Abstract
The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), which provides a justification for democracy, is based on voters who are imperfectly informed insofar as they know the correct policy with a probability of less than one but greater than one-half. We reassess the consequences of the CJT for democracy when extension of the franchise adds equal numbers of non-distinguishable informed and uninformed voters to the collective decision making group. Uninformed voters vote correctly with probability one-half. We show that adding equal numbers of informed and uninformed voters maintains the CJT conclusion that enlarging the group of decision makers increases the likelihood of a correct collective decision.
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Ben-Yashar, R., Zahavi, M. The Condorcet jury theorem and extension of the franchise with rationally ignorant voters. Public Choice 148, 435–443 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9663-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9663-0