Introduction

The use and non-use of new information and communication technologies (ICT) in organizations are typically studied within acceptance and resistance frameworks. While acceptance theories are largely attitude-based and predict use from behavioral intention (Davis 1986; Venkatesh et al. 2003), resistance is generally treated as conscious and voluntary behavior in response to the consequences of the new ICT, its implementation, and use (Beaudry and Pinsonneault 2005; Lapointe and Rivard 2005). A literature search in the fields of psychology, political science, sociology and management studies reveals that the term “non-use” of technology usually is applied in a wider societal context, such as for example citizens’ choice not to use the Internet and assistive technology (e.g. Selwyn 2003; Wessels et al. 2003; Wyatt et al. 2005). With a few exceptions (Baumer et al. 2015; Slater 1986), non-use as something else than the opposite of acceptance or different from resistance has received little attention. Involuntary non-use of new ICT in organizations is here simply defined as a situation where employees want to use the new technology but are not able to.

This is a case study that took place in three comparable Norwegian power grid companies. These implemented a variety of new enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems with partly parallel and complementary functions, as well as a system supposed to coordinate these and to increase performance efficiency of manual work tasks out in the field—Power Data. There were three main employee groups: managers, planners and installers. While the planners and managers used the new ICT as intended, it remained underutilized by the installers—despite their outspoken wish to use it. In a socio-technical approach, this study explores the interplay between technological and social-organizational factors that produce differences in use between different employee groups in the same organization, including involuntary non-use for employees that lack initial ICT skills. The two main employee groups in this study are installers and planners. As the companies were characterized by identical technological solutions, identical organizational structures and tasks, and identical employee groups that were internally homogenous, the study investigates differences in ICT use between installers and planners across organizations, rather than between the three case organizations.

The installers and the planners had very different backgrounds and work tasks, and thus the premises for using the new ICT were very different as well. The two main differences between the two groups in addition to tasks and backgrounds were the planners’ skills in ICT, and their closeness to managers. A more thorough description of the case and context is given in the case description section. In the theory section, the notion of involuntary non-use of ICT at work is elaborated further based on how it differs from acceptance and resistance behaviors in a scenario like the one in the case study. The importance of healthy change processes and the quality of change leadership for successful ICT-based organizational change is emphasized in order to enlighten the relationship between social-organizational factors and technology. Relevant to this is self-determination theory—explaining why and how the integration of ICT use in work operations is dependent of the nature of this relationship. A model that summarizes this preliminary framework concludes the theory section. The findings section identifies social-organizational factors that take on different expressions and effects for different employee groups, parting from the initial differences in skills and proximity to managers. The expressions of these factors in terms of working conditions affect employees’ levels of self-determination. At its base, involuntary non-use of new ICT at work is proposed to stem from working conditions’ failure to link together change processes, the technology, new routines and work methods, and the meant-to-be users. Employees lacking ICT skills are subject to working conditions that make them unable to learn to use the new ICT and to integrate its use into their daily work practices.

Theoretical Background

While we know a lot about technology acceptance and resistance, involuntary ICT non-use is an underdeveloped concept. The study of differences in ICT use between different employee groups should not treat technology as a ‘black box’ (Orlikowski 1992). In order to accept and use new technology employees must see both its usefulness and its applicability (Venkatesh et al. 2003). Organizational, individual, project-related and management-based factors influence technology use, as well as the systems’ flexibility (Venkatesh et al. 2003; Groth 1999; Riley 1989).The effects of social influence and expected consequences are well-documented (e.g. Thompson et al. 1991), as well as self-efficacy—the belief that one has the capability to perform a certain behavior—found to influence both affection and anxiety vis-à-vis the use of information systems (e.g. Compeau and Higgins 1995; Compeau et al. 1999). The socio-technical approach of this study has the leadership and quality of the ICT-organization integration process as its main social-organizational components—in order to understand how user behaviors may develop so differently within the same company walls. ICT-organization integration often leads to complex implicit and explicit changes in the workplace, and non-use may stem from inability to use the new technology—due to inadequate fit between ICT and social-organizational factors, which fails to respond to employees’ needs. The theory section takes up on this view by furthering an understanding of involuntary non-use as a phenomenon that may arise in a situation where the new ICT is inherently accepted and there is an absence of perceived threats. It puts emphasis on skills and social-organizational factors as moderators of ICT use and non-use, as well as on the relevance of self-determination, in ICT-organization integration.

Involuntary Non-use of New ICT at Work as a Phenomenon Beyond Acceptance and Resistance

Digitalization of work became a popular means of effectivization from the 1980s on. The installation of computers moved from so-called knowledge-intensive firms to industrial organizations, which created new possibilities as well as challenges for the organization of work and those working there. ICT-organization integration processes are undertaken with varying luck—the non-use of new ICT has for many companies been costly and an important threat to productivity. Two main branches of research have dominated the field of ICT use/non-use: technology acceptance theories and theories on technology resistance. Technology acceptance theories such as the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis 1986) and the Unified Theory of the Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh et al. 2003) build on the theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). TPB is an attitudinal model predicting behavioral intention based on expectations. Inherent in these models is the hypothesis that behavioral intention predicts behavior. UTAUT consists of eight independent variables that affect the use of new ICT; perceived usefulness (PU), perceived ease of use (PEOU) and social influence affect behavioral intention directly, facilitating conditions is the only variable that directly affects behavior, while previous experience, gender, age, and voluntariness of use are moderating variables. PU and PEOU fully mediate a range of factors, like for example computer self-efficacy (Compeau and Higgins 1995) and computer anxiety (Heinssen et al. 1987). If involuntary non-use is when one wants to use new ICT but is unable to, it follows that the conditions that create behavioral intention to use new ICT should be satisfied. One must expect the new ICT to be useful, to be possible to integrate in one’s daily work, and significant others—for example managers or colleagues—must expect one to use it. If these conditions are satisfied but the new ICT remains underutilized, this non-use may be involuntary. Involuntary non-use of new ICT is thus beyond the explanatory power of technology acceptance theories. According to previous research, resistance against new ICT in organizations is commonly based on perceived threats (Lapointe and Rivard 2005; Coetsee 1999). Resistance behaviors may be seen as “illegal” as they are outside the given frames for “authorized behavior.” (Jian 2007). The goal of resistance is to challenge the new ICT, its perceived consequences, and/or relevant decision-makers. If ICT non-use is involuntary, there is an absence of perceived threats.

ICT Skills and Social-Organizational Factors as Moderators of ICT Use and Non-use

For non-use of new ICT at work to be involuntary, two major conditions thus need to be satisfied: (1) The technology is accepted, and (2) The non-use is not due to resistance. Involuntary non-use has been defined in terms of the absence of technology (Slater 1986). Later research has pointed at the need for rethinking issues of non-use, users and settings (Baumer et al. 2015). In groups that are homogenous with regard to gender and age, where the new technology is accepted and not resisted, and where significant others expect use, previous skills/experience and working conditions as expressions of social-organizational factors can be assumed key moderators of use. In this context, if skills and experience differ between different employee groups, employees who master the new ICT may come in a position where they are able to influence the nature of social-organizational factors in order to facilitate use for themselves (Andersen 2015). In this way, employees that are already experienced in working with ICTs gain status and power in the organization at the expense of those who do not. Lack of skills is an evident disabler of ICT use (Mossberger et al. 2008; Brinkerhoff 2006). Lack of skills may lead to involuntary non-use that differs from resistance in terms of motives for non-use and nature of attitudes towards the new ICT. While resistance is rooted in negative attitudes towards the new ICT or appending changes (Piderit 2000; Dent and Goldberg 1999; Van de Ven and Poole 1995; Weick 1995), involuntary non-use may be caused by conditions over which the unskilled employees have little control. This lack of control is strengthened by the imbalance in power between the skilled and the unskilled (Salin 2003; Casciaro and Piskorski 2005). Factors that inhibit the integration of ICT use in daily work practices create incongruence between technology, tasks and work processes, and can institutionalize a pattern of involuntary non-use for employees lacking ICT skills (Zuboff 1988). Incongruence as a disabler of the use of new ICT especially for employees that lack necessary skills and critical control is supported by previous studies. Zuboff (1988) describes a scenario where employees, due to the symbolic nature of ICT, may experience ambiguity in dealing with ICT, as (1) it is not institutionalized in their work routines; (2) it is not perceived as corresponding to their working reality; and (3) there has been little focus on the shift from action-oriented skills to cognitive-based skills. Research has emphasized the necessity of changed work processes during ICT implementation, and of organizational learning through enactment and communication for the use of new ICT at work (Robey et al. 2002; Boudreau and Robey 2005). An ICT-organization integration process that does not establish congruence between work processes, work content, and the new ICT may lead to involuntary non-use in particular for ICT novices.

