate a general societal atmosphere of uncertainty and individualization (Giddens 1996, Beck 1986).

When we follow these references, they lead us to the following question: what does reflection on educational theory and education today actually aim at, if theory and practice can no longer be formulated as a unity? This is, as I will show, the situation that we are in today, when we accept the self-problematizing of modern thought. After a brief characterization of educational philosophy and educational studies in the German context (section ‘Philosophy of Education in the Context of “General Education”’.), I will discuss the central topic of limits of understanding subjectivity by exemplifying it in the case of individualized learning (section ‘The Limitations of Understanding Subjectivity’).

If philosophical reflection concerning education does not prove to be as confident with respect to its object as it ought to be, if—speaking with Plato—the distinction between inside and outside the cave (Pol. 514a) has turned into a problem, then it seems important to find a different answer to the question that we have considered earlier, namely how the philosophical method of leading one’s life is related to the non-philosophical method. In this essay, I argue that the philosophy of education of the future will encompass an “economy” (section ‘Towards an Economy of Pedagogical Knowledge’) as well as an “ecology” (section ‘Starting Points: The Ecology of Pedagogical Knowledge’.) of pedagogical or educational knowledge. Here, analyses of contemporary educational practices are brought together with the invention and discovery of other or alternative possibilities. I will develop this position with recourse to a notion of the political as it has been done in the work of Jacques Rancière, Isabelle Stengers and Ernesto Laclau/Chantal Mouffe.Footnote 1

Philosophy of Education in the Context of “General Education”

"General Education" is used here as the translation of "Allgemeine Pädagogik". It refers to all overarching issues of educational situations.

The philosophy of education within the German-speaking tradition is heavily influenced by philosophical authors ranging from antiquity up to today. By referring to the occidental philosophical tradition, a shared history is affirmed. From the onset, philosophical questions have always been raised as pedagogical questions—for instance, whether ethics or virtue could be learned (Fischer 1996; Benner 1988) or if it is thinkable that a human being may be raised into a state of morality via education (Kant 1963; Ruhloff 2005). The educational science discipline has not been established via the discipline of philosophy, and yet the process of educational reflection occurs eminently along the lines of various philosophical agendas, such as the claims and considerations made by Dilthey with respect to the humanities (“Geisteswissenschaft” and “geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik”). Educational and philosophical questions thus are raised in process of close mutual exchange (Meyer-Drawe 2003; Ricken 2010; Thompson and Weiß 2008). This still holds true, even if the lines drawn between the disciplines in Germany no longer reflect this liaison or affinity and even if there has been a strong differentiation within the educational studies in the past 30 years (Horn 2011).

Engaging the tradition is motivated by systematic considerations. Within the German debate, the reference to tradition is used to provide a space for reflection and assessment. Theodor Ballauff, the German philosopher of education, says in his three volume work “Pädagogik. Geschichte der Bildung und Erziehung” (Pedagogics. The History of Education and Learning): “The challenges posed by pedagogics today may only be properly assessed using a historical perspective. This is the only way in which we may show the historical currency of topics and tasks that we are confronted with. This is how we protect ourselves from ephemera as well as actualities that are being dictated to us from the outside” (Ballauff 1970 I, pg. 15). Thus, dealing with the tradition is motivated by the desire to work out those categories and topics that have been influential in educational theory and practice so far. By doing so, we are engaging in a process of reviewing and evaluating various figurations of argument and justification, in order to make the contingency and prejudice of our own thought apparent to us.

In the course of this engagement, there has not been the point to agree on a “common basis of education.” Rather, the systematic groundwork reveals the plurality of theoretical and practical approaches to “education” in changing societal and historical contexts. There is, in other words, an ongoing debate on how to give education an uncontroversial foundation. This can be illustrated referring to Dietrich Benner’s book “General Education,” first published in 1987 and re-edited many times. Until this day the book has been the subject of critical debate (Giesinger 2011, Schäfer 2012). Benner’s intention to formulate constitutive principles of “education” has not been without criticism. This is to say that the foundational issues of education are constantly under debate. Whatever is thought to be foundational is—to be more precise—negotiated in the mode of discussion (cf. Ruhloff 1991, cf. Schäfer et al. 2012).

