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Grading Trump’s China Trade Strategy

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2019

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 10))

Abstract

Although much has been written about the ongoing trade war between China and the United States from 2017 to early 2019, this literature omits detailed examination of the substance of the US trade complaints about China. This article seeks to fill that gap in the literature by unpacking the 20 most prominent complaints that are being levelled by the Trump Administration. The article finds that half of the complaints involve behaviour that is contrary to WTO rules and yet the Trump Administration has lodged only three WTO cases against that behaviour. The Trump Administration justifies this omission on the ground that WTO dispute settlement is not capable of resolving legal complaints against China’s nonmarket economy and that many of the Chinese measures characterized in this article as WTO-illegal are actually permitted by the WTO. The article suggests that the real reason why the Administration chose not to bring multiple new WTO cases against China is that the Administration prefers to confront China with power-based measures in the form of unilateral tariffs. Moreover, robust WTO dispute settlement is viewed by the Trump Administration as unwanted international control over disguised trade protectionism long favoured by US trade officials.

This article is current as of 19 April 2019 and sources from the internet were accessed on this date.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    To be sure, Trump’s fixation on China’s economic policies is misplaced as the US has greater interests in securing from China more accommodating policies on regional security and climate change. Cooperation with China is especially vital on climate change to address classic market and government failures.

  2. 2.

    19 USC § 2415(a)(1).

  3. 3.

    19 USC § 2465(a).

  4. 4.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 21. Prior to the pause, the Administration had threatened to raise the tariff levels and to impose tariffs on more imports from China.

  5. 5.

    Davis B, Ballhaus R, Trump says tariffs on Chinese goods will stay on for ‘substantial period of time’. Wall Street Journal, 21 March 2019.

  6. 6.

    USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018. See Nos. 1, 6, 18 and 20 below. Navarro P, Trump’s tariffs are a defense against China’s aggression. Wall Street Journal, 21 June 2018, p. A17.

  7. 7.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 20.

  8. 8.

    Nixon S, Trump puts the WTO on the ropes. Wall Street Journal, 11 July 2018. The Appellate Body serves as the WTO’s appellate tribunal.

  9. 9.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 6.

  10. 10.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26.

  11. 11.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26.

  12. 12.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26.

  13. 13.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 27.

  14. 14.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 6.

  15. 15.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 6.

  16. 16.

    USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report, March 2018, p. 4.

  17. 17.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 27.

  18. 18.

    USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report, March 2018, p. 2.

  19. 19.

    Petersmann (2018), p. 187.

  20. 20.

    USTR denies that the Trump Administration is engaging in protectionism. Lighthizer, at APEC, says defending U.S. market against unfair trade is not protectionism. World Trade Online, 21 May 2017.

  21. 21.

    White House, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, 1 June 2017.

  22. 22.

    https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en.

  23. 23.

    Tooze (2019).

  24. 24.

    USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report, March 2018, p. 2.

  25. 25.

    For a US private sector analysis, see Business Roundtable, Recommendations for Chinese reforms to address trade and investment barriers, July 2018, https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/archive/letters/BRT%20China%20Priorities.pdf.

  26. 26.

    White House, What You Need to Know About President Donald J. Trump’s Actions Responding to China’s Unfair Trade Practices, 6 April 2018; White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China’s Economic Aggression, 22 March 2018; White House, Statement by the President Regarding Trade with China, 15 June 2018.

  27. 27.

    If the list were going over 20, this study would have included currency manipulation and weak enforcement of US intellectual property rights.

  28. 28.

    White House, Statement from the President, 17 September 2018.

  29. 29.

    White House, Remarks by Vice President Pence to the Hudson Institute on the Administration’s Policy Toward China, 4 October 2018.

  30. 30.

    White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s economic aggression threatens the technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, pp. 2, 16.

  31. 31.

    White House, What You Need to Know About President Donald J. Trump’s Actions Responding to China’s Unfair Trade Practices, 6 April 2018.

  32. 32.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 8.

  33. 33.

    White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018.

  34. 34.

    White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s economic aggression threatens the technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 1.

  35. 35.

    White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018.

  36. 36.

    White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018; White House, Statement of the United States Regarding China Talks, 31 January 2019.

  37. 37.

    White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018.

  38. 38.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 9.

  39. 39.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 8.

  40. 40.

    White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s economic aggression threatens the technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 8.

  41. 41.

    White House, Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Additional Proposed Section 301 Remedies, 5 April 2018.

  42. 42.

    WTO, China – Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, Request for Establishment of a WTO Panel by the United States, WT/DS558/2, 19 October 2018.