The Role of Leadership for ICT-Organization Integration in a Perspective of Sociomateriality

A large-scale ICT implementation process usually includes a range of appending organizational changes; to tasks, to procedures, and to work and organizational processes. ICTs increase the options for work process automation, as well as for both centralized and decentralized monitoring and control (Groth 1999). Large-scale ICT-based change is thus more appropriately referred to as ICT-organization integration. For it to be a success, there needs to be congruence between the new ICT and new tasks, norms (Saksvik et al. 2007), and routines (Becker 2004). The quality of communication and interaction are key during these processes (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). While early socio-technical perspectives saw technology, the organization and those working there as separate entities (Trist 1981), sociomateriality understands these as mutually dependent and interwoven through organizational members’ everyday practices (Orlikowski 2007; Orlikowski and Scott 2008). Routines and norms are dynamic, and arise from and contribute to the institutionalization of behavioral patterns of practice. Thus, the nature of the ICT-organization integration process and the leadership of it are crucial for the development of the intended user behaviors.

Sociomateriality and Healthy Leadership of ICT-Organization Integration

A healthy change process is one that pays attention to the adaption of social norms, employee diversity, and early role clarification, and where managers are available and conflicts are used constructively to deal with employees’ perceptions, experiences and reactions to change (Saksvik et al. 2007). These criteria can be applied to any major change process, such as ICT-organization integration. Healthy leadership of change processes has been defined as interactive information-handling together with employees, that builds mutual understanding through common evaluation (Øyum et al. 2006). In addition, good leaders of change processes create space for dealing with change issues at the same time as ensuring satisfactory productivity levels; shield their employees from chaos by sorting relevant and irrelevant issues; form the change processes in a way that builds energy rather than drains it; and they are basically human-oriented (Øyum et al. 2006). These approaches are more dynamic and interactive, human- and practice-oriented, and support the inherent foci of sociomateriality more than do stage-based models of ICT implementation (like for example Cooper and Zmud 1990). Healthy leadership and change processes further both employee job satisfaction (e.g. Judge et al. 2001) and a balanced psychosocial work environment (e.g. Karasek and Theorell 1990), and increase the likelihood of the development of intended user behaviors. Healthy change and healthy leadership may establish important learning arenas that foster use, also for unskilled employees. These perspectives are useful to include in a socio-technical approach for understanding involuntary non-use of new ICT at work.

The Relevance of Self-Determination for a Socio-Technical Approach to the Use of New ICT

Self-determination theory (SDT) postulates the importance of inherent needs satisfaction for personal development and behavioral self-regulation (Ryan and Deci 2000). Central to SDT are three innate psychological needs: autonomy; competence; and relatedness giving a high level of self-determination when satisfied. Motivation is a regulator of behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977; Steers and Porter 1991). Our perceptions form our attitudes/expectations, and our attitudes/expectations influence our motivation. There is therefore a need for environments that foster intrinsic rather than extrinsic regulation of behavior (Thompson et al. 2006), as intrinsic motivation is more likely to create favorable user perceptions and expectations towards use (Venkatesh 1999). Type of motivation influences performance, learning and experience, and highly controlling environments hampers internalization. Employees having a satisfactory level of self-determination are thus better able to internalize use of new ICT at work. Especially, inexperienced employees that are subject to social-organizational factors that counteract self-determination may develop involuntary non-use of new ICT. Healthy change processes and healthy leadership of change may create an organizational environment that stimulates employees’ self-determination. Autonomy can be developed through involvement and participation, competence can be developed through formal and informal training, and relatedness can be developed through the implicit and explicit understanding of the relationship between technology, organization, and employees. Internalized behavior improves both performance and persistency (Sheldon et al. 1997; Deci and Ryan 1991). The ICT-organization integration should therefore be conducted in a way that satisfies employees’ inherent needs in order to enable them to learn to use the new ICT.

A Preliminary Model of ICT-Organization Integration

Figure 1 illustrates this socio-technical approach that assumes an inherent sociomateriality—that unites new ICT, the nature of ICT-organization integration and its leadership, the satisfaction of inherent human needs, and the effect of these mutually dependent factors on ICT use practices.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Preliminary framework for the study of differences in ICT use for skilled and unskilled employees. This model visualizes a socio-technical approach for the understanding and further exploration of differences between employees’ ICT use on the group level as well as the notion of involuntary non-use of new ICT at work

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The point of departure for this preliminary model is an organizational setting where the new ICT is accepted and there is absence of resistance. The new ICT, the nature of leadership and change processes, and how they respond to inherent employee needs affect employees with and without ICT skills differently. Through their adequacy of fit to employees’ tasks and work situation, the experienced quality of change processes and leadership, and the possibilities they yield for informal and formal learning, both previous skills and the mutual dependencies between technology and social-organizational factors moderate ICT-use practices. With the introduction of new ICT, differences in ICT skills between employee groups may create a power imbalance in disfavor of the unskilled, who get less control over their everyday work. This may create multiple incongruences for them that function as disablers of use internalization. The experience of autonomy, adequate competence, and relatedness vis-à-vis the new ICT and changed work situation are deemed critical for learning to use new ICT.

This model was used as a framework for thinking about the relationship between ICT, organization, and employees, and ICT use/non-use. It offers a way to study differences in ICT use between ICT skilled and unskilled outside the resistance framework, and for employee groups not categorized as knowledge or service workers—commonly studied in relation to ICT use/non-use. Focus on the factors inherent in healthy change leadership and healthy change processes in an ICT-organization integration can establish a good platform for the development of competence, autonomy and relatedness vis-à-vis a new working reality that includes new ICT—also for the unskilled and inexperienced employees. However, an implementation process that favors the experienced employees while the unskilled employees remain unskilled and keep losing control due to incongruence between their working reality and the new ICT, may produce involuntary non-use of ICT.

Case Description

The three grid companies were comparable regarding size, organizational structure and work tasks. They mainly operated in large cities. The population is the employees in Norwegian grid companies: installers, planners, and managers. The Norwegian power grid industry has undergone organizational transformations throughout the past three decades. Since the 1980s, ICT has been a steadily growing part of these, seen as key to lower expenses, increased flexibility and reliability, and more efficient operations. The law of Energy that was activated in 1991 opened for competition-based trade of energy where there earlier had been a monopoly on energy production and distribution with political steered pricing (Molund et al. 2013). As the market was privatized, the energy industry that earlier was government-owned, was split into separate companies that now had to compete with each other for concessions. The new law also affected the organization of work, for example it implemented a strict division between production and distribution companies. This had several consequences for the case organizations. After World War II the energy industry was one of the wealthiest in the country. They could therefore afford to keep an abundance of employees, in particular installers—also those who due to illness or injuries not really could perform their duties. Due to privatization and divisonalization they were forced to undertake large-scale downsizing, keeping only the installers deemed to be the most competent and change-willing. They could no longer afford apprentices, which led to an aging of the workforce. After 2005, market shares were regained, and the companies were now lacking installers and apprentices. The remaining installers were described as “the best in the country”, and they frequently received job offers from competing companies.