We may generally note that the modus operandi in the German philosophy of education is marked, on the one hand, by an awareness of the tradition that dominates the systematic and critical articulation of various issues. On the other hand, it is marked by habitual reflection and critical inquiry (Meyer-Drawe 2002). Pedagogical concepts and theories are not a canon or set of definitions that need shop keeping. Rather, they convey the problems surrounding that which is educational in the light of their various contexts and thinkable solutions.Footnote 3

This very brief characterization of the modus operandi prevalent in the German tradition may already shift our attention towards the central topic that is to be explicated in what is to come. In the following the habitual reflection and critical inquiry developed so far will be referred to the limits of understanding subjectivity. These limits will be worked out along the lines of various theoretical frameworks.

The Limitations of Understanding Subjectivity

Immanuel Kant (1990) opens his “Critique of Pure Reason” with the note: “Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.” (A VII). Kant presents us with a “natural” tendency of reason to transcend itself and thus in transcending “every faculty of the mind” is in danger of seeing the semblance of things rather than the truth of the matter. The “Critique of Pure Reason” proceeds by enlightening reason itself by way of the means available to reason to do so. This self-enlightenment of reason then is viewed as a critical enterprise or rather as an enterprise that is critical of metaphysics.Footnote 4

Reflection of Metaphysics

What Kant has called a fateful “calling” of human reason, may be related to education by critically looking at the metaphysical premises that are associated with “education.” These premises make a critical inquiry necessary (cf. e.g. Buck 1984). This is to say that working on the theory of education means to undertake a (liminal) reflection upon the constitutive elements of that which is under scrutiny—a reflection on the way in which educational processes are conceptualized. This begins with what kind of terminology is used in order to describe these proceesses. The articulation of issues implies the significance of particular terms and concepts.Footnote 5

Using a poststructuralist concept of language, we may show that and how articulation requires such liminal reflection. According to that concept, language is not viewed as originating from a speaking sovereign subject. Rather language is seen as the medium of social reality. In never-ending processes of re-articulation social reality is shaped by making differences. Language precedes the speaking subject, because it is language itself that gives the speaker his or her position as a speaker and as an understanding recipient. The subject isn’t in command of language, but is constituted as a subject within the language’s framework that allows the subject to understand its being (Butler 2001; Jergus 2013).

The poststructuralist notion of language preceding its speaker may be illustrated by the “manipulating concepts” that are heavily in use in the realm of education as Reichenbach has shown (Reichenbach 2003). Those are concepts that already carry pedagogical normativity and value judgments in their sheer formulation. Take, for instance, the pedagogical concept of “individualization” of teaching or instruction. This concept is—in the German use—laden with pedagogical pretensions and rhetoric without reflecting the possibilities and limits of these learning arrangements adequately. The talk of “individualization” determines what is sayable or thinkable in the context of education—and what is not. Pedagogical procedures are charged with the claim that they will substantiate the individual by way of learning.

According to Reichenbach, one task in the philosophy of educations is to critically understand this quality of “manipulation” inherent in pedagogical concepts. Additionally, he thinks that it is necessary to formulate a sort of linguistics of education that becomes aware of the romanticizing, overriding, and metaphorical elements within the language that is used. But understanding language as a reality-constituting medium is not limited to critically identifying illegitimate uses of language. Instead, utterances constitute phenomena: with every kind of “articulation”, say Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe 2001), things and events gain a gestalt and are demarcated from other things and events, which are in turn shifted and restituted with every new articulation (cf. Thompson 2007).Footnote 6

The notion of language presented here operates with a postsovereign concept of the subject, according to which the subject does not confront the world as a mundus intelligibilis, but is embedded in the flow of the social and is birthed thereby. We are speaking the language of others and, if we do not speak it, we will not be understood. Our understandability as subjects depends on language and even our “academic comprehensibility” is reliant on the language that is spoken as educational discourse. Furthermore, this notion of language implies that educational processes must be thought in the rationale of language and not as an interaction of one subjective intentionality that exist for themselves with another.Footnote 7

Dialectics Within Education

Secondly, the topic “limitations of understanding subjectivity” could be developed along the lines of Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s “Dialectics of Enlightenment.” I shall do so by referring to the example of “individualization” that I cited earlier, because that concept is often seen in the context of the modernization and the improvement of scholastic learning and teaching arrangements. General testing is replaced by portfolios and other personalized evaluation settings.Footnote 8 According to Horkheimer and Adorno, however, there is a dialectic convergence of freedom and subjugation in modernity and modernization.

