Abstract.
We consider a cooperative model of bargaining where the location of the disagreement point may be uncertain. Based on the maximin criterion, we formulate an ex ante efficiency condition and characterize the class of bargaining solutions satisfying this axiom. These solutions are generalizations of the monotone path solutions. Adding individual rationality yields a subclass of these solutions. By employing maximin efficiency and an invariance property that implies individual rationality, a new axiomatization of the monotone path solutions is obtained. Furthermore, we examine the consequences of employing efficiency axioms based on alternative decision criteria.
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Received: 17 March 2000/Accepted: 15 January 2001
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Bossert, W., Peters, H. Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 489–502 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100124
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100124