The installers’ tasks were tied to building and maintaining the power grids, installation operations in buildings that were part of large entrepreneurial projects, as well as installation tasks in private households. Much work was outside. It was the installers’ job to lay high-voltage cables both in the ground and in the air, and to install and maintain outdoor transformer stations both above and below the ground. The typical installer was a male in his thirties-forties and had an average time of employment of about 20 years. Some were employed immediately after lower secondary school (a practice which ended in the mid-1980s), while others had passed upper secondary education with specialization in electrical trades. The installers’ tasks were planned by the planners, who were mostly male, and mostly engineers. They typically had higher seniority and age than the installers. While the installers spent their workday outside, the planners shared an open office area together with managers. In this way planners and managers maintained a fluent and continuous dialogue. Planners’ and managers’ primary work tool was the computer, and they were familiar with both old and new ICTs. ICTs were, for the most part, underutilized by the installers. All installers had been given a high quality, water resistant, personal computer for outdoor use. However, during field visits, the researchers never saw an installer with an open computer.

This study looks mainly at the implementation of the ERP solution PD, that should integrate software tied to time planning, task planning, the order of materials and work hour registration, described as a “strategic tool for the analysis of power grid data” in the three companies. PD offered tools for modeling, creating, analyzing, converting, and validating spatial data. Administration should go from paper-based to digital, the companies sold their large storehouses where installers would drop in several times a day to pick up materials, and PD should take over for paper-based maps and logs as well as local knowledge for the maintenance and development of the power grid. Now the installers were expected to find professional and geographical data, extract job orders, order materials, and document work hours by using their computers, and thus being their own administrators. They were expected to minimize interaction with colleagues in order to increase efficacy by working alone and in their “car office”.

The development, acquisition, and installation of PD were initiated by one group of planners in one of the case companies. PD was intended to be an overarching system that should answer to the challenges experienced until now with ICTs—such as the many ICT systems that lacked coordination, that partly overlapped, and the fact that they did not communicate between them. As they saw that the cost of developing PD would be substantial they contacted planners in the other two companies. With permission from management an interorganizational project group of planners was established. Their mandate was to develop PD based on the present and future needs of the organizations, corresponding to installers’, planners’ and managers’ responsibilities, tasks, and work flow. It should coordinate both different employees and as much as possible replace the many different systems used up to now. In this way, the planners got the responsibility of mapping installers’ tasks and workflow, as well as their ICT competencies. Managers’ gave their permission, considering the planners to be ICT experts, but were otherwise not engaged in these processes.

Along with the installation of PD came a range of additional organizational changes. The planners who were in control of the new ICT were also given the mandate to plan and effectuate necessary organizational reorganization. For example, it became an outspoken goal that in order to obtain more efficient operations the installers should now have a car each, work as much as possible alone rather than in pairs, and maximize the time spent outdoors. The planners should maximize their office time, avoiding taking trips out in the field. According to the planners, PD should replace this need. Work flows and tasks were then modified in order to obtain a better fit with PD, which now was supposed to mediate communication between planners and installers. Documentation was a key activity in the new organizational regime. Documentation was the process of collecting data in the field alongside with grid and installation operations, and entering them into PD. This data consisted for example of geographical information about cables, transformer stations and power pylons, the currency that went through them, and who they delivered to. The installers registered these data in a sketch version of PD, while the planners validated the information and re-registered it into a permanent version of PD. It could take up to 1 year before the information was permanently updated. This type of data was used to elaborate the inherent maps of PD which the installers should rely on during their work. These maps were, however, not always accurate. Consequences of, for example, cutting an unidentified live high voltage cable in two without knowing it was there, could potentially be lethal. The installers therefore mistrusted the PD-generated maps. In addition, the cars lacked computer brackets and internet antennas, which made ICT-use out in the field bothersome. Not least, most of the installers lacked even basic ICT skills.

Method

This is a case study of three Norwegian power grid companies conducted over a four-year period, from 2007 to 2010. Five researchers carried out the data collection and analyses, and this group was stable throughout the study. The researchers were independent of the case organizations as well as of the project funder, belonging to a private research foundation. This was a project funded by the Norwegian Research Council having as goal to explore the relationship between the grid industry and ICTs. The concrete focus of the project thus was elaborated by the researchers and the case organizations in cooperation, based on experienced challenges—such as marked differences in ICT use between different employee groups. A case study does not necessarily follow a standardized research process with carefully planned phases, but goes back and forth between research activities and between the empirical world and theory (Dubois and Gadde 2002). This was an inherent part of this study. Periods of data collection were interrupted by periods of reflection on findings and reevaluation of focus. Focus and boundaries often change during the study. This was also the case in this study. Eighteen months into the study after an elaborate reevaluation, focus went from ICT use and the benefits of ICTs in general, to understand differences in ICT use between different employee groups and the nature of and reasons for non-use of new ICT at work. Generalizations from case studies are analytical and based on reasoning, not statistical, and may be inductive, deductive or abductive (Johansson 2003). This study adopted an abductive approach.

The Relevance of Abduction as Case Study Methodology for Exploring ICT Use and Non-use

“Abduction is the process of facing an unexpected fact, applying some rule (known already or created for the occasion), and, as a result, positing a case that may be.” (Johansson 2003, p. 9). Abduction can strengthen the theoretical ground of case analyses as it allows for the use of existing theory as point of departure for reasoning, but is less theory-driven than deduction (Järvensivu and Törnroos 2010). This is unlike induction, of which grounded theory is a prime example (Johansson 2003). One of the reasons for choosing abduction as methodology for this study was the relative scarce body of research on the non-use of new ICT at work beyond the acceptance and resistance frameworks. Dubois and Gadde (2002) argue that systematic combining is a non-linear process of matching between theory and reality, and that categories constructed through abductive matching potentially yields more knowledge than categories constructed through inductive fit without a theoretical platform. By choosing an abductive approach the exploration of a relatively unexplored challenge—which became the main focus of this study—could be supported by a range of theoretical perspectives through the construction of a preliminary framework for analysis. The researchers strived to obtain a plausible and relevant match between the case and the analytical framework. Triangulation of research techniques—in this study, for example, interviews and field observation together with working meetings with case representatives—lead to the discovery of new dimensions, which may cause a redirection of the case study (Yin 1994; Dubois and Gadde 2002). This also happened in this study. While deduction relies on a tight and prestructured framework of analysis, an inductive approach uses a very loose framework. Abduction is closer to induction than deduction, but there is a closer interplay between theory and the empirical world. As such, while induction is about theory generation from data, abduction is about explanatory theory development through the study of specific cases in combination with a theoretical point of departure (Dubois and Gadde 2002; Hammersley 2005; Thomas 2010; Råholm 2010). Abduction therefore fitted this study well, not least because abductive reasoning is a means for the development of deeper understanding of epistemologies, emphasizing the prevalence of thorough theoretical and empirical knowledge (Eriksson and Lindström 1997; Hintikka 1998; Niiniluoto 1999). The main developing feature of abduction is the reflexivity of thought described as the continuous commuting of mind between data, interpretation and established theory (Calás and Smircich 1992)—representing another type of triangulation beneficial for the validity of findings (Denzin 1978).

Data Collection

The data material consists of ninety semi-structured interviews recorded and transcribed, and thirty field notes in the form of thick descriptions through open-ended narratives (Rallis and Rossman 1998) based on naturalistic observation. The interviews and field notes were made during ten field visits that took place in the project period. Of the ninety interviews, eighteen are with managers, thirty-four are with planners, and thirty-eight are with installers—some of whom are job assigners. In retrospect the data collection underwent three phases; phases 1 and 2 each lasted eighteen months, and phase 3 lasted 12 months. The phases were not overlapping and will be explained more later in this section. The interviews are equally distributed between phases 1 and 2, and companies. Some interview subjects were the same but not all. The distribution of subjects regarding employee groups is relatively equal between the phases (see Table 1). Ten of the field notes stem from attendance to formal meetings, whereas the other twenty are from the researchers’ presence in the field with installers. The researchers collected the data mainly in pairs. The data collection resulted in more than 900 pages of transcripts and notes.

Table 1 Overview of interviews conducted during the study’s phases 1 and 2 (in retrospect)
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The researchers were non-participant observers. The respondent-interview (Kvale 1997) was used, with the goal to gather information about attitudes to the new ICT systems and their functioning, general work conditions, work tasks, as well as physical and psycho-social work environments along a temporal continuum. Characteristic for this interview type is the focus on certain topics in the world of the interviewee; descriptions were sought of the respondents’ working reality in order to be able to interpret the significance of influencing phenomena. Regarding interpretation the researchers focused both on what was said and the way it was said, searching to reveal eventual underlying meaning. All interviews lasted 1–2 h, were recorded with the respondents’ permission, and then transcribed.