Horkheimer and Adorno had claimed that the liberation from inscrutable mythical powers went along with a subjugation of the subject. The modern genesis of the subject is birthed in a self-chastisement, domination, and repression of the self, as the authors had exemplified it by the figure of Odysseus (Horkheimer and Adorno 1987, pg. 67ff.). While passing by the Sirens, Odysseus asks to be tied to the mast of his ship and thus can escape their mythical powers by repressing his desires. The subject, therefore, must pay a price in order to free itself from those impenetrable powers that stand above it.

The pedagogical demand for “individualization” is also wedged between a similar dialectic and ambivalence. On the one hand, it is the hallmark of modern schools. On the other hand, it forces certain forms of participation limiting the possibilites of withdrawal. Take for example the personalization in “morning circles”: Pupils make the experience of peer pressure, for it is harder to refuse the participation in the conversations within that circle. Similarly individualized and personalized school settings increase the necessity of justification for this or that behavior or performance. In the new contractual culture the behavior of the pupils is subject to the constraints of free consent. Individualizations thus mobilize discipline and control—where it was not intended to be established.

Horkheimer and Adorno expounded the problems inherent in the notion of a pure reason and the enlightenment in general. They showed that the mechanisms of domination and subjugation inherent in (pedagogical) reason must then be analyzed, without being able to qualify a dialectical abolition of the paradoxes in the sense of a general solution. In the philosophy of education this could become productive, if we place education—and the concepts and things reflected by our discipline—at the juncture of freedom and domination. By constantly negotiating the dialectical paradox, we can also show that that which is, isn’t everything.Footnote 9

Normalization in Education

Thirdly the limits of understanding subjectivity can be highlighted with the concept of “normalization” (following Foucault). Foucault has developed a concept of power that decenters the dynamics of the social from their gravitation around common “ways of thinking.” In his analysis of power, Foucault makes us aware of strategic operations of power within the social and their constitutive effects on subject formation (Foucault 1987).

The concept of “individualization” can for example be described as a constellation of “knowledge,” “power,” and “subjectification.” It brings forth or triggers particular forms of knowledge, knowledge that is supposed to “reveal” the truth about the individual. This knowledge is formed by the individual learning practices—and the learning subject is constituted as a task-fulfilling subject: The individual expresses its individuality within the individualized setting by showing that it is aware that it ought to fulfill certain tasks that are catered towards its individual profile. This subjectification is an effect of power that derives from the practical arrangement of the individualized learning situation.

Individualization and the corresponding forms of subjectification bring forth normalization. The normalizing aspect lies in the expectation and normality of an active or task-fulfilling subject. This has been shown by Sabine Reh and Kerstin Rabenstein (Rabenstein and Reh 2009). They have shown the parallelism of an increased discourse based on autonomy in the broadened learning situation and the increase of attention deficits in pedagogical and psychological discourses (Rabenstein and Reh 2009). The pupil who fulfills tasks has become a normal perception and is increasingly expected in school practice. That which doesn’t fulfill with these expectations appears as aberration from the norm.

The analysis of power clarifies the impenetrable and multitudinous power relationships that are not dominated by a pedagogical plan. The figure of the autonomous pupil is layered with various power constellations: the promise of an autonomous learning process, the perspective of a successful future, the hope of a successful school experience etc. The subjectification of an individualized or “enterprising” self (Bröckling 2007) often escapes our attention.

Up to now, I have developed the topic “limits of understanding subjectivity” in three different theoretical contexts. These three contexts show the analytical tasks and the modus operandi prevalent in the German tradition of philosophy of education from a poststructuralist and critical theoretical point of view. This provides insights into the constitution of pedagogical knowledge, the logic of pedagogical meaning-making and the corresponding forms of subjectification.

Speaking with Kant, the focus of educational philosophy is set upon a critical reflection of limits. This reflection is aimed at recognizing how we as subjects are constituted within pedagogical contexts, and how spaces of experiencing the world, thinking, and acting are constituted as well. Unlike Kant, however, this liminal reflection suggested here cannot be performed once and for all (paving a “highroad” for every enterprise of reason, KrV B884). In the work of educational philosophy, pedagogical issues or pedagogical spaces must be checked with respect to how the pedagogical comes to presence within the given contexts. Critique then turns into an analytical practice with respect to the terminological and practical realization of pedagogical operations. These analyses are not free from power relations. However, they can instigate a critical economy and ecology of pedagogical knowledge.

