Abstract
This paper examines the role of government policy in technology licensing decision. We show that both the outside and the inside innovators license a new product (or drastic process innovation) to all potential licensees in the presence of tax/subsidy policies. An implication of our analysis is that a monopolist producer may prefer technology licensing in a homogeneous goods industry. Our results also provide a rationale for franchising to multiple sellers.
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Mukherjee, A., Tsai, Y. Technology licensing under optimal tax policy. J Econ 108, 231–247 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0277-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0277-5