The structure and content of the interview guides and interviewer behavior were thoroughly considered and discussed both beforehand and as the interviews progressed. At the start of the project the main focus was on the installers’ safety, quality and efficiency of work processes, seen in light of new information and communication technologies implemented a few months ago. The interview guide during the first phase therefore emphasized control over and demands in the work situation, social support and communication, as well as work procedures and time disposal. As we concentrated on the installers, the interview guide was basically the same to all employee groups within the three companies. The managers were asked additional questions on organizational history, development and policy. Well into data collection we discovered that it was indeed very difficult to study the installers’ ICT-based work processes as they hardly used any of the new ICT—a finding that was strikingly similar in all three grid companies. A new interview guide was elaborated focusing on attitudes toward ICT, attitudes towards change, user competence, experience with ICT, the systems’ purpose and functionality, and as well as post-implementation changes (i.e. work conditions, work organization, organizational identity, job satisfaction, physical and psychosocial work environment etc.). Managers were also asked more about the reason for implementing the new ICT systems. The main focus of the study now had shifted from ICT-based work processes to understanding why the new ICT was heavily underutilized by the installers. The categories of the first interview guide were developed based on dialogue with the three companies and theories on demand/control/support (Karasek and Theorell 1990), communication (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005), social norms (Saksvik et al. 2007) and organizational routines (Becker 2004). The categories of the second interview guide for the second phase of data collection was developed based on the interviews already conducted, and theories on demand/control/support (Karasek and Theorell 1990), technology acceptance (Venkatesh et al. 2003), computer anxiety (Heinssen et al. 1987), computer self-efficacy (Compeau and Higgins 1995), job satisfaction (Judge et al. 2001), organizational identification and identification congruency (Knippenberg and Schie 2000; Mael and Ashforth 1992; Dutton et al. 1994), attitude towards change (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Piderit 2000), and motivation (Steers and Porter 1991; Ryan and Deci 2000). In the final phase of the project, data collection was mainly observational out in the field and through meeting attendance, as well as informal dialogues. In this phase, the researchers started to look at the main finding—underutilization of new ICT by the installers—through the lens of self-determination theory (Ryan and Deci 2000). The interview guides were not pre-tested, but based on a mix of themes from the empirical world and drawn from validated scales. The themes were chosen based on the research focus and the researchers’ assumptions and experiences relative to the cases.

The observational data consist of notes written during and after the field visits. Observational data, as long as researcher biases are minimized, is considered to be valid by their nature, just as eye witness testimonials may be considered in criminal investigations (Kuklick 1996; Pelto and Pelto 1978). Also, as the main group practicing non-use were the installers, it is the organizational reality of the installers that was the primary focus—they were the experts, and therefore the field notes were written at the lowest level of abstraction possible (Angrosino and Mays de Pérez 2003).

Data Analysis

According to Kvale (1997), qualitatively based knowledge is validated through practice. In this study, validity of the findings was strengthened via several paths. As the core characteristic of abduction is a continuous going back-and-forth between the case and the theoretical framework there is a validity control of the findings during the whole research process (Järvensivu and Törnroos 2010). Validity was also tested through tight dialogue, both with the participants and between the researchers, and through systematic combining.

In order to reach a deeper level understanding of non-use of new ICT relative to the different employee groups, the researchers first, and based on the interview guide, analyzed the data alone, before all met to discuss individual interpretations on underlying causes for involuntary non-use and how these could be categorized. Thus, inter-rater agreement took place through dialogue in plenary sessions among the researchers based on individual interpretation. The interpretation process followed the logic of systematic combining, meaning that the causes and categories identified at one point in the analytic process might be rejected or altered in the next step, until sufficient saturation of meaning was obtained. Observational data was coupled with interview data. Finally, the categories were compared with theory; resistance/non-use and use of ICT, and SDT.

Findings

Believing there is more to differences in ICT use between employee groups in the same organization than merely differences in ICT skills, this study embraces organizational complexity through a socio-technical approach. In order to understand more about how differences in the use of new ICT arise, the data analyses had most focus on the installers’ underutilization. The underlying assumption for this choice, based in sociomateriality, was that this perspective also would shed valuable light on the planners’ use and on the interactions between ICT, employees, and organization.

The New ICT, Employees’ Relation to It, and the Further Exploration of Involuntary Non-use

After economic recession and serious downsizing where only the most competent installers were kept, the grid companies now experienced a more favorable situation. When asked about organizational changes in general and the installation and implementation of new ICT in particular, a common answer was that “We have been changing for at least a decade!” From the part of the organizations it was hoped that digitalization would increase the installers’ efficiency by 20 %.

Planners and managers shared physical work space and thus interacted naturally throughout the day. Communication and collective problem-solving vis-à-vis the new technology were natural parts of this interaction, which became a source for professional and social support,. A consequence of this daily and direct interaction between managers and planners was that the managers knew the planners’ challenges and needs vis-à-vis the new technology, and were able to respond to these before, during and after ICT-organization integration. Among the installers, the planners’ department was humorously referred to as the painkiller department, indicating a slow pace and low level of energy. As put by an installer, “I used to say that today I feel a bit tired, so I will take a couple of painkillers and go up to the third floor and sit down.” When asked, planners and managers described an installer as “someone who uses a screwdriver.” There seemed to be both physical and cognitive distance between the two main employee groups. When asked about the new ICT, the installers showed a high level of interest in the systems and a positive attitude towards the assumed benefits of use…:

“The will for using new technology is high among us installers, but the solutions don’t work!” (Installer, 40)“I find grid documentation highly interesting—but I have no idea what it’s for!” (Installer, 29)

… not least with regard to changing into “more modern” workers and taking more part in organizational life at work. They acknowledged that not using the new ICT put them in an awkward position in the organization and expressed that they would have liked to use it.

The data analysis of the causes of the installers’ underutilization of the new ICT related to the initial theoretical framework revealed three major categories: (1) Poor task-technology fit for those unskilled in using ICT; (2) System-oriented leadership and ICT-organization integration process; and (3) Different possibilities for learning and competence development for planners and installers. These categories manifest themselves on the group level, and are mutually dependent. “Poor task-technology fit” refers to the inadequacy of fit between the new ICT and the installers’ tasks, workflow, and general work situation. It describes the essence of the installers’ work situation which itself became a barrier towards ICT use. “System-oriented leadership and ICT-organization integration” refers to the nature of the combined ICT implementation and organizational change process. The process focused on installation of the new ICT at the expense of a more human- and practice-orientation. “Different possibilities for learning and competence development” refers to the installers’ lack of both practice-based skills and of the implicit understanding of ICT necessary to use the new technology. This includes lack of arenas for formal and informal learning, as well as a lack of possibility to adapt work processes and work roles to new (digital) tasks and task execution. See Table 2 for a summary. Several authors have pointed at seemingly similar barriers tied to successful ICT implementation, for example in terms of configuration and assimilation of new work processes (Robey et al. 2002); environmental barriers, learning difficulties, cultural differences and employee valuation (Venkatesh et al. 2010); the complex relationships between the workings of new technologies and employees work perceptions (Davis and Hufnagel 2007); and adaptation strategies based on the balance between perceived consequences and degree of control (Beaudry and Pinsonneault 2005). These studies and more shed valuable light on the barriers for successful ICT use that hinders intended acceptance and use of new technology, but do not problematize thoroughly enough (a) Involuntary non-use; (b) Barriers created in the intersection between technological, organizational and individual factors in a setting where employees have accepted but are unable to use the new technology, or (c) the mechanisms behind and consequences of these barriers. Non-use seems to be understood as the employees’ own responsibility and a result of more or less conscious and comprehensible individual choices. More insight about the nature of non-adaption, and how organizational factors interact with basic human needs, could contribute to better design of ICT-organization integration processes.