Towards an Economy of Pedagogical Knowledge

In the introduction, the Platonic question was raised of how to relate the philosophical and the non-philosophical life today given the uncertain and dialectical aspects of modernity. In the previous section, the ambivalent effects of modernity on the pedagogical idea and practice of “individualization” was discussed. It was shown, that, on the one hand, individualization opens up an opportunity of a self-directed learning, and that, on the other hand, individualization entails power and domination. As of consequence, the task of “General Education” or educational philosophy was determined as an analytical and critical undertaking: to work out how subjects of education are shaped or determined by the articulations and manifestations of educational theory and practice. However, educational philosophy is also responsible for showing how pedagogical theory and practice can be conceived in a different way. The position of educational philosophy, therefore, is not to represent or incorporate theories or practical forms of action. Instead, it is marked by an attitude of reflection and the consideration of alternatives. I would like to describe this attitude as working on the economy and ecology of pedagogical knowledge.

The term “economy” is used in this contribution to describe the interdependence of elements in how they come to presence through language in educational contexts. This intelligibility or coming to presence can be worked out by analyzing how pedagogical knowledge is shaped, how it is legitimized, differentiated, and how it is made to circulate among various agents in the social realm. The economy of pedagogical knowledge also shows how this knowledge is translated into other contexts, as, for instance, from scientific reflection to practical contexts and situations of educational policy. Analytical instruments, used in an economy of pedagogical knowledge, make use of power analysis or dialectical reflection, as I have demonstrated earlier.Footnote 10 A very importanct current issue for an economy of pedagogical knowledge would be the expanding practice of reporting and protocolling within the education system and I will use this as an example in the following. Considering the more and more differentiated and specialized educational research and the differentiation within the education system, we are often confronted with voices, demanding that we make visible and check the performance of educational research and practice. This request in turn produces various forms of knowledge and specific representations of educational research or practice. An increasing number of reports and reviews are being produced. They are supposed to assess the efficiency and quality of pedagogical interventions and processes. Using the example of the American “What Works Clearing-House,” I would like to show what challenges are to be expected in an analysis of the economy of knowledge.

The WWC, which is part of the “Institute of Educational Sciences” within the American Department of Education, is responsible for producing reviews concerning scientific studies (cf. regarding WWC as well as other review initiatives: Jornitz 2008). Various systematic reviews are created for a number of educational topics, such as “Early Education” or “Student Behavior.” The topics that are chosen and the method of inquiry is focused on practical applications. In a three step process, the WWC first checks the relevancy of the topic, the quality of the results of existing studies, and the appropriateness of the reported data, in order to then ascertain the quality of the intervention, which is measured by “standards of evidence”.Footnote 11 This is done in order to present those studies concisely which have been “identified” as being of a high quality.Footnote 12

The compilation of those reviews by the WWC is a form of producing knowledge with the intention of summarizing scientific findings and to make them available to a larger circle of addressees, especially those in the practical or applied field. It is argued that because of the differentiation of the academic it is hardly possible for somebody working practically to follow the current level of academic research (Gough 2009). The review is thus presented as a service for those working in the practical field, in order to enable them to have grounded and reasoned judgment in their day-to-day practice. The intentions that are pursued in this enterprise are understandable. However, it is not taken into account how the way in which scientific studies are processed and represented in fact modifies the knowledge presented in the original research. The work of the WWC is a secondary processing that gives the research results a new meaning.

The limitation and narrowing down of that knowledge by way of that secondary processing has been discussed before. First of all, this secondary processing is limited because it focuses on quantitative and statistical research (Biesta 2011b; Herzog 2011, Bellmann and Müller 2011). The neutrality feigned by that kind of scientific objectivism is fueled by the promise of efficiency, which has given the WWC its name. This pretended neutral selection and assortment relieves the recipient of contemplating the findings for him- or herself. The recipients are relieved or divested of assessing what kind of meaning such findings have for one’s own pedagogical reflection and action. This brings about a democratic deficit, as Gert Biesta has pointed out (Biesta 2011b); for there is no consulting available regarding the meaningfulness of that knowledge and the yardsticks used in its assessment. The review gives off the semblance that it is simply making knowledge available and replaces individual reading, reflection, and assessment of those studies. In contradistinction to a reflective negotiation without interests, studies are from the beginning presented in the alleged interest of the addressees who as “stake holders” receive a representation of that knowledge—mainly practitioners, such as teachers and parents.

