Abstract
This article aims at understanding the interactions between public policies, such as unemployment benefit systems, and firms’ technological choices. For this purpose, we use a matching model in which workers are vertically differentiated and where the nature of jobs is endogenous. We show that an improvement in unemployment benefits leads to an increase in productivity by making agents more selective and jobs more complex. However, the impact on labour market participation is negative.
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Amine, S., Lages Dos Santos, P. Technological choices and unemployment benefits in a matching model with heterogenous workers. J Econ 101, 1–19 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0133-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0133-4