Table 2 Presentation and explanations of the three main categories tied to differences in use and involuntary non-use
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Poor Task-Technology Fit for Installers but not for Planners

The same factors may not contribute to the same task-technology fit for all employees. Previous experience being a moderating variable; the conditions that facilitate use of the new ICT for the planners may just as well have the opposite effect on the installers’ use of the new ICT. Evaluating the installers’ attitudes to and perceptions of the new ICT there is reason to claim that their non-use was not due to a lack of acceptance or presence of resistance, but involuntary. The new technology was well in place, but there was a lack of coordination and integration of technology and the manual work processes of the installers. This created incompatibility shown through (1) More demanding work—work became more time-consuming at the same time as increased efficiency was expected; (2) The installers’ physical work environment was not adapted in order to integrate the new ICT in their work; and (3) Quite contrary to planners, the installers experienced less control and support in their everyday work after the installation of PD than earlier. In line with the sociomateriality perspective, use—as situated, changed behavior—can only develop in the interaction between employee and ICT. In this case the installers were impeded from integrating the new ICT into their work practices.

More Demanding Work for the Installers

For the installers the new ICT systems seemed to primarily imply more work and less time:

“We installers are the ones who’re supposed to use the maps. But at the same time, we don’t have the time to document. Also, not everything in the field is marked, neither—then documentation is very demanding. The same is the case with technical data—a lot of installers lack competencies.” (Installer, 32)

By mandating use without matching and integrating the new ICT with employees’ work tasks, new routines were time-consuming and without practical value for the installers as they did not provide a basis for the necessary transition from manual to digital work tasks and practices:

“Work processes and work organization are to a large extent based on the old technology, and management needs to establish an understanding of the value-cost relationship of documentation.” (Installer, 33)

As the installers saw it, the main change brought on by the new ICT was the introduction of the computer as a work tool that (1) based on digital maps defined their work space in the field, and (2) functioned as a documentation unit. However, little time had been invested to integrate this new tool with already established and refined work practices adapted to the installers’ tasks, and thus the installers experienced the introduction of the personal computer as complicating their everyday work:

“You update the systems when you have the chance, but some jobs are quicker and with shorter distance between them, which means you are supposed to update often [after each job], but you don’t have the time because start-up is slow. Some jobs are outside the city, with long distances and no internet available. And then you try to look in the electronic log, but the details won’t come up, and if someone calls it is difficult to remember the details of all the jobs you’ve done. Therefore I write most things down in my little book.” (Installer, 29)

As a consequence the installers developed heuristics such as printing out maps before going to jobs, and making paper forms for reporting that they filled out by hand and then delivered to the job distribution responsible for him or her to convert into digital format:

“I wish Power Data could be more integrated—why can’t Power Data and GPS talk together? They’ve managed to do that on boats! Driving around with the computer constantly open is hazardous—I experience my share of honking. That’s why I make my foreman print out manual maps for me.” (Installer, 34)

Also, the digital maps were often incorrect, so the installers risked for example to cut old live high-voltage cables during ground digging, which gave them the feeling that it was insecure to rely on Power Data out in the field—especially since updating was defined to be the task of the planners:

“In some cases it may take up to a year before a defect in the digital maps is corrected—that might be fatal for us installers.” (Installer, 40)

Insufficient integration created multiple inadequacies between system and task characteristics. ICT-use thus became time-consuming rather than time-saving:

“Power data takes one-third of our time—it’s not adjusted for our work. I haven’t had a normal 9 to 5 day since we started with this system.” (Installer, 41)

The planners, on the other hand, experienced more streamlined work processes, and enjoyed a more comfortable work situation. PD was developed based on the planners’ tasks and work processes, not those of the installers.

More Challenging Physical Working Conditions for the Installers

As the installers were forced to adapt to the technology rather than being empowered to adapt it to their work, and eventually change work practices, they made new routines to over-ride or avoid the systems in order to be able to efficiently perform their everyday work tasks:

“I don’t see any purpose to register data directly when I’m out in the field. It’s often hectic and a lot of disturbances and weather conditions can make it difficult to use computer equipment outside. It’s important to have some quiet time when entering the data.” (Installer, 32)

The way the installers’ work day was organized and the lack of necessary internet access were disablers of ICT use during the workday. If the installers were to perform their ascribed grid-related tasks they did not have the time to apply the new ICT during these operations. This is thus an example of involuntary non-use. The differences between the planners and the installers were clearly reflected in the equipment they had at their disposal the level of facilitation. Some planners said that the installers complained they had to continuously switch between systems, and that the installers didn’t remember to move files between the systems. However, the planners had a fixed seat in an office and up to three screens each. As put by the installers:

“It would be far easier to use the system if it was available in the car.” (Installer, 29)

“I don’t use my computer in this car because the car lacks antenna, and therefore I don’t get on the Internet. I asked my foreman to get one, but he didn’t have any.” (Installer, 41)

“The different systems have different standards that clash. We do a lot of double work.” (Installer, 33)

“I prefer to do job extractions and documentation from home in the evenings—in the car I need to sit with the laptop on my knees, and it’s calmer at home.” (Installer, 34)

The installers were continuously measured on the number of grid operations—less than on the quality of these—they managed to perform during the day. Lack of access, equipment and facilitation contributed to involuntary non-use for the installers. The planners’ physical work situation, however, was fully adapted to ICT-use.

Decrease in Levels of Control and Support for the Installers, not for the Planners

The shift from manual to data-related “core mentality” was welcomed by the planners who experienced an increased recognition of their expertise, while the installers were not included as participants to the same extent. They were expected to do most work from their company car, but brackets were not installed for their computers, the Internet connection was frequently breached, and it took “ages” to restart and login. The reorganization driven on the premises of ICT functionalities affected, as seen, social relations:

“Compared to earlier I miss the social—both meetings and general discussions. In social events I only get placed with people I don’t know and who work in other sections.” (Installer, 42)

The installers experienced a growing isolation from their colleagues, both regarding tasks and social time. This obviously had implications on their experienced level of support during the workday:

“When there’s not a specific reason for it I don’t go to the main office; now materials are picked up elsewhere, and I extract job orders and do the documentation at home—it may go up to a week that I don’t see any colleague.” (Installer, 37)

The planners, on the other hand:

“We profit from those around us—that’s important. It’s an advantage to be seated in an open-plan office—it’s easy to communicate.” (Planner, 58)

The increase in demands and the changes in their work situation that gave the installers less control over their own work and work execution increased the control of the planners. In particular as they controlled the new ICT, were responsible for reorganizations, and also controlled the data entered by the installers. The planners also had high level of support in their work situation, both through other planners as well as through managers.

System-Oriented Leadership and ICT-Organization Integration Process

The ICT-organization integration process in all three companies, based on the descriptions by installers, planners and managers alike, was system-oriented rather than practice-oriented, as more attention was given to the installation than to the integration of the new ICT:

“I can’t see that anyone has given much thought about the changes to come. The problem is that there is a well-integrated production line and that an effort must be made in order to prepare people for the changes to come.” (Installer, 51 years)

Moreover, the development and acquisition of the new ICT was led by some of the planners, not by manageers, which influenced orientation:

“I don’t think they have thought about the order of things in the implementation process. What comes first? Systems or roles?” (Planner, 48)

“The roles in documentation work are not clear.” (Installer, 33)

The responsibility for implementation was allocated to the planners—who were ICT experts—with little managerial partaking:

“Neither the installers nor the grid owners were involved in defining system specifications—however, planning was strongly involved. There was no enthusiasm from managers in the beginning.” (Manager, 49)

As the planners were the assumed experts, managers allowed themselves to take on a laissez-faire attitude:

“There was no project group for the development of system specifications—just ‘two–three guys’…” (Planner, 58)

As managers were basically absent in the ICT-organization integration process it makes little sense to evaluate the findings in terms of healthy change leadership. When it comes to the criteria for healthy change these were not inherent in the system-oriented process, but were to a certain extent fulfilled for the part of the planners. The ICT-organization integration process was fitted to the planners’ premises (ICT experience) and not to the installers’ (very little ICT experience). The findings indicate two themes relevant to the differences between installers and planners and the notion of involuntary non-use that arose from this system-orientation: (1) The new systems responded to the expertise and needs of the planners rather than the installers; and (2) Planners’ negative prejudices about the installers were allowed to influence official organizational attitudes and norms.