  43. 43.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 2.

  44. 44.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 3.

  45. 45.

    White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China’s Economic Aggression, 22 March 2018.

  46. 46.

    White House, Statement from the President Regarding Trade with China, 18 June 2018.

  47. 47.

    White House, Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 25 September 2018.

  48. 48.

    White House, Statement on Steps to Protect Domestic Technology and Intellectual Property from China’s Discriminatory and Burdensome Trade Practices, 29 May 2018.

  49. 49.

    White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018.

  50. 50.

    White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China’s Economic Aggression, 22 March 2018.

  51. 51.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 15.

  52. 52.

    White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s economic aggression threatens the technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 1.

  53. 53.

    White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s economic aggression threatens the technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 1.

  54. 54.

    White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s economic aggression threatens the technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 4.

  55. 55.

    USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018.

  56. 56.

    White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s economic aggression threatens the technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 11.

  57. 57.

    White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018; Mike Pompeo, Remarks by Secretary Pompeo on America’s Economic Revival at Detroit Economic Club, 18 June 2018.

  58. 58.

    White House, Remarks by Vice President Pence to the Hudson Institute on the Administration’s Policy Toward China, 4 October 2018.

  59. 59.

    USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018.

  60. 60.

    See below Nos. 8 (Trade remedies), 9 (Data localization), 10 (Retaliation), and 12 (Trade deficit).

  61. 61.

    United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS233/AB/R, p. 14 (adopted 23 May 1997).

  62. 62.

    When this article states that a measure by China or the United States violates the WTO, that is a prediction of what a WTO tribunal would rule should a well pleaded claim be brought to WTO dispute settlement.

  63. 63.

    WTO, Protocol of the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001.

  64. 64.

    Charnovitz (2008) and Ehring (2014).

  65. 65.

    WTO, Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 2001.

  66. 66.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 7.

  67. 67.

    USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018.

  68. 68.

    USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018.

  69. 69.

    Ding (2014) and Rovnov (2019).

  70. 70.

    Supplemental Report of the U.S. International Trade Commission Regarding Unforeseen Developments, 28 December 2017, https://solarbuildermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ITC_Report_Suniva.pdf.

  71. 71.

    Charnovitz (1993–94), p. 88.

  72. 72.

    See, for example, Articles 8 (expired), 25.3, 27.13, 27.14, 29.1.

  73. 73.

    Meyer (2018), pp. 538–539.

  74. 74.

    White House, Press Conference by President Trump, 27 September 2018. More recently, Trump declared: “The steel industry is thriving now and it was dead when I came to office.” White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of Executive Order, “Strengthening Buy-American Preferences for Infrastructure Projects,” 31 January 2019.

  75. 75.

    The import relief to those industries is questionable under US law which requires a path to “positive adjustment” and a showing that the relief will “provide greater economic and social benefits than costs.” See 19 USC § 2251(a). Furthermore, the absence of US domestic judicial review of such import relief is in tension with GATT Article X:3(b).

  76. 76.

    White House, What You Need to Know About President Donald J. Trump’s Actions Responding to China’s Unfair Trade Practices, 6 April 2018.

  77. 77.

    A panel against China requested by the Obama Administration was composed at the beginning of the Trump Administration on the subject of China’s agricultural support. The cause of action in this case is “support” under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, not subsidies under the SCM Agreement. Recently, the panel report was released, and the panel found that China was out of compliance with the WTO Agriculture Agreement. China – Domestic Support for Agricultural Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS511/R, circulated 28 February 2019.

  78. 78.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 8.

  79. 79.

    Kahn (2017).

  80. 80.

    Bacchus J “Do as I say, not as I do”: Trump’s sizable China hypocrisy, The Hill, 25 January 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/426946-do-as-i-say-not-as-i-do-trumps-sizable-china-hypocrisy.

  81. 81.

    50 USC § 4812.

  82. 82.

    USTR, Update concerning China’s acts, policies and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation, 20 November 2018, p. 8.

  83. 83.

    China – Tariff Rate Quotas for Certain Agricultural Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS517/R, 18 April 2019.

  84. 84.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 3.

  85. 85.

    Yamaoka (2013), pp. 153–156 (taxonomy).

  86. 86.

    In 2018, USTR declared that “it seems clear that the United States erred in supporting China’s entry into the WTO on terms that have proven to be ineffective in securing China’s embrace of an open, market-oriented trade regime.” USTR, 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, January 2018, p. 2.

  87. 87.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 8.

  88. 88.

