Abstract
While there has been considerable interest in recent years in the role of macroeconomic determinants of antidumping actions by the United States and other traditional users, on the one hand, and the determinants of the growing global usage of this trade policy instrument, on the other, there has to date been no systematic exploration of the motivations for the significant number of foreign antidumping cases filed against US exporters. Several observers have remarked that the growing number of foreign users of antidumping might threaten US exporters, but the determinants of these actions have not been examined. That is the purpose of this study. We find that these actions are in part explained by macroeconomic forces and as a response to US export superiority in particular sectors, however a significant role (and larger than found for global antidumping more generally) is played by retaliation for US trade policy actions.
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Feinberg, R., Reynolds, K. Friendly Fire? The Impact of US Antidumping Enforcement on US Exporters. Rev World Econ 144, 366–378 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-008-0151-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-008-0151-2