The New ICT Represented Best Fit to Only One Employee Group—The Planners

The planners saw the features of the new ICT systems as fixed objects with self-evident meaning and utilitarian value, as equal to all employee groups, and as setting unambiguous premises for work execution. Improving technical specifications was seen as problem-solving:

“We thought the solutions for registration were good, but when we go deeper into them we see that they are insufficient. We need to go through the technical specifications to make application more predictable and more accurate.” (Manager, 47)

Several managers acknowledged that the technical solutions were inadequate, but still did not recognize the need for a different orientation than system-focus. However, some managers started to question the nature of the change. As planners misjudged the extent of installers’ necessary use of the new ICT for new organizational functioning to occur, the new ICT was customized to fit the planners work tasks and work processes. This did not work for the installers:

“After documentation is handed in it may take months before the data are registered and available in the systems. I think it would have a motivating effect if you could see the results immediately, but as it is now we don’t have access to put the data directly into the systems. Some of us don’t even have access to look in the systems!” (Installer, 29)

Incomplete mapping of previous experiences, work tasks and the work processes of the installers was revealed when implementation partly failed. Treating the new ICT systems as something that merely needed installation rather than implementation was one cause of involuntary non-use:

“There has been a great underestimation of the resources tied to implementation—Power Data was by most understood as and standardized system, not a development project.” (Manager, 53)

The implementation of PD was apprehended as straightforward—as changing a light bulb, which became a barrier to a more human-oriented process where learning and a more overall perspective towards digitalization of work were inherent issues. In the system-oriented change process managers were unavailable for the installers, role clarification was taken for granted, and employee diversity was not paid attention to. Using eventual conflicts as basis for constructive dialogue was not really an option, as managers supported the planners and the installers were increasingly isolated. Social norms guide workplace behavior, but new norms were prejudice- rather than reality-based.

Prejudices were Transformed into Stereotypes and Norms

Who mastered the new ICT and who didn’t was seen as random and individually based, not as group-level patterns of user behaviors influenced by the complex interplay of socio-technical factors. Due to the closeness to the planners, managers more or less automatically judged non-use as resistance without considering other options:

“The installers drag themselves through the new ICT. But they just have to learn it! Some make things more difficult than they are.” (Planner, 43 years)

As a result, norms for user behavior were established that stereotyped the installers into employees that were not conscious about, interested in, or against use of the new ICT:

“The installers are not used to—they have no culture for documentation.” (Planner, 51)

“It is a problem that some installers are lazy and don’t bother to hand in documentation after a job is finished.” (Planner, 37)

There were indications that the installers were thought of as secondary users of the new ICT. Thus, their assumed use was perceived as somewhat easy to establish and to administer compared to the more complex ICT tasks of planners:

“A manager got annoyed with me yesterday; we are supposed to check all transformer stations within given time intervals, and he suggested that we could just drive by them and take a quick look from the outside, or perhaps just peek inside quickly before “checking” the next one and just put a “check” on the form. I got really angry; why don’t they ask us field specialists what should be prioritized?” (Installer, 41)

This increased the gap between installers and other employee groups. The installers experienced a marginalization and a diminution of their professional status:

“Our status, as well as the power-relationship between installers and planners, has definitely changed because of the new ICT. You go from being an excellent installer to a mediocre one.” (Installer, 35)

Some of this marginalization was rooted in the fact that many planners didn’t trust the installers’ documentation work in the new ICT systems:

“It would be best if the documentation could be done during the planner phase and not the doer phase.” (Planner, 53)

“If I’m unsure about the correctness of what is displayed in Power Data, I will check it out via other methods. For me it’s rather the planners who should control documentation and reporting in the system.” (Planner, 47)

Norms were changed in a way that increased the perceived differences between installers and planners.

Different Possibilities for Learning and Competence Development for Planners and Installers

Incongruence between the installers’ work and the new ICT also affected time, space and environment for learning, contributing to installers’ multilevel skills deficiency. The nature of the ICT-organization integration process created important barriers for both learning and the development of new work practices that include ICT use. This category focuses on two sides of competence; explicit, which deals with the degree to which someone “knows their way around a computer,” and implicit, which is concerned with the understanding of the organizational implications of the new ICT:

“In order to understand the importance of documentation you also need to have an understanding of the data model in Power Data.” (Planner, 53)

While managers and planners possessed explicit and implicit competencies tied to the operation of Power Data and the new ERP systems, the installers did not:

“We have received very little information about the systems. I am very unsure of the quality of Power Data as an operational tool.” (Installer, 36)

Most installers were in their thirties and forties and had never owned a computer or been remotely interested in ICT. In the 1980s computers started to become accessible in large scale for university students but were not common in private households:

“When I went to vocational education and training in the electrical trades we used to laugh at the geeks in the ICT department. Guess who’s laughing now!” (Installer, 39)

Many of the installers understood their lack of skills and need for training on their level—not on the level of planners:

“I’ve never been interested in computers and stuff, but now I’ve moved together with my girlfriend, and she has started to show me how to get on the Internet.” (Installer, 36)

Deficiency of Competence Development on the Explicit Level of ICT Use

The new ICT systems were described by all employee groups as very complex with a high user interface. Only the planners handling them on a daily basis knew really well (almost) all functionalities of the most complex software, and they had had the computer as their primary work tool for two decades. It was therefore easier for the planners to assimilate and use new ICT than for the installers, many of whom had to start from scratch. The planners also benefitted from both formal and informal training…;

“Planners here have a great training program; they also spend periods with the other units such as the developers, the contractors and the installers.” (Planner, 45)

…a work environment suitable for improvised learning, and for trial and error…;

“Learning by doing—that’s the best way. You have to use it, and to get time for trial and error. What you use you know. And we have 2–3 screens each, which is very useful.” (Planner, 47)

…and they could also use a home office if they needed quiet time to do their tasks:

“All planners can use home office. I often use my home office, especially when I have a lot to do. Then I get peace to do the work.” (Planner, 48)

The stereotypes adherent to the installers may be one reason why adequate measures for learning and training had not been introduced for the installers:

“We haven’t got any training—only a two-hour session. It’s ridiculous! I’ve never been interested in data—how am I supposed to use the new tools without training?” (Installer, 39)

It was up to the installers to adapt to the new ICT as best as they could, which they were unable to do on their own. ICT was unfamiliar to them, and the way the ICT-organization integration process was handled made them unable to learn and to integrate use. Contrary to the planners the installers had little room for improvised learning—vital for the adoption of new ICT:

“It’s a challenge to get the installers to use Power Data, to make them understand what a powerful tool it actually is. They have too much to do and then they are supposed to sit down and learn the system as well.” (Manager, 42)

Also, direct communication channels between installers and planners/managers had been drastically reduced in order to increase efficiency, which impaired crucial dialogue and reinforced stereotypes:

“My opinion is that they know less and less what our work is about. They seem to think that we don’t try to be efficient, but truth is that this week I have worked twice past midnight in order to meet the deadline. They only sit on the third floor pushing buttons and exploring the systems.” (Installer, 34)

“I spent several hours of my spare time to make a roadmap on paper in order to remember which systems to use, how to navigate in the menus and what buttons to press. I know many of the guys have the same problems, but the technical department refused to distribute it.” (Installer, 41)

Deficiency of Learning on the Implicit Level of ICT Use

Training and change of work practices are critical preliminary steps to implicit ICT competence. What’s contributed to the lack in the installers’ implicit competencies was that managers and planners did not know whether the installers had an understanding of the new ICT systems or not:

“The installers have struggled quite a bit. I have had a two hour training session with the installers, and there were many flaring eyes. But I haven’t had any follow-up afterwards, so I don’t know their present level. They just have to use it; a little course is not enough!” (Planner, 47)

As the installers to a large degree only had the manuals to support their further learning, most of them were unable to build the necessary competencies for use:

“There is a documentation guide, but it is too extensive and complex that I manage to use it.” (Installer, 33)

The installers expressed regrets also with regard to the value of informal meetings with colleagues, as they now were expected to work mostly alone:

“I miss the morning coffee we used to drink together [the installers], the exchange of experiences and the understanding of things, and the everyday encounters we used to have with each other—when it’s time for lunch I’m far away.” (Installer, 36)

Contrary to the planners, the installers was deprived of a learning environment as planners and managers estimated that the new ICT systems provided sufficient work support, which drastically limited their possibility for both formal and informal learning. In this way the planners and managers became “super-users” of the technology and the systems, and were to a greater extent able to adapt both their tasks and their use of the various technological features for a best fit. This enabled the planners to influence organizational development in general, too. The installers could not:

“For many of us the systems appear more a bundle of demands and regulations rather than helpful tools; they are so difficult to figure out and we don’t find the information we need. At the same time we are asked to ‘check’ this and to ‘check’ that.” (Installer, 42)p

When there is incongruence between task, work processes and ICT, obtaining a new understanding of the new ICT is rendered difficult.