In the process of the review studies are dragged into a one-dimensional hierarchy, in which only the degree of evidence is discerned. The operation within the logic of knowledge, which takes place here is that of the hierarchical representation of studies according to the strictness of their procedures (e.g. RCT and quasi-experimental designs)—and this is everything but trivial. The legitimacy of the operation is vested in the assertion that the objectivism inherent in the method can be equated to the scientific nature of the study. And thus the decontextualization of a knowledge construct takes its course with respect to the effectiveness of an intervention. By constituting knowledge under the premise of an effective educational intervention (e.g. a learning software), a secondary effect is set into motion that uplifts the intervention under focus and turns it into the deciding instrument of the learning situation that is also then thought to be independent of the contexts in which it is used.

Reporting and assessing reviews (which is composed with “effectiveness” in mind) then presents the evidence brought forth by studies as the fulfillment or success of the pedagogical practice. Reality is modelled after the parameters set by the experiment. Successful pedagogical action then is presented as the evidence of experimentally studied and proven effectiveness. The result of the review stands, therefore, for the “promise” that the pedagogical practice will be successful. In essence, this means that under the label of application-orientation the review institutes an equivalency in the relationship between the experimental-statistical studies and the pedagogical practice.

The reviews, which the WWC produces, then become the origin of subsequent translations, as they are, for example, used at conferences and meetings. In doing so, the contextualization of that meeting may shift as well; thus effectiveness studies translate into the reception of the educational software (as we may very well observe e.g. on Amazon). Here, too, the constituted knowledge is shifted and the relationship between the reflecting subject and the object of reflection is shifted, because the object is as a product subjugated to a distancing calculus of cost-benefit considerations. When we conceptualize the instruments of learning as “products,” which is associated with certain cost-benefit considerations, then this also implies a specific way of structuring and shaping processes of learning—and it also implies that a certain scope is made available in which the pedagogical addressees may undergo a process of subjectification.

The semantics of efficiency implies formations of knowledge that bear consequences for education and learning processes. It is becoming increasingly apparent that by orienting ourselves along the lines of efficiency, especially in reporting, new formations of education and identificatory practices (of quality, values etc.) take shape. By means of the reviews an educational software is endowed with the promise that it has a certain pedagogical potential in influencing learning processes positively. We ascribe this positive effect to the software (product). In doing so, experimental constructs go into effect and the pedagogical reality is shaped in accordance to them. In other words, it is thought that the software enables learning (and nothing else), because the relationship of its results to a control group simply makes the “difference.” Reports and the assessment of efficiency and quality is—from an economy of knowledge perspective—a place in which responsibility and performance is ascribed to various agents. Theorizing this phenomena in the logic of governmentality, we may say that we are dealing with a government that operates by scientification of that which is (by way of inquiry) “perceived” as a consequence within procedures. Practitioners in the field use the review as an external resource, as it promises to present the consequences that will result from a specific pedagogical intervention.

An economy of pedagogical knowledge will now also continue to pursue the question by asking how the review is translated into the practice or into further research and what kind of transformations that knowledge thereby undergoes. Knowledge, as I have shown, is shaped by the frame in which it is used and is not simply fully realized by the various representations of subjects that are involved in it. In contradistinction to the perception of knowledge as a cognitive construct, the economy of pedagogical knowledge looks at how knowledge is embedded in the social realm and how it is used there. At this point, we may also observe that the analytical work done in the economy of pedagogical knowledge requires a philosophical-systematical attitude and, furthermore, needs an empirical attitude that is open towards recognizing how subjectifications and objectifications go along with that knowledge in pedagogical contexts.

Starting Points: The Ecology of Pedagogical Knowledge

I will now roughly outline an ecology of pedagogical knowledge. While in an economical perspective we are focused on analyzing processes of circulation, legitimization, and translation, in the ecological perspective we are interested in looking at the limits of constituting knowledge. The thesis is that knowledge can never be reduced to its scientific production. Instead, we are to acknowledge that, which knowledge refers to, is multifarious and cannot be fully accounted for by way of reflection. Bearing this in mind, which we may also associate with Adorno’s critique of identifying certain way of thinking or Foucault’s remarks on desubjectification (Thompson 2009), I would like to once again return to Plato’s digression on philosophers in the dialogue Theaetetus.

