Abstract
A highly integrated area like the EMU features a large amount of interactions between the participating countries. In this context the interactions of monetary and fiscal policies are a crucial issue. This paper focuses on how coalitions among policymakers are formed and discusses their effects on the stabilization of output and price. We emphasize the role played by the institutional design of “cooperation forums” (as, e.g., the ECOFIN). If the coalition formation game is played without communication among the policymakers, full cooperation is an unlikely outcome. On the other hand, if policymakers can communicate, full cooperation becomes a possible equilibrium, while the complete non-cooperative solution is, in general, not a stable equilibrium. This supports the view that institutions for discussions can play a crucial role in achieving international cooperation even when these institutions are not endowed with enforcement powers.
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revised version received August 1, 2003
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van Aarle, B., Bartolomeo, G., Engwerda, J. et al. Policymakers’ Coalitions and Stabilization Policies in the EMU. JEcon 82, 1–24 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-003-0032-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-003-0032-z