Summary of Findings

The findings revealed three main categories; (1) Poor task-technology fit for installers but not for planners; (2) System-oriented leadership and ICT-organization integration process; and (3) Different possibilities for learning and competence development for planners and installers. All though many of the mechanisms that explain why such marked differences in ICT use between installers and planners—as well as involuntary non-use within the group of installers, were able to develop, are intertwined, it is important to identify and, albeit artificially, separate them in order to understand the complexity inherent in these interrelationships. Table 3 shows the three categories and belonging mechanisms.

Table 3 Categories and subcategories of causes of involuntary non-use
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The mechanisms that foster group level differences in ICT use, including involuntary non-use, do it in interaction with each other and show how behaviors and attitudes on the organizational level have consequences for both group-level working conditions and individual learning. The discussion elaborates more on the relationship between these mechanisms and how they foster group level user differences and involuntary non-use, beyond what can be explained by previous experience.

No single category is descriptive of employees’ need for autonomy, relatedness, and competence at once. However, both task-technology fit and degree of involvement and active participation in the ICT-organization integration processes inherently contribute to employees’ levels of autonomy, while the development of understandings and competencies nurture employees’ needs of relatedness and competence vis-à-vis the new ICT. These interrelationships between ICT, organizational processes, and employees’ levels of self-determination as use-furthering or use-hampering will be elaborated further in the discussion section. Figure 2 shows an empirical model that operationalizes these interrelationships and their differential group-level outcomes for employees who have previous ICT experience vs. employees that do not. This is a dynamic and practice-based model that emphasizes the importance of ICT fit, interaction, and involvement, for the development of ICT use behaviors that are integrated in everyday work practices.

Fig. 2
figure 2

Empirical model of how the interplay between technology, organizational processes and employee need satisfaction lead to group level differences in use between ICT skilled and ICT unskilled

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The model goes further than TAM (Davis 1986) and UTAUT (Venkatesh et al. 2003) in being explicit on which factors that further or hamper actual ICT use rather than being focused on behavioral intention to use new ICT. Critical preconditions for the model’s applicability are that the criteria of presence of ICT acceptance and absence of ICT resistance are fulfilled. The focus on the quality of leadership and of the change process precedes the identification of single and specific social-organizational factors as an attempt to investigate the hearthstone of the group level differences in ICT use. Finally; the model indicates that the presence of ICT acceptance and the absence of ICT resistance are not sufficient for employees that lack previous ICT experience in order to internalize use behavior and develop integrated ICT use practices. In the continuation of the article the installers are referred to as ICT novices and the planners are referred to as ICT experts.

Discussion

Large-scale ICT implementation is a specific type of organizational change that employees in many business sectors are subject to. There are large bodies of research on the acceptance and the resistance of new ICTs. In most cases the subjects studied have some previous experience, and most studies are within the sectors of knowledge or service work where ICTs are assumed to be natural constituents. This study compared groups of ICT experts and ICT novices that had different occupations within the same organization in a non-typical sector—the power grid industry. In this study, the new ICT was used by the experts, but underutilized by the ICT novices. While managers argued that the novices had received training and were resisting the new technology, the novices expressed technology acceptance, but also that they were unable to use it. There are thus indications that the presence of acceptance, absence of resistance, and previous experience not necessarily regulate all elements of ICT use. Based on the theoretical framework and the empirical findings the discussion explores three interrelated issues tied to these group level differences in ICT use. First, the way use-furthering or use-hampering mechanisms arise in the intersection between ICT, organizational change processes and employee need satisfaction. Second, some further attention is given involuntary non-use of new ICT at work, defined as the willingness but inability to use new ICT, and as a phenomenon beyond acceptance, resistance, and experience in order to shed additional light on group level use differences. Third, there is a need to reflect more on the relationship between the nature of the ICT-organization integration process and its leadership, and the enabling of practice-based employee learning of ICT skills through need satisfaction.

Group Differences in ICT Use the Intersection Between ICT, Change Processes, and Employee Needs

The domination of the group of ICT experts was generally accepted by managers. With regard to choice of solutions and the implementation process managers displayed a laissez-faire attitude. They kept a distance to the ICT-organization integration process; as a form of abdicated leadership. For the experts it was comfortable and empowering to be in charge. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the experts redefined and reorganized work in a way that increased their organizational power and status at the expense of the ICT novices. By using themselves and their own work as defaults for systems development, they became prime suppliers of premises for new organizational routines and norms. What most of all made ICT experts informal managers of the ICT-organization integration processes was the trust invested in them by the managers. It allowed for a redefinition and a reorganization of work that for the novices implied a mere installation of the new ICT rather than an integration of it related to their work tasks, practices, and processes. The differential working conditions inherent in the new work order were masked by the differences in ICT use—visible in employees’ behaviors. The novices’ underutilization was thus defined by the organization as the most critical issue, rather than the reorganization of work.

The reorganization of work had been executed according to the leading principle that ‘one size fits all’, using the experts’ requirements as standard. Rather than setting the weakest link in the chain as reference point for a successful ICT-organization integration process, the novices were forgotten or at best overlooked. Rather than furthering ICT use for those that were most challenged in their encounter with the new technology, the interplay between the ICT, organizational processes and leadership, and inadequate need satisfaction hampered ICT use for the novices. This fits well with a perspective of sociomateriality (Orlikowski 2007) and the development of user practices as situated change. Serving as template, the experts experienced adequate task-technology fit, a tailored ICT-organization integration process, and substantial possibilities for formal training and informal learning through planned sessions, trial and error, quiet time, and interaction with other experts, managers, and support. Through ‘practicing’—the situated process of developing new practices, the experts gained improved understanding and skills tied to the new ICT. For technical support, the experts could either call someone physically, or search in a special archive available only for them. The novices, on the other hand, were from the start defined as a less important part of the interplay between technology, organization, and employees. As the novices’ tasks were fundamentally different from those of the experts, the inherent requirements of their work and work situation posed different demands to an ICT system for it to be sufficiently applicable and functional. The physical isolation of the novices left them alone with only the new ICT to interact with. As the new ICT was incongruent with their work, they were not able to really interact with it. This contributed to the institutionalization of a pattern of involuntary non-use for the ICT novices.

Task-technology fit, the quality of leadership and the ICT-organization integration processes, and learning possibilities inherent in the way work is organized, can either further or hamper use of new ICT in organizations. Adaptive and flexible user behaviors develop through practicing, and the nature of these factors decide the room employees possess in their everyday work for practicing. The more control employees exert over their own work situation in terms of decision-making, status, and (technology) understanding, the more room for practicing they will be able to create. Challenging issues are threats to flexibility—the fewer negative issues employees have in relation to their work performance, the more flexibility they may be able to incorporate into their work situation. The organizational trend of isolating and cultivating different business areas separately in the name of effectivization is a paradox to sociomateriality that sees new practices as developing through actions and interactions. In a work environment characterized by segregation, learning and the development of new competencies are challenged. For an organization that deems to change—and in particular become more ICT-based—it is contradictory that interaction crucial for practicing is formally excluded through organizational routines. Norms that institutionalize group level prejudices contribute further to the institutionalization of group level differences in ICT use.