    WTO Cases 427, 483, 454 + 460, 414, 440, 427, 425, 414. Cases are listed in reverse chronological order of final decision. Cases that appear more than once involve follow-on compliance proceedings.

  89. 89.

    WTO Cases 534, 523 (under appeal), 505 (under appeal), 437 (under appeal), 488, 471, 464, 429, 437, 436, 449, 422, 404, 382, 379, 402, 383, 302 + 294, 350, 345, 343, 344, 268, 335, 322, 264, 294, 257, 282, 212, 296, 268, 264, 277, 257, 248 + 249 + 251 + 252 + 253 + 254 + 258 + 259, 234, 212, 213, 236, 206, 202, 184, 177 + 178, 179, 166, 136 + 162, 138, 99. Cases are listed in reverse chronological order of final decision. Cases that appear more than once involve follow-on compliance proceedings.

  90. 90.

    By way of comparison, the EU has lost 11 trade remedy proceedings: WTO Cases 486, 480, 442, 473, 397, 405, 337, 299, 219, 141 (twice).

  91. 91.

    WTO Cases 436, 533, 534, 539, 536 (order of establishment).

  92. 92.

    China way more protectionist than US, says Trump official, South China Morning Post, 25 January 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2130520/china-way-more-protectionist-us-says-trump-official.

  93. 93.

    Aaronson (2018), pp. 10–11.

  94. 94.

    Ferracane MF et al., Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index. European Centre for International Political Economy, April 2018, pp. 6 (overall conclusion), 54–55 (China’s data localization), https://ecipe.org/dte/dte-report.

  95. 95.

    Crosby D (2016), Analysis of data localization measures under WTO services trade rules and commitments. E15, March 2016, http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Policy-Brief-Crosby-Final.pdf.

  96. 96.

    The WTO law status of digital trade is ambiguous. Data may be a WTO good or a service or both or neither. Many things with value, such as money and real property, are neither a good nor a service. Data may likewise not be a good or a service. Some clarification emerges from WTO legal text and subsequent practice. For example, when data is in an electronic form of something that is a good (like a book), then the electronic book is considered a good. The WTO agreement of 1998 to pledge not to impose customs duties on electronic transmissions (WT/MIN(98)/DEC2, 25 May 1998) may suggest that such transmissions are a good. That various GATS Agreements cover “data processing”, “transfers of data”, and “data transmission” may suggest that working on data is a service. GATS Article XIV(c)(ii) posits that regulation of the use of personal data is the regulation of a GATS service.

  97. 97.

    Charnovitz (2001), p. 104.

  98. 98.

    https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2018/march/2018-fact-sheet-key-barriers-digital.

  99. 99.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program, March 2019, Annual Report, p. 64.

  100. 100.

    Lu Z, Schott, Jeffrey J., How is China retaliating for US national security tariffs on steel and aluminum?. Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), 9 April 2018; Bown CP et al., China’s retaliation to Trump’s tariffs, PIIE, 22 June 2018.

  101. 101.

    Charnovitz S, EU can retaliate immediately against Trump’s metal tariffs. 2 March 2018, https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/eu-can-retaliate-immediately-against-trumps-metal-tariffs.html.

  102. 102.

    19 USC § 1862.

  103. 103.

    WTO, Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron and Steel Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS490, 496 (adopted 27 August 2018), para. 5.60.

  104. 104.

    But consultations are ongoing in DS565.

  105. 105.

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  106. 106.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 5.

  107. 107.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 5.

  108. 108.

    WTO, Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 2001, para. 6.

  109. 109.

    WTO, Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 2001, para. 115.

  110. 110.

    WTO, WTO Ministerial Conference approves China’s Accession, 10 November 2001, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm.

  111. 111.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 2.

  112. 112.

    https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html.

  113. 113.

    White House, Statement from the President Regarding Trade with China, 18 June 2018.

  114. 114.

    https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/trad0119.pdf (BOP basis).

  115. 115.

    White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China’s Economic Aggression, 22 March 2018; Sukin G, Mnuchin says China will buy $1.2 trillion in U.S. goods, 22 February 2019, https://www.axios.com/us-china-currency-deal-trump-trade-war-0d1f5de8-26f5-42f1-becd-102f8106b67c.html.

  116. 116.

    WTO, Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 2001, para. 46. A measure mandating the importation of goods from a favoured country is a GATT Article I violation.

  117. 117.

    Charnovitz (2018), pp. 239–240; Pinchis-Paulsen M, Trade multilateralism and national security: Antinomies in the history of the International Trade Organization, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3353426.