We have so far seen how the ambivalence inherent in modernity goes along with various power and domination effects, which in turn raise problematic questions with respect to the understanding, auctorial pedagogical subject. After the considerations we have made above, we may ask whether it is appropriate to identify a philosophical way of life with the figure of Thales. Doesn’t the scene document the fact that we are to put an issue between the two attitudes and have the two figures (the philosophical and non-philosophical rationale) respond to it in the mode of “active consideration”? Isn’t the problem to be seen in the fact that we too quickly ascribe a certain role to the philosopher (or scientist), which entails the understanding that his knowledge is somehow of a superior kind? Doesn’t this thinking always create a rigid difference between those who can rely on the power of their discourse and those who are denied publicity and are only able to articulate their positions in the realm of private interests (Rancière 2002, 2008)?

Without now dealing with the basic conflict between the idea of theoretical and of practical life—as it has been dominant in philosophical debate from Plato and Aristotle to Heidegger and ArendtFootnote 13, it is important to clarify as who we deal with pedagogical questions and think about them. Maybe the issue isn’t really to get comfortable with legitimized knowledge in a position (of critique), but instead to take a dynamic and ecological perspective that is located between the dispassionate contemplation of the episteme and the inveigling affection of the doxa. In her cosmopolitical proposal, Isabelle Stengers says that it is about making issues present in a way that does not simplify them by seeking unambiguity, but looks at the relationship between individuals and those issues (Stengers 2005, pg. 1002f.). This makes witnesses or diplomats important beyond the realm of “experts”—in order to make things visible that otherwise would remain unrepresented in the scientific representation.

Now, using the motif of the “limits of understanding subjectivity,” I also wanted to show where our belief in scientific procedures and experts endangers us of becoming all too narrow in our perspective and thus deprive pedagogical issues of alternative considerations and shared reflection upon the issues at hand. At this point, we may see that the example of reporting within the education system is much more than an example. My brief analysis already could show that the perception of scientific expertise creates certain identifications of performance and ascribes performance. This is tied to learning materials and often deproblematizes their usage.Footnote 14

An ecology of pedagogical knowledge expands upon the analysis performed under the focus of economy and models or condenses them to problems, and in doing so it opens them up to shared reflection and deliberation. Such a problem could for instance be the above described inefficient usage of educational software that had originally been introduced because of its “effectiveness” and now brings about a negative attribution by the pupils using it.Footnote 15 What these constellations of problems associated with a certain issue then bring to light or make visible, is how the inquiry into effectiveness effects processes of performance assessment. Assessing performance takes place via a verification of a perception that presupposes effectiveness that is made invisible by the individualizing attribution.

Looking at the problem in such a way, we realize that alongside the expert perspective, we also have the position of the witness that testifies on how school life or work with educational software may take place. It also shows how pedagogical work counts and is accounted for is not represented adequately. The issue, which appears as an issue in the new formulation of the problem, has something to do with how scholastic performance is identified and on how selections are made on basis of that identification and how difference is practiced in the school setting.

Laying out the problem in such way, does not mean that the issue is reduced to a single fact, which can be scientifically proven and is without alternative.Footnote 16 Having said all this, it ought to be clear that the goal isn’t to resolve every problem in an assessment that is founded on some sort of verdict made in the light of educational philosophy. Instead of identifying the issue with a solution, resolving a conflict, or creating some sort of consensus, we are interested in creating dissent that shows that which was not accounted for and that which cannot become visible under the current partition of the sensible (Rancière 2002). The ecology of pedagogical knowledge is, to say it in the words of Rancière, the enablement of politics.

In the light of educational philosophy, I would like to now retell the story of Thales and the Thracian maiden. Having gone through a database on studies made in the field of educational sciences, a teacher posts the following message on Facebook. He says, “evidence-based knowledge” does not alleviate his pedagogical actions directed at unenthusiastic students from their inherent insecurity and discomfort. Some other user responds to his post with a Smile and asks, why he is sure that what he was doing had anything to do with school at all?

translated by Christopher Paul Campbell.