It is understandable and necessary that managers seek expert advice when it comes to important organizational changes such as the implementation of new ICT systems. However, the outsourcing of critical decision-making created a counter-productive power imbalance between ICT experts and ICT novices. The following reorganization of work and of the workplace were based on prejudices, and shaped conditions for learning that favored experts over novices. Previous experience functioned as a gatekeeper for involvement in the process of developing, acquiring, and implementing the new ICT. The reorganization of work hindered the novices from gaining skills and experience necessary to use it. The interplay between technological, organizational, and employee factors thus condition ICT use behaviors in the workplace and can lead to intergroup differences.

Beyond Acceptance, Resistance, and Experience: Involuntary Non-use of new ICT at Work

The ICT novices had positive expectations towards PD, but were defined as secondary rather than just different users of the new ICT. Based on prejudiced assumptions, the ICT experts shaped new work tasks, work practices and reorganized the work situation of the novices without including them in the process. Much of the origin of involuntary non-use lies in this omission. Identifying the novices’ non-use as involuntary, it is necessary to recognize that it was the experts’ experience in ICT that laid the grounds for their favorable situation. In UTAUT (Venkatesh et al. 2003) experience is a moderating factor, particularly for perceived ease of use, social influence, and facilitating conditions. Acceptance theories are attitude-based which connects experience and attitudes, and behavioral intention. Facilitating conditions is the only variable that affects behavior directly. But; UTAUT does not provide a deeper understanding of the why and how of these interdependent relationships between factors. In a socio-technical perspective, experience is included as a relevant characteristic of employees alongside technological and organizational characteristics, and the main focus is behavior and not behavioral intention. This study partly builds on validated acceptance theories, but widens the theoretical framework and give alternative explanations to employees’ use and non-use of new ICT. The identification of mechanisms in employees’ work environment as facilitators or disablers of ICT use becomes particularly important.

For the novices, the inadequate interplay between ICT and organizational processes refrained them from becoming experienced. The novices’ new work situation imported a substantial increase in demands—new digital tasks and work processes were juxtaposed on already existing tasks, and imposed on the novices. The merging of new and old tasks and processes were awkwardly organized, and made it impossible for the novices to sustain a productive workflow. Prevented from gaining experience in ICTs in a good way, the novices suffered from a decrease in control because of the deficient ICT-organization integration. Due to increased isolation as well as marginalization, the installers also had a decrease in support in their everyday work situation. High and challenging demands, and lack of necessary control and support in order to handle them (e.g. Karasek and Theorell 1990), contributed to novices’ involuntary non-use of new ICT—which gives additional knowledge beyond the contributions of acceptance and resistance theories, and the role of experience.

Sociomateriality and ICT-Organization Integration: The Significance of Self-Determination

The automating and informating potentials inherent in ICT (Zuboff 1988) demand both explicit and implicit understanding and skills to enable use. A work situation characterized by high demands, low control and a low level of support may create involuntary non-use of new ICT. For the novices; prejudices, isolation, and system inaccessibility incorporated involuntary non-use in self-reinforcing work practices. The reason for this malfunctioning interactional pattern between ICT and ICT novices was an imbalance between demands, control and support they could not influence. According to Karasek and Theorell (1990), employees that face high demands, together with low levels of control and support are isolated prisoners unable to influence their own work situation. This constitutes a meager learning environment. The findings point at an ICT-organization integration process that for ICT novices was system-oriented and institutionalized incongruence between their work and the new ICT.

Autonomy, competence and relatedness are important in order to use new ICT—presumably for both experts and novices. There are parallels between unsatisfied needs of autonomy, competence and relatedness and an imbalance in demands, control and support. This imbalance adds to the imbalances between experts and novices. The nature of the ICT-organization integration can be different for different employee groups, and contribute to a solidification of intergroup differences. While the integration process was system-oriented for the novices, it was practice- and human-oriented for the experts. The reorganization of work, the new routines and organizational norms rendered experts autonomous, competent and related to the new ICT. The opposite was the case for the novices. The experts were autonomous in that they controlled the new ICT and the new organizational order, were skilled because they had the opportunity for formal and informal learning and practicing, and had a strong relation to the new ICT has they had taken part in its development and steered its implementation. As the ICT experts spent their workday grouped together in an open-land office together with the managers, manager availability and the opportunity to learn from dialogue and constructive conflicts were present factors. Combined with high levels of autonomy vis-à-vis demands, control both in the form of competence and influence, as well of relatedness and support, the ICT-organization integration was almost ideal for them. The novices were controlled and told what to do, had no real platforms for learning and practicing, and lacked ownership to the new ICT as it fitted badly with their everyday work situation. Lack of autonomy, competence and relatedness should be considered considerable barriers to the use of new ICT, in particular for ICT novices. As implied by sociomateriality; just as formal training is insufficient when it comes to fully learning to apply new ICT, only having the explicit skills does not suffice for the development of functional work practices.

The findings indicate a relationship between the quality of the psychosocial work environment (Karasek and Theorell 1990), employees’ levels of self-determination (Ryan and Deci 2000), and learning and practicing. Both the psychosocial work environment and levels of self-determination are affected by the nature of ICT-organization integration processes. What enabled the ICT experts to create their favorable work situation in addition to their previous experience was (1) High levels of involvement and participation; (2) High levels of interaction and support; and (3) Good task-technology fit. The quality of the change process and of change leadership are important components of an ICT-organization integration that succeed in establishing these conditions. Critical requirements for the experts to come in this position were the adequate adaption of norms and routines, early role clarification, manager availability and constructive and continuous dialogue. One reason for partial failure of the ICT-organization integration—exemplified by the ICT novices’ comprehensive non-use, was the lack of consideration for employee diversity. This situation arose from the combination of expert control and abdicated leadership. The identified conditions are intrinsic elements of good learning environment. This implies that a healthy change process (Saksvik et al. 2007) and high quality change leadership (Øyum et al. 2006) are critical for a good match between the psychosocial work environment (Karasek and Theorell 1990) and employees’ level of self-determination (Ryan and Deci 2000). This links the quality of the ICT-organization integration process and employee learning. In a landscape of abdicated leadership and expert control, ICT novices can be hindered from building new skills due to lack of participation and interaction. A perspective of sociomateriality thus helps identify conditions and the interrelationships between them that constitute either a functional or a dysfunctional environment for practice-based learning.

Practical Implications and Limitations

The interplay between ICT, organizational processes and employee needs can establish different ICT user behaviors in different employee groups through their effects on the psychosicoal work environment and employees’ level of self-determination. Previous experience and skills are important gatekeepers in that they affect the degree to which employees are entitled to participate and interact in the development of the new ICT and the reorganization of work. Consequences of abdicated leadership and expert control was ignorance of the importance of the ICT-organization integration process, of ICT characteristics, and of the interplay between a balance between demands, control and support and employees’ needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness vis-à-vis the new technology for integrated user practices to develop. This lead to involuntary non-use for the ICT novices—a non-use behavior that is beyond the explanatory reach of previous experience, and of technology acceptance and resistance theories.

This study provides insight into how new ICT should be implemented in a setting with ICT novices, and sheds important light onto the pitfalls to avoid through the comparison between experts and novices. Implicit and institutionalized differences between employee groups in terms of status and power can be counterproductive for the integration of ICT user behavior, particularly if based on prejudice and faulty understanding of tasks and roles. Employee involvement as well as arenas for interaction are essential tools in the process of technology implementation.

This study identifies numerous variables that play a role in the establishment of group level differences. The model presented in Fig. 2 gives an overview and systemizes the main interrelationships indicated by the findings. The socio-technical approach, however, identified several factors and relationships that need further study and specification. For example the exact role of experience, participation, and interaction and the relationships between them. This also goes for the amounts of demands, control and support imposed on employees by their work environment, and the satisfaction of the inherent needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness for ICT use. This study is one step on the way to understand more about the interplay between ICT, organization and employees and ICT use/non-use of new ICT. More research is needed in order to restudy, refine and more precisely operationalize the phenomena and the way they are interrelated that is presented here. The model also needs to be tested in other work sectors and on different occupational groups in order to explore its validity and generalizability. With valid operationalization of the concepts into measurable dimensions the practical applicability of the model would increase.