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    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 27.

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    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 15.

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    Murase S, “Belt and Road” from the viewpoint of international law. Unpublished manuscript 2018.

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    Chaisse and Matsushita (2018), p. 163.

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    Chatzky and McBride (2019).

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    Even if the proposed $60 billion level funding level were approved by the US Congress (which seems doubtful), the US government funding would remain substantially less than the Chinese government funding.

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    White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s economic aggression threatens the technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 1.

  127. 127.

    Esty (2019).

  128. 128.

    Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), 3 March 2018, Article 20.3.6.

  129. 129.

    After the Trump Administration pulled the US out of the TPP, the remaining 11 nations renamed the Agreement as “Comprehensive and Progressive” and, in true Orwellian fashion, made it less comprehensive by suspending 22 provisions on investment and intellectual property that had been championed by the US. Goodman MP, From TPP to CPTPP. CSIS, 8 March 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-cptpp.

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  131. 131.

    Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble, 15 April 1994.

  132. 132.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 6.

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    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 5.

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    Annual Report 2018, April 2019, https://reports.jpmorganchase.com/investor-relations/2018/ar-ceo-letters.htm?a=1.

  135. 135.

    According to the latest IMF projections, the growth rate for China in 2019 will be 6.3% as compared to the US growth rate of 2.3%. See World Economic Outlook, April 2019.

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    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program, March 2019, p. 2.

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    WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Preamble.

  138. 138.

    TRIPS Article 66.2.

  139. 139.

    USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018.

  140. 140.

    50 USC § 4565(e)(1).

  141. 141.

    See Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union, Annexed Statement 3, Joint Statement on Market Oriented Conditions, 31 May 2018 (“The Ministers noted the following elements or indications that signal that market conditions exist for businesses and industries: […] (2) decisions of enterprises on investments are freely determined and made in response to market signals;…”), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/may/joint-statement-trilateral-meeting.

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    Klein JX, It’s not just the U.S.: Around the world, doors are shutting on Chinese investment. South China Morning Post, 13 September 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/13/china-us-investment-788834.

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    White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s economic aggression threatens the technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 11.

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    The modern corporation, Statement on company law, October 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2848833.

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    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 25.

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    Fajgelbaum PD et al., The return to protectionism. 10 March 2019, http://www.econ.ucla.edu/pfajgelbaum/RTP.pdf.

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    Porter R, Trump’s big trade opening, Wall Street Journal, 14 March 2019.

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    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 8.

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    White House, What You Need to Know About President Donald J. Trump’s Actions Responding to China’s Unfair Trade Practices, 6 April 2018.

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    White House, Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Additional Proposed Section 301 Remedies, 5 April 2018.

  153. 153.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26.

  154. 154.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 10.

  155. 155.

    USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 23.

  156. 156.

    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26.

  157. 157.

    For example, see Schoenbaum and Chow (2019), pp. 190–192.

  158. 158.

    U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018 Report to Congress, November 2018, p. 22.

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    Bown CP, Why the US needs allies in a trade war against China, Harvard Business Review Digital, 11 December 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/12/why-the-u-s-needs-allies-in-a-trade-war-against-china.

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    See Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union, Annexed Statement 3, Joint Statement on Market Oriented Conditions, 31 May 2018.

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    USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26.

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    Hoe S et al., Trump’s new Executive Order requires additional Buy American preferences for infrastructure projects. Covington, 7 February 2019, https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2019/02/trumps-new-executive-order-requires-additional-buy-american-preferences-infrastructure-projects/.

  163. 163.

    Charnovitz (2010).

  164. 164.

    Deng C, China defends WTO record as trade fight looms. Wall Street Journal, 28 June 2018 (discussing China’s White Paper). Taking note of China’s pro-legalization stance, USTR has complained that “It is very troubling to see that China believes that giving more authority to the Appellate Body would be in China’s interest.” USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 27.

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    Baschuk B, WTO defies Trump with historic ruling on national security, 5 April 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-05/wto-defies-trump-with-historic-first-ruling-on-national-security.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. George Washington University Law School, Washington, DC, USA

    Steve Charnovitz

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  1. Faculty of Law, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

  3. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Christian J. Tams

  4. Competition and Regulation Institute, Leuphana University Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany

    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

  5. Faculty of Law and Criminal Sciences, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Andreas R. Ziegler

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Charnovitz, S. (2019). Grading Trump’s China Trade Strategy. In: Bungenberg, M., Krajewski, M., Tams, C.J., Terhechte, J.P., Ziegler, A.R. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2019. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 10. